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In the first chapter, I explore the problem of optimal contracting un-
der delegation of information acquisition. I study a model where equity-
holders of a fund delegate their portfolio allocation to a fund manager in
an environment where: i) the expected return of the implemented portfolio
depends on the ex-ante unknown future price of an asset, ii) the manager
can acquire costly information about the future price, and iii) information
acquisition is unobservable and unverifiable. I characterize the optimal
contract which incentivizes the manager to obtain information and take
the profit-maximizing position based on the available information. I show
that the optimal contract implies a premium for positions against the pub-
licly available information: a long position when an asset is considered
overvalued, and vice versa. This premium leads the manager to adopt
contrarian positions more often than the first best. I argue that this ‘bias
against the flow’ is supported by empirical evidence.
In the second chapter, I explore the impact of Credit Rating Agen-
cies (CRAs) on capital markets. I argue that the source for potential ineffi-
ciencies arising from CRAs might be more pathological than the literature
xii
recognizes; even in the absence of conflicts of interest or other distortions
resulting from players’ behavior, a CRA might have an adverse effect on
critical economics variables. I develop a model of investment financing
which, similarly to capital markets, is characterized by information asym-
metry and lack of commitment. In the benchmark setting, the CRA is
capable of perfect monitoring and reveals its private information truth-
fully and without cost. I explore the impact of such an “ideal” CRA on
the interest rate and the probabilities of project financing and default. I
find that introducing such a CRA may lead to under-financing of projects
with a positive net present value (NPV) that would otherwise be financed;
a higher expected interest rate; and a higher expected probability of de-
fault. These findings relate to the feedback effect, which is inherent in
capital markets, and its asymmetric impact on firms of different quality. I
evaluate the policy of restricting CRAs to provide hard evidence with their
ratings, and suggest that it might have an unfavorable effect on the proba-
bilities of project financing and default.
In the third chapter, I explore the problem of security design with
endogenous implementation choice. I study an economy where an en-
trepreneur raises capital to finance an investment project. My focus is on
an environment where the entrepreneur shares the same characteristics as
the representative entrepreneur in crowdfunding platforms: i) there is no
record regarding her ability, ii) she might be associated with a negative-
NPV project, and iii) she has limited liability. Asymmetric information re-
garding the entrepreneur’s ability between the entrepreneur and potential
investors gives rise to a signaling game when the former issues securities to
xiii
raise capital. I characterize the optimal security, and show that it is always
optimal to reward the non-implementation of the project after financing
takes place. I show that compared to a case where the entrepreneur is
obliged to implement the project after raising capital, endogenizing the
project implementation choice: i) prevents market breakdown, ii) leads to
a more efficient allocation of resources, and iii) strengthens the incentive of
an entrepreneur to invest in her productivity.
xiv
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The ‘standard’ principal-agent models focus on the problem of incentiviz-
ing an agent to take a particular action, which is in the principal’s best
interest.1 This action usually includes exerting effort or not diverting re-
sources from the company. There are many situations, however, in which
the action which is in the principal’s best interest is ex-ante unknown, i.e., it
depends on the ex-ante unknown state of the world. One example is when
equity holders delegate their portfolio allocation to a manager, where a
long (short) position is profit-maximizing only if the ex-ante unknown fu-
ture price falls (increases). Other examples include product design, mar-
keting orientation, and the rating process by credit rating agencies.2 The
1Seminal papers include Harris and Raviv (1978) and Hölmstrom (1979).
2In the product design problem, allocating company’s resources to the production of
a new product is a profit-maximizing action as long as it succeeds in accommodating
1
aim of this paper is to address the following question: how could a prin-
cipal incentivize an agent to take a profit-maximizing action when neither
he nor the agent knows ex-ante what the profit-maximizing action is?
The answer is straightforward. The principal should incentivize the
agent to collect information regarding the state of the world, and subse-
quently take the profit-maximizing action, based on the available infor-
mation. However, a problem which arises naturally in this environment
is that information acquisition is costly, and in many cases, unobserved by
the principal.3 Consequently, the only way to motivate the agent to acquire
information is through a contract contingent on the implemented action.
Nevertheless, this contract – apart from affecting the agent’s incentives to
acquire information – also affects his implemented action after the informa-
tion is obtained. This results in a trade-off between the cost of incentivizing
information acquisition and the benefit of using the obtained information
effectively. The key contribution of this paper is to show that the incentive
scheme which optimally solves this trade-off, should reward contrarian ac-
tions, which subsequently leads an agent to adopt these actions more often
than the first best.
We develop a model in which: i) a profit-maximizer principal dele-
gates a binary action to a utility-maximizer expert, ii) the expected return
of the implemented action depends on the ex-ante unknown binary state
the ex-ante unknown consumer’ preference. Similarly, in the market orientation problem,
adopting a new marketing technique over a conventional one is a profit-maximizing action
as long as its ex-ante unknown productivity exceeds the productivity of the conventional
technique. Finally, in the rating process, a bad rating over a good rating is a profit-
maximizing action as long as the company defaults.
3This characteristic relates to the nature of the delegation problem – the principal, as
opposed to the agent – has expertise in inferring the unknown state of the world. Thus,
the principal unaware of the evidence the agent needs to collect to infer the unknown
state of the world, and how costly it is for the agent to collect these evidence.
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of the world, iii) the expert can acquire costly information about the state
of the world, and iv) the action of information acquisition is not observable
to the principal. In the benchmark model, the principal is a representative
equity holder of a fund, and the agent is a fund manager. The action set
consists of a short and a long position. Finally, the state of the world refers
to the future price of the asset.
We differ from the conventional principal-agent setup in two dimen-
sions. First, neither the principal nor the agent knows ex-ante the profit
maximizing action. Second, we allow for an environment where neither
the action of learning nor the learning outcome are observable to the prin-
cipal. As a result, the compensation contract affects both the manager’s
incentives to acquire information and his investment decision after the in-
formation is obtained. Thus, the derivation of the optimal compensation
contract consists of two parts: i) the characterization of the most cost-
efficient contract which implements a given investment decision, and ii)
the characterization of the investment decision which maximizes the eq-
uity holder’s profit.
The first set of findings relates to the optimal compensation con-
tract. We show that the promised payment is positive only: i) when the
manager goes long, and the price eventually increases, and ii) when the
manager goes short, and the price eventually decreases. In all other cases,
the payment is zero. Besides, when the prior beliefs indicate that the asset
is overvalued, the payment which corresponds to the long position exceeds
the payment which corresponds to the short position, and vice versa. This
premium leads to over-investment against the flow: when the asset is consid-
ered undervalued, a short position is implemented more often than the first
3
best, and the other way around. The bias against the flow is consistent with
the empirical evidence on the behavior of financial analysts, whose prob-
lem is similarly to this setting: they need obtain private information before
taking an observable action (issuing a forecast). For instance, Bernhardt
and Kutsoati (2001) provide evidence that analysts issue biased contrarian
forecasts. Similar evidence is provided by Pierdzioch et al. (2013), Laster
et al. (1997), and Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996).
The second set of findings relates to the consequences of the op-
timal compensation contract on the informational role of the investment
decision. We show that the informational role of a given position differs
depending on whether prior beliefs indicate that the asset is overvalued
or undervalued. In particular, we find that when an asset is considered
overvalued, the conditional probability that the asset price will drop, given
a short position, exceeds the corresponding probability when there is no
agency problem. In other words, a short position is a weak indicator that
the asset price will eventually drop. This finding relates to the result that a
short position might be driven by the premium of the corresponding pay-
ment, rather than the manager’s belief that the price will fall. Following a
similar logic, a long position is a strong indicator that the asset price will
eventually increase. This finding relates to the result that the manager is
willing to forgo the premium a short position entails, only if he is very
confident that the price will increase. The opposite findings hold when
the asset is considered undervalued. The previous mechanism could pro-
vide a theoretical foundation for the empirical evidence which indicates
that investors over-react and/or under-react to financial analysts’ forecasts
(Elgers et al., 2001, Elliot et al., 1995, Elliot et al., 1995, Mendenhall, 1991,
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Sloan, 1996). The rationale is that similar to the forecasts of financial ana-
lysts, the investment position of the manager is informative about his pri-
vate information, and thus can be used by market participants to infer the
future price of the asset. Our model predicts that rational investors should
under-react when a manager takes a contrarian position, and over-react
otherwise.
The bias against the flow is a key finding, which plays a critical role
in the implications of the optimal contract. The intuition behind this bias
relies on the interaction of unobservable information acquisition and the
multi-tasking nature of the problem. In order to incentivize the agent to
acquire information, the principal should promise a positive payment only
if the (ex-post) revenue-maximizing position is implemented. However,
the compensation contract also affects the manager’s investment decision,
which in turn, determines the portfolio’s expected revenue. In this envi-
ronment, the portfolio’s revenue is maximized when the payments which
correspond to a short and a long position are equal. For equal payments,
the outside option of the manager is to follow the flow without acquir-
ing information, which under the optimal contract, equals the manager’s
utility when information is obtained. The principal can thus worsen the
manager’s outside option by lowering the payment when the flow is fol-
lowed. Worsening the outside option of the manager enables the principal
to incentivize information acquisition at a lower cost. However, changing
the ratio of payments comes at the cost of decreasing the portfolio’s ex-
pected revenue; for a ratio of payments different than one, the first best
is no longer implemented. The optimal contract thus solves the inher-
ent trade-off between the cost of incentivizing learning and the benefit of
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implementing an investment decision as close as possible to the revenue-
maximizing one. This trade-off lies at the heart of our paper. We show that
for small deviations from the first best, the decrease in the expected cost is
greater than the decrease in the expected revenue.
In Appendix A.1 and A.2, we explore two extensions of the bench-
mark setting. Appendix A.1 analyzes the case where the state of the world
is imperfectly observed. Appendix A.2 examines the case where equity
holders allocate the tasks of information acquisition and portfolio alloca-
tion to two different individuals. We show that the optimal contract in
these cases has the same features as the optimal contract in the benchmark
setting, and the main finding of over-investment against the flow remains.
In Section 6 we discuss four alternative environments which share
the same characteristics as the benchmark setting (delegation, uncertainty
about the state of the world and unobservable information acquisition),
and provide the main implications of the optimal contract in each setting.
First, in a different portfolio allocation problem, where a fund manager
invests in a risky or a safe asset, we argue that the optimal contract leads
to under-investment or over-investment in the risky asset, depending on
the prior beliefs. Second, in a product design problem, we argue that
the optimal contract leads to product features which are more likely to
fail to accommodate future demand compared to the first best. Third, we
consider the rating process used by credit rating agencies, and claim that
the optimal contract implies more frequent bad ratings than the first best
when the market is optimistic about the company’ creditworthiness, and
vice versa. This finding could support extreme prior beliefs about a com-
pany’s creditworthiness. Finally, in an environment where the principal
6
aims to motivate innovation, we claim that, depending on market beliefs,
the optimal contract can capture both the under-implementation and over-
implementation of innovative strategies.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the
related literature. Section 1.3 describes the benchmark model. Section 1.4
characterizes the optimal compensation contract. Section 1.5 explores the
implications of the optimal compensation contract. Section 1.6 discusses
alternative applications and concludes. Appendix A.1 extends the model
to the case where the state of the world is imperfectly revealed. Appendix
A.2 explores the case where the principal allocates the tasks of information
acquisition and portfolio allocation to different individuals.
1.2 Related Literature
This work pertains mainly to two strands of the literature. First, the liter-
ature which explores the problem of optimal contracting under delegation
of information acquisition, and second, the literature which highlights the
resulting distortion of information asymmetries in investment decisions
and financial analysts’ reports. Also, regarding its main implications, this
paper relates to the literature which highlights the optimality of relative
performance pay, and the literature which recognizes the emergence of
potential distortions under multi-tasking.
1.2.1 Contracting and Information Acquisition
Similarly to our model, Inderst and Ottaviani (2009), Lewis and Sapping-
ton (1997), Gromb and Martimort (2007), Lambert (1986), and Chade and
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Kovrijnykh (2016) explore the optimal contracting problem in a setting
where a principal delegates information acquisition to an agent.
Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) consider a setup where a principal del-
egates a purchase recommendation to a seller representative. We differ
from Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) because the principal can never observe
whether the agent actually acquired information. This is a key departure,
which critically affects not only the optimal compensation contract but
also its main implications. Lewis and Sappington (1997) consider a setup,
where an agent is optimally incentivized to acquire information about the
state of the world, before choosing an unobservable level of cost-reducing
effort. A critical difference from this paper is that, in our setting, the ac-
tion that the principal prefers the agent to implement is state-dependent.
This characteristic is responsible for an inherent trade-off between the cost
of incentivizing information acquisition, and the benefit of implementing a
decision as close as possible to the revenue-maximizing one. This trade-off,
in turn, results in bias in the investment decision. In addition, as opposed
to Lewis and Sappington (1997), allocating the tasks to two different agents,
does not make the principal better-off.
The papers which consider environments which are closer to ours is
Lambert (1986) and Gromb and Martimort (2007). Gromb and Martimort
(2007) characterize the most cost-efficient contract of incentivizing an ana-
lyst – first, to acquire a costly binary signal about a project’s quality, and
second, to truthfully reveal the signal realization. We differ from Gromb
and Martimort (2007) because our setup gives rise to the aforementioned
trade-off, which results in the bias in the investment decision. Such trade-
off, thus, bias does not appear in Gromb and Martimort (2007).
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Lambert (1986) explores the optimal compensation contract which
incentivizes the manager to obtain information before deciding to invest
in a risky or a safe asset. As opposed to Lambert (1986), we are able to
formally characterize a simple condition which determines the direction
of the bias compared to the first best. This condition is whether the prior
beliefs about the state being good exceed one-half. The simplicity of this
condition allows us to generate testable implications about the informa-
tional role of investment decisions, and perform a series of comparative
statics. Also, we explore a more general setup than Lambert (1986) by fo-
cusing on information acquisition regarding the realized state of the world,
rather than a particular action. Hence, our setup could be used to explore
alternative environments, like the ones we discuss in Section 1.6.
A recent paper which allows for delegation of information acquisi-
tion is Chade and Kovrijnykh (2016). The main focus of the two papers
differ; in our paper, we focus on the investment decision, whereas Chade
and Kovrijnykh (2016) focus on the quality of information available. An-
other critical difference is that in Chade and Kovrijnykh (2016) the signal
realization (but not its precision) is observed by all parties, and the agents
cannot misreport it. In contrast, we explore a setup where the principal
cannot observe the realized signal, and as a result, the contract cannot be
contingent on that.
The literature on delegation also includes, among others, Demski
and Sappington (1987), Garicano and Santos (2001), Malcomson (2009),
Szalay (2005), Eso˝ and Szentes (2007).
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1.2.2 Information asymmetry, investment decision and an-
alysts reports
This work also relates to the literature which recognizes that informa-
tion asymmetry might distort manager’s investment decision or finan-
cial analysts’ forecasts. This strand of the literature, which starts with
the seminal work of Scharfstein and Stein (1990), and it includes Otta-
viani and Sørensen (2006), Zwiebel (1995), and Levy (2004), highlights the
impact of publicly available information on financial decisions. In par-
ticular, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006)
provide models which give rise to managers mimicking the decisions of
other managers (herding behavior), whereas, Zwiebel (1995), and Levy
(2004) develop models where anti-herding behavior in the analysts’ fore-
casts arises. The existing empirical evidence on the emergence of herding
or anti-herding behavior is conflicting. For instance, Trueman (1990) pro-
vides evidence which indicates herding behavior. In contrast, Bernhardt
and Kutsoati (2001) finds strong evidence that support anti-herding behav-
ior. This finding is supported by Laster et al. (1997), Ehrbeck and Wald-
mann (1996), and Pierdzioch et al. (2013). More recently, Guerrieri and
Kondor (2009) explores a setup where manager’s career concerns can dis-
tort his investment decisions, which, in turn, magnify asset prices volatil-
ity, even in the absence of strategic complementaries among managers. In
these papers, the main mechanism which leads to distortion compared to
the first best is the agent’s career concerns; the manager (analyst) uses his
investment decision (forecast) as an instrument to signal his type, rather
than to maximize the principal’s profits.
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We differ from this literature in three important directions. First, we
are interested in the optimal compensation of an agent, a topic that is not
examined in the previous papers. Second, we explore a different source of
asymmetry, by recognizing that assuming that agents are endowed with a
private signal is a significant shortcoming. In practice, the evaluation of a
financial decision by a manager, or the forecasting of an asset’s price by an
analyst, involves a series of costly actions, such as collecting and evaluating
information regarding industry competition, the economic climate, poten-
tial changes in regulation, etc. Thus, we are interested in exploring not only
how to incentivize a manager to take a decision, or an analyst to disclose
his private information truthfully, but also how to optimally incentivize the
agent to acquire costly information before the action is taken. In terms of
the model, the source of information asymmetry differs; our environment
is not characterized by information asymmetry regarding the type (ability)
of the manager, but by ex-ante moral hazard (information acquisition is a
hidden action) and ex-post asymmetric information (the signal realization
is the agent’s private information). Hence, the mechanism that gives rise
to the bias differs; the bias is a consequence of the principal’s motive to
optimally solve the trade-off between the cost of incentivizing information
acquisition, and the benefit of implementing an action as close as possible
to the portfolio’s revenue-maximizing one.
1.2.3 Optimality of relative performance pay
An implication of our analysis is that under the optimal contract, both
the agent’s compensation and the bias in the agent’s decision depend on
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the prior beliefs. Since we do not impose any restriction on how prior
beliefs are formed, our setup can allow for the case where prior beliefs
capture actions of other agents, as long as these actions uncover some in-
formation about the state of the world. Based on this remark, our work
relates to Hölmstrom (1979) , Holmstrom (1982), Lazear and Rosen (1979),
McConnell et al. (1982) which highlight the benefit of evaluating agents
on the basis of their relative performances in environments where agents’
performance is affected by common shocks.
We differ from this literature in two directions. First, our setup ex-
plores the case where before taking a decision, the agent observes the ac-
tions of other agents. Hence, as opposed to Hölmstrom (1979), we allow for
the agent to contingent his decision on other agents’ actions. The second
variation refers to the benefit of relative pay. In our model, the benefit of
a relative pay comes from worsening the agent’s outside option of not ac-
quiring information, whereas in Hölmstrom (1979) the benefit stems from
the fact that relative performance is a more informative indicator about
whether an unobservable action is taken.
1.2.4 Contracting under multi-tasking
Finally, this paper pertains on the literature which highlights the misallo-
cation consequences of the optimal contract. For instance, Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991) explore a principal-agent model, where an agent allocates
his effort across multiple tasks, and the principal observes a performance
measure for each of these tasks. The nature of this multi-tasking problem
differs from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). In our setup, multi-tasking
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emerges endogenously: the principal is only interested in information ac-
quisition to the extent that it improves the information set, based on which
the agent takes an action. In our paper, multi-taking arises endogenously.
Inderst and Ottaviani (2009), and Lambert (1986) also find a resulting bias
in one of the tasks. Also, Athey and Roberts (2001) point out that motivat-
ing effort in an efficient way may not necessarily coincide with incentiviz-
ing the agent to take the right investment choices.
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1.3 Benchmark Model
Environment: We consider a setting with two risk neutral players: a repre-
sentative equity holder of a fund (principal) and a fund manager (agent).
The equity holder delegates an investment decision, denoted by d, to the
fund manager. The investment decision consists of two options: buying
a given asset (“going long”, d = L) or short-selling a given asset (“going
short”, d = S).
The expected return of each position depends on the expected price
movement of the asset, Pθ1 − P0, which in turn, depends on the ex-ante un-
known quality (state of the world) of the asset, denoted by θ. The manager
and the equity holder share common prior beliefs about the quality of the
asset. In particular, they expect the asset to be of good quality (θ = G), with
probability p, and of bad quality (θ = B), with probability 1− p. Following
the binary nature of the quality, the value of p incorporates any publicly
available information regarding the asset’s quality.4
We assume that if the asset is of good quality, its price is expected
to increase to PG1 = P0 + e, whereas if the asset is of bad quality, its price
is expected to decrease to PB1 = P0 − e. This assumption captures the idea
that the asset price moves towards its fundamental value.
Information Acquisition Technology: Before the investment decision is
taken, the manager can acquire a signal about the quality of the asset. The
manager’s private information consists of the signal realization and signal
4The publicly available information, which is captured by p, can include analyst’s
forecasts, decisions of other managers, and credit ratings. We do not impose any structure
on how these beliefs are formed.
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acquisition, the latter of which incurs a cost c.5 This cost can be interpreted
a utility loss due to effort of acquiring a signal. Conditional on acquiring
information, the manager receives a noisy signal s ∈ [0, 1] about the quality
of the asset. The signal s is distributed according to a continuous density
function fθ(.), with a distribution function Fθ(.), where θ = {B, G}. Hence,
for a signal realization s′, the following hold:
fθ(s′) ≡ Pr(s = s′|θ)
Fθ(s′) ≡ Pr(s ≤ s′|θ)
After observing the signal realization s′, the manager updates his beliefs as
follows:
Pr(θ = G|s = s′) = fG(s
′)p
fG(s′)p + fB(s′)(1− p) = 1− Pr(θ = B|s = s
′)
Assumption 1: Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP)
For any signal realization s′ ∈ [0, 1], the ratio fG(s′)fB(s′) is increasing in s
′.
A direct consequence of Assumption 1 is that the probability that the asset
is of good quality is increasing in the signal realization. In addition, given
that fG(s) and fB(s) represent probability density functions, Assumption 1
implies that fG(s) and fB(s) satisfy the single-crossing condition.
5This characteristic relates to the nature of the delegation problem – the manager, as
opposed to the equity holder – has expertise in inferring the unknown state of the world.
Thus, the equity holder is unaware of the evidence the agent needs to collect to infer the
unknown state of the world, and how costly it is for the manager to collect these evidence.
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Preferences and Actions: The equity holder designs the manager’s com-
pensation contract, which is denoted by Wˆ and specified below, in order to
maximize his expected profits:
EΠ = E[R|Wˆ]−E[C|Wˆ] (1.1)
where E[R|Wˆ] stands for the expected revenue of the portfolio, whereas
E[C|Wˆ] stands for the manager’s expected compensation, given a contract
Wˆ. Note that the compensation contract affects the expected portfolio re-
turn, ER, through the investment decision of the manager.
The manager faces two kinds of decisions: the information acquisi-
tion decision, and the decision to go short or long. The objective of the
manager is to maximize his expected utility:
EV = E[C|Wˆ]− 1c (1.2)
where 1 equals 1 if information is acquired, and zero otherwise.
Set of available contracts: We allow for contracts contingent on the im-
plemented position, d, and the state realization, θ, i.e., Wˆ : d × θ 7→ R+,
where d = {S, L} and θ = {B, G}. Thus, the contract is characterized by
the following quadruple:
Wˆ = {wSG, wSB, wLG, wLB}
where wSG (wSB) denotes the payment when the manager goes short and
the asset quality is revealed to be good (bad). Likewise, wLG (wLB) denotes
16
the payment when the manager goes long, and the quality is revealed to
be good (bad). For the sake of tractability, we assume that the agent is
protected by limited liability, i.e., payment wd,θ is non-negative. In section
1.4.2, however, we show that the limited liability assumption can be relaxed
without affecting the main findings qualitatively.
In Appendix A.1, we explore the case where it is not feasible for the
principal to offer contracts contingent on the realized state of the world.
We show that, as long as there is a public signal, which is revealed af-
ter the decision is taken and it is informative about the actual state of the
world, the main findings go through. Besides, in Appendix A.2, we allow
for contracts contingent on: i) messages sent by the manager to the equity
holder, and ii) the realized state of the world. We show that the optimal
contract is effectively the same, independently of whether it is contingent
on the implemented position or the agent’s messages.
Timing: The sequence of events is the following:
1. The equity holder offers a compensation contract Wˆ.
2. The manager decides whether to acquire information.
3. If information is obtained, the manager observes the signal realiza-
tion.
4. The manager chooses the implemented position.
5. The state is realized, and the contract is executed.
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1.4 Optimal Compensation Contract
In this section, we characterize the optimal compensation contract. Given
that information acquisition is unobservable, the only way to motivate the
manager to acquire information is through a contract contingent on the
implemented position. As a result, the compensation contract affects both,
the manager’s incentives to acquire information, and his investment deci-
sion after the information is obtained. Thus, the derivation of the optimal
compensation contract consists of two parts: i) the characterization of the
most cost-efficient contract which implements a given investment decision,
and ii) the characterization of the investment decision which maximizes
the principal’s profit.
Our analysis highlights the inherent trade-off between the cost of
incentivizing information acquisition, and the benefit of implementing an
investment decision as close as possible to the revenue-maximizing one.
The goal of this section is to show that the contract which optimally solves
this trade-off gives rise to over-investment against the flow. In other words,
the manager takes the opposite position to the one that the equity holder
would take, had he not hired a manager, more often than the first best.
Characterization of the optimal compensation contract
The derivation of the optimal contract can be analyzed in 4 steps:
1. Characterization of the investment decision rule, DR : s 7→ d, which
maximizes equity holder’s profits, given any compensation contract.
2. Characterization of the contract which minimizes the expected com-
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pensation of the manager, subject to the constraint that a given deci-
sion rule DR is implemented. This step effectively derives the equity
holder’s expected cost of implementing a decision rule DR, which
we denote as EC(DR).
3. Derivation of the expected portfolio revenue of implementing a deci-
sion rule DR, ER(DR).
4. Characterization of the optimal decision rule DR∗, i.e., the deci-
sion rule DR which maximizes profits, EΠ(DR) = ER(DR) −
EC(DR).
Thus, the optimal compensation contract is the constrained-optimal com-
pensation contract of step 2, subject to the constraint that DR ≡ DR∗,
where DR∗ is characterized in step 4.
1.4.1 Step 1: Investment Decision Rule DR
In this step, we take the contract as given, as we are interested in finding
the mapping from the signal realization to the position, i.e. DR : s 7→ d,
which maximizes principal’s profits. We show in Lemma 1 that, indepen-
dently of the compensation contract, the principal’s preference regarding
the agent’s position are characterized by a monotonic relation.
Lemma 1: If the equity holder prefers the manager to go long for s = s′, then
he also prefers the manager to go long for any s > s′. Likewise, if a short posi-
tion is preferred for s = s′, then this also holds true for any s < s′. Also, for
any compensation contract which incentivizes the manager to acquire information
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there always exists a unique s, denoted by sˆ, where the equity holder is indifferent
between the manager going short or long.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Lemma 1 is an implication of the MLRP, according to which the higher the
signal realization, the higher the probability that going long is the profit-
maximizing position. A direct consequence of Lemma 1 is that the decision
rule is characterized by a threshold sˆ, such as:
DR =

long if s > sˆ
short if s < sˆ
i.e., the principal aims to implement a decision rule, where the agent goes
long when the signal realization is high enough (greater than sˆ) and goes
short otherwise. Hence, a particular decision rule corresponds to a partic-
ular threshold sˆ, and vice versa.
1.4.2 Step 2: Constrained-optimal compensation contract
that implements cut-off sˆ
The aim of this sub-section is to characterize the constrained-optimal com-
pensation contract, i.e., the compensation contract which minimizes the
expected compensation of the manager, subject to the constraint that cut-
off sˆ is implemented. We focus on the case where the equity holder finds it
optimal to incentivize the manager to acquire information. In section 1.4.7,
we characterize the conditions when incentivizing information acquisition
is optimal.
20
Suppose that the equity holder designs a compensation contract
such as the manager acquires information, and then implements sˆ. Then,
the optimal contract should satisfy two sets of constraints. First, the man-
ager should prefer acquiring to not acquiring a signal, and second, given
that a signal is obtained, the manager should prefer implementing sˆ, to any
other mapping from the signal realization to the implemented position.
Constraints for implementing DR
Implementing sˆ implies that the following two sets of constraints should
be satisfied. The first set of constraints guarantees that the manager prefers
going long for any s′ ∈ [sˆ, 1].
EV[long|s′] ≥ EV[short|s′] =⇒
Pr(G|s′)[wLG − wSG] ≥ Pr(B|s′)[wSB − wLB].
The second set of constraints guarantees that the manager prefers going
short for any s′′ ∈ [0, sˆ].
EV[long|s′′] ≤ EV[short|s′′] =⇒
Pr(G|s′′)[wLG − wSG] ≤ Pr(B|s′′)[wSB − wLB].
Given that Pr(G|sˆ) is increasing in sˆ, the previous constraints are not mu-
tually exclusive as long as:
wLG − wSG ≥ 0 (1.3)
wSB − wLB ≥ 0. (1.4)
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In other words, during both states of the world, the payment which cor-
responds to the revenue-maximizing position should not be lower than
the payment which corresponds to the opposite position. As long as (1.3)
and (1.4) hold, the previous two sets of constraints pin down to a single
constraint:
Pr(G|sˆ)[wLG − wSG] = Pr(B|sˆ)[wSB − wLB]. (1.5)
Constraint (1.5) implies that for s = sˆ, the manager is indifferent between
going long and going short. We assume, without loss of generality, that if
the manager is indifferent, he goes short.
Information acquisition constraints
Relation (1.6) provides the manager’s expected utility under his outside
option of taking an investment position without acquiring information.
EV[not signal] = max{EV[no signal + long],EV[no signal + short]}
(1.6)
where the expected utility of each position is given by:
EV[no signal + long] = p× wLG + (1− p)× wLB
EV[no signal + short] = p× wSG + (1− p)× wSB.
Note that the manager has no private information, thus, his expectations
about the quality of the asset coincide with his prior.
We now derive the manager’s expected utility when acquiring infor-
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mation. In the derivation of the expected utility, the manager takes into
account the decision rule that he anticipates to follow after the signal is
obtained, i.e., going long for signals s > sˆ and going short otherwise. The
expected utility equals the expected compensation reduced by the cost of
acquiring information, c:
EV[signal|sˆ] = −c +
∫ sˆ
0
EC[short|s] f (s)ds +
∫ 1
sˆ
EC[long|s] f (s)ds (1.7)
where f (s) = p fG(s) + (1 − p) fB(s), and the expected compensation of
each position is given by:
EC[long|s] = Pr(G|s)× wLG + Pr(B|s)× wLB (1.8)
EC[short|s] = Pr(G|s)× wSG + Pr(B|s)× wSB. (1.9)
By substituting of (1.8) and (1.9) into (1.7), and applying Bayes rule, we
obtain:
EV[signal|sˆ] = −c+
pFG(sˆ)wSG + (1− p)FB(sˆ)wSB + p(1− FG(sˆ))wLG + (1− p)(1− FB(sˆ))wLB
(1.10)
Hence, the information acquisition constraints pin down to:
EV[signal|sˆ] ≥ EV[no signal + long] =⇒
pFG(sˆ)(wSG − wLG) + (1− p)FB(sˆ)(wSB − wLB) ≥ c (1.11)
EV[signal|sˆ] ≥ EV[no signal + short] =⇒
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p(1− FG(sˆ))(wLG − wSG) + (1− p)(1− FB(sˆ))(wLB − wSB) ≥ c. (1.12)
Cost Minimization Problem
Following the previous analysis, the cost minimization problem of incen-
tivizing information acquisition, given a decision rule which is character-




pFG(sˆ)(wSG − wLG) + (1− p)FB(sˆ)(wSB − wLB) ≥ c (1.11)
p(1− FG(sˆ))(wLG − wSG) + (1− p)(1− FB(sˆ))(wLB − wSB) ≥ c (1.12)
fG(sˆ)p[wLG − wSG] = fB(sˆ)(1− p)[wSB − wLB] (1.13)
wLG − wSG ≥ 0 (1.14)
wSB − wLB ≥ 0 (1.15)
wSG ≥ 0, wSB ≥ 0, wLG ≥ 0, wLB ≥ 0 (1.16)
where EC(sˆ) is given by:
EC(sˆ) =
pFG(sˆ)wSG + (1− p)FB(sˆ)wSB + p(1− FG(sˆ))wLG + (1− p)(1− FB(sˆ))wLB
(1.17)
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal contract, subject to the constraint
that the investment decision threshold is sˆ.
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Proposition 1: Constrained Optimal Contract
For sˆ ≤ sˆmin the constrained optimal contract is given by:
w∗SB(sˆ) =
fG(sˆ)
(1− p)(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− FG(sˆ) fB(sˆ)) c
w∗LG(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)




For sˆ ≥ sˆmin the constrained optimal contract is given by:
w∗SB(sˆ) =
fG(sˆ)
(1− p)[(1− FG(sˆ)) fB(sˆ)− (1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ)] c
w∗LG(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)




where sˆmin solves fB(sˆmin) = fG(sˆmin).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The underlying intuition behind the constrained optimal contract relates
to three remarks.
1st Remark: Note that the incentive constraints in the minimization problem
are expressed in terms of the difference between the payment which cor-
responds to the revenue-maximizing position and the payment which cor-
responds to the opposite position, i.e., wSB −wLB, if the realized quality of
the asset is bad, and wLG −wSG, if the realized quality of the asset is good.
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Following this remark, it is easy to show that under the optimal contract,
the payment when the manager does not take the revenue-maximizing po-
sition is zero, i.e., w∗LB = w
∗
SG = 0. For w
∗
LB = 0, the intuition is the follow-
ing. By decreasing the payment which corresponds to the long (wLB) and
the short position (wSB) by the same amount, the equity holder decreases
the expected compensation of the manager without affecting the incentive
constraints. Such a deviation is feasible until wLB hits its low bound. Simi-
lar intuition applies for the optimality of w∗SG = 0.
2nd Remark: By relation (1.13), the relative pay wSB/wLG should be equal
to Pr(G|sˆ)/Pr(B|sˆ), which is determined by the choice of sˆ. Note that,
Pr(G|sˆ)/Pr(B|sˆ) is increasing in sˆ. The intuition behind this remark is that
as sˆ increases, the probability that the manager attributes to the asset being
of good quality for a signal realization s = sˆ, increases as well. Thus, the
relative payment that the manager requires to go short for s = sˆ, increases
with sˆ, in order to compensate for the low probability that this payment
will be realized.
3rd Remark: The last remark relates to the information acquisition con-
straints. It can be shown that if s < sˆmin, (1.12) becomes redundant, and
under the optimal contract, (1.11) binds. The opposite holds when s > sˆmin.
The intuition is the following. First, recall that the take-it-or-leave-it nature
of the contract implies that the manager’s utility when acquiring informa-
tion and implementing sˆ should be equal to his outside option. Suppose
now that the principal aims to implement a low value of sˆ. For this value of
sˆ, the manager attributes a high probability to the asset being bad, and, fol-
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lowing the second remark, requires a relatively high payment to go long,
wLG/wSB. For this ratio of payments, the manager’s utility when going
long without acquiring information exceeds his utility when going short
without acquiring information. Hence (1.11) is more restrictive than (1.12).
Relaxing Limited Liability
It is worth highlighting that relaxing the agent’s limited liability assump-
tion would not affect qualitatively the optimal contract. This is captured
by the first remark. Hence, if the agent has an initial wealth of w¯, and
w¯ is common knowledge, the payments of the optimal contract would
be: w′SG(sˆ) = −w¯, w′LB(sˆ) = −w¯, w′SB(sˆ) = w∗SB(sˆ) − w¯, and w′LG(sˆ) =
w∗LG(sˆ)− w¯.
The following lemma explores how the optimal payment w∗SB(sˆ) and w
∗
LG(sˆ)
relates to sˆ. Lemma 2 is critical for the relationship between the expected
compensation cost, EC(sˆ), and sˆ, which will in turn, allow us to shed light
on the characterization of the optimal value of sˆ. Figure 1.1 provides the
graphical illustration of w∗SB(sˆ) and w
∗
LG(sˆ) for p = 0.5, and for the case
where fG(s) = 2s, fB(s) = 2(1− s) (linear signal structure), with sˆ cap-
tured in the horizontal axis.
Lemma 2: Relationship between optimal payments and sˆ.
The optimal payments w∗SB(sˆ) and w
∗
LG(sˆ) are:
(i) decreasing in sˆ, for sˆ ≤ sˆmin
(ii) increasing in sˆ, for sˆ ≥ sˆmin.
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(iii) minimized for sˆmin such as fG(sˆmin) = fB(sˆmin).
(iv) convex in sˆ.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.







Figure 1.1. Relationship between optimal payments and sˆ.
Critical for the underlying mechanism in Lemma 2 is the role of the pay-
ments as opportunity cost. In fact, the opportunity cost of taking the
“wrong” position coincides with wLG, when the agent goes short and the
revenue-maximizing position is long. In contrast, when the agent goes
long and the revenue-maximizing position is short, the opportunity cost
coincides with wSB.
In order to capture the main mechanism, we explore the case where:
i) the equity holder considers switching from an optimal contract which
implements sˆ = sˆmin to an optimal contract which implements sˆ = sˆ′ >
sˆmin, and ii) p = 0.5. For this value of p, the ratio of payments wSB/wLG
that implements sˆmin equals one. Note that increasing sˆ leads to a higher
value of Pr(G|sˆ)Pr(B|sˆ) . Thus, by (1.13), the increase in sˆ should be accompanied by
an increase in the payment ratio wSBwLG . This implies that the equity holder,
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in order to prevent the manager from going long for s ∈ [sˆmin, sˆ′], should
increase wSB.6 However, the increase in wSB increases the manager’s utility
when going short without acquiring information, which now exceeds the
manager’s utility when acquiring information. Following that, the only
way the equity holder can prevent the manager from going short without
acquiring information is by increasing the opportunity cost of taking the
wrong position, which is achieved by increasing wLG. Hence, a deviation
from sˆ = sˆmin to sˆ = sˆ′ > sˆmin increases both wSB and wLG.7
The previous analysis refers to the part of Lemma 2 which explores
deviations to values of sˆ higher than sˆmin. Similar intuition applies for the
case where the principal considers switching from implementing sˆ = sˆmin
to implementing sˆ = sˆ′′ < sˆmin.
From the constrained-optimal to the optimal contract.
Recall that the optimal contract is defined by the optimal compensation
contract that implements a threshold sˆ = sˆ∗, where sˆ∗ is the value of sˆ
which maximizes the expected profit of the equity holder, EΠ(sˆ), with:
EΠ(sˆ) = ER(sˆ)−EC(sˆ). (1.18)
where EC(sˆ) denotes the expected compensation cost of implementing sˆ
(derived in subsection 1.4.3), and ER(sˆ) denotes the expected revenue of
implementing sˆ (derived in subsection 1.4.4).
6We show in Appendix a.3 that decreasing wLG instead of increasing wSB is not feasi-
ble, because this would contradict with the optimality of the initial contract which imple-
ments sˆ = sˆmin.
7The previous reasoning is only a pedagogical tool, which helps us capture the main
mechanism; the steps presented above take place simultaneously.
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1.4.3 Expected compensation cost of implementing sˆ, EC(sˆ).
The constrained optimal contract, provided in Proposition 1, enables us
to derive the expected cost of implementing sˆ, EC(sˆ), which equals the
manager’s expected compensation:
EC(sˆ) = (1− p)FB(sˆ)w∗SB(sˆ) + p(1− FG(sˆ))w∗LG(sˆ) (1.19)
Corollary 1: Expected cost of implementing sˆ, EC(sˆ)
For sˆ ≤ sˆmin, the expected cost is given by:
EC(sˆ) ≡ EC(sˆ)− =
[
FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ) + (1− FG(sˆ)) fB(sˆ)
FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− FG(sˆ) fB(sˆ)
]
c
For sˆ ≥ sˆmin, the expected cost is given by:
EC(sˆ) ≡ EC(sˆ)+ =
[
FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ) + (1− FG(sˆ)) fB(sˆ)
(1− FG(sˆ)) fB(sˆ)− (1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ)
]
c
Proof. Corollary 2 is derived after substituting the optimal payments of
Proposition 1 into (1.19).
The first remark derived from Corollary 1 is that the expected cost of im-
plementing sˆ is linearly dependent on the cost of acquiring information,
c. The second remark is that the expected cost of implementing a given
threshold sˆ does not depend on the prior beliefs, p - p is internalized by
the optimal payment. The last remark is about the behavior of EC(sˆ) with
respect to threshold sˆ, which is summarized in Lemma 3.
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Lemma 3: Relationship between EC(sˆ) and sˆ.
(i) For each sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin), EC(sˆ) is decreasing in sˆ.
(ii) For each sˆ ∈ (sˆmin, 1], EC(sˆ) is increasing in sˆ.
(iii) EC(sˆ) is minimized for sˆmin such as fG(sˆmin) = fB(sˆmin).
(iv) EC(sˆ) is convex in sˆ.
One can easily notice the similarity of Lemma 3 with Lemma 2 – the behav-
ior of EC(sˆ) with respect to sˆ follows a similar pattern with the behavior
of wSB(sˆ) and wLG(sˆ) with respect to sˆ. This relates to the following re-
mark. Under the optimal contract, the expected utility of the risk-neutral
agent when implementing sˆ: i) coincides with his expected compensation
reduced by the cost of acquiring information, c, and ii) equals his outside
option, which is given by:
EV(sˆ) = max{EV(no signal + long),EV(no signal + short)}
= max{p× w∗LG(sˆ), (1− p)× w∗SB(sˆ)}. (1.20)
Hence, following Proposition 1, the expected cost EC(sˆ) for sˆ < sˆmin
equals:
EC(sˆ) = p× w∗LG(sˆ) + c (1.21)
whereas, the expected cost EC(sˆ) for sˆ > sˆmin equals:
EC(sˆ) = (1− p)× w∗SB(sˆ) + c. (1.22)
Relations (1.21) and (1.22) capture the finding that EC(sˆ) behaves similarly
to the payment wLG(sˆ), for s < sˆmin, and similarly to the payment wSB(sˆ),
31
for s > sˆmin. Thus, the intuition behind the relation of EC(sˆ) with sˆ is
identical to the underlying intuition in Lemma 2. Figure 1.2 provides the
graphical illustration of EC(sˆ), for the case where fG(s) = 2s, fB(s) =
2(1− s) (linear signal structure), with sˆ captured in the horizontal axis.





Figure 1.2. Relationship between EC(sˆ) and sˆ.
1.4.4 Step 3: Expected revenue of implementing sˆ, ER(sˆ)
Suppose that the equity holder offers a contract which implements sˆ. When
he forms his beliefs about the expected revenue, he anticipates the manager
to go long when the signal is greater than sˆ, and to go short otherwise.




ER[short|s] f (s)ds +
∫ 1
sˆ
ER[long|s] f (s)ds (1.23)
where f (s) = p fG(s) + (1− p) fB(s). Also, the equity holder’s expected
revenue when the manager goes short or long, given a signal s, is given by:
ER[short|s] = P0 −E[P1|s] = e{−Pr(G|s) + Pr(B|s)} (1.24)
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ER[long|s] = −P0 +E[P1|s] = e{Pr(G|s)− Pr(B|s)} (1.25)
By substituting (1.24) and (1.25) into (1.23), and applying the Bayes rule,
we obtain:
ER(sˆ) = e{p(1− 2FG(sˆ)) + (1− p)(2FB(sˆ)− 1)} (1.26)
Lemma 4 provides the relationship between the expected revenue and the
implemented threshold sˆ. Figure 1.3 provides the graphical illustration of
ER(sˆ) for the case where fG(s) = 2s, fB(s) = 2(1− s) (linear signal struc-
ture), where sˆ is presented in the horizontal axis.
Lemma 4 Relationship between ER and sˆ.
(i) For each sˆ ∈ [0, sˆFB), ER(sˆ) is increasing and concave in sˆ.
(ii) For each sˆ ∈ (sˆFB, 1], ER(sˆ) is decreasing and concave in sˆ.







Proof. See Appendix A.3.
1st Remark: Given the symmetry of the problem, the equity holder prefers
the manager to go long when his updated beliefs are above 0.5, and to go
short otherwise. For a signal realization where the manager’s updated be-
liefs equal 0.5, the equity holder is indifferent. The signal realization which
leads to an updated belief of 0.5 solves (1.27). We show in the Appendix
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1.2 ER(sˆ, p = 0.5)
ER(sˆ, p = 0.2)
ER(sˆ, p = 0.8)
Figure 1.3. Relationship between ER(sˆ) and sˆ.
that the signal realization which solves (1.27) coincides with the threshold
that the equity holder would implement if there were no agency problem.
2nd Remark: The concavity of ER(sˆ) is an implication of the MLRP. Recall
that by applying Bayes rule, Pr(G|s)Pr(B|s) equals
fG(s)
fB(s)
× p1−p . Hence, the lower
the value of sˆ compared to sˆFB, the higher the expected distortion of going
long in the area s ∈ (sˆ, sˆFB), as it is the more likely that going short is the
revenue-maximizing position. Similar intuition applies for deviations to
sˆ > sˆFB.
3rd Remark: A clear implication of (1.27) is that the peak of ER(sˆ) moves
towards lower sˆ as the value of p increases. The intuition is straightforward;
the higher the prior belief p, the higher the prior probability that the equity
holder attributes to a long position being revenue-maximizing. Thus, for
high values of p, the equity holder prefers the manager to go long, unless
he receives strong evidence that going short is the revenue-maximizing
position, i.e., a very low signal. The opposite holds for low values of p.
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1.4.5 Step 4: Optimal threshold sˆ∗
The goal of this section is to characterize the optimal threshold sˆ∗, which
maximizes the expected profit of the equity holder, EΠ(sˆ), where,
EΠ(sˆ) = ER(sˆ)−EC(sˆ)












Thus, as long as p 6= 0.5, the value of sˆ which maximizes the expected
revenue, sˆFB, differs from the value which minimizes the expected cost,
sˆmin. As a result, the optimal value of sˆ relies on an inherent trade-off be-
tween minimizing the cost of incentivizing information acquisition, and
the benefit of implementing a threshold sˆ, which is as close as possible to
the revenue-maximizing threshold, sˆFB.
Optimality condition for sˆ.
The equity holder offers a contract that corresponds to a threshold sˆ which
optimally resolves this trade-off. Thus, for a threshold sˆ to be optimal, the
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Condition (1.30) captures the idea that for the optimal value of sˆ, denoted
by sˆ∗, the expected marginal revenue (∂ER(sˆ)/∂sˆ) should equal the ex-
pected marginal cost (∂EC(sˆ)/∂sˆ), where ER(sˆ) is defined in Lemma 4,
whereas EC(sˆ) is defined in Lemma 3.
1.4.6 Optimal compensation contract
The optimal compensation contract Wˆ∗(sˆ∗) is the constrained-optimal com-
pensation contract of Proposition 1, subject to the constraint that sˆ ≡ sˆ∗.
Proposition 2: Optimality Contract, Wˆ∗(sˆ∗)
If p ≥ 0.5, the optimal value of sˆ, sˆ∗ solves:
2e{−p fG(sˆ) + (1− p) fB(sˆ)} = c
FB(sˆ)[ f ′B(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ)]
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ) fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))2
(1.31)













If p ≤ 0.5, the optimal value of sˆ, sˆ∗ solves:
2e{−p fG(sˆ)+ (1− p) fB(sˆ)} = −c
( fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ)− f ′B(sˆ) fG(sˆ))(−1+ FG(sˆ))
[ fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ) fG(sˆ) + fB(sˆ)(−1+ FG(sˆ))]2
(1.32)












Proof. See Appendix A.3.
1.4.7 When is information acquisition profitable?
Recall that the previous analysis refers to the case where the equity holder
finds it optimal to incentivize the manager to acquire information. How-
ever, the equity holder has the option of offering a contract which does not
impose the manager to obtain information. If the manager does not hold
any private information, the equity holder would prefer the manager to
go long if the asset is considered undervalued (p > 0.5), and to go short
otherwise. We can show that the principal could implement this decision
rule by offering a contract, denoted as Wˆ ′, which pays an arbitrarily small
amount η˜ → 0, if the agent follows the aforementioned strategy, and zero
otherwise. Following this remark, Lemma 7 characterizes the condition




The equity holder finds it optimal to incentivize the manager to acquire information
as long as:
2e{(1− p)FB(sˆ∗)− pFG(sˆ∗)− 2p} ≥ FB(sˆ
∗) fG(sˆ∗) + (1− FG(sˆ∗)) fB(sˆ∗)
FB(sˆ∗) fG(sˆ∗)− FG(sˆ∗) fB(sˆ∗) c
(1.33)
2e{(1− p)FB(sˆ∗)− pFG(sˆ∗)− 2(1− p)} ≥
FB(sˆ∗) fG(sˆ∗) + (1− FG(sˆ∗)) fB(sˆ∗)
(1− FG(sˆ∗) fB(sˆ∗)− (1− FB(sˆ∗)) fG(sˆ∗) c (1.34)
where (1.33) ((1.34)) corresponds to the case where p > 0.5 (p < 0.5). Note
that 2e reflects the benefit of taking the “right” over the “wrong” position,
where “right” is the revenue-maximizing position.8 Note also that the term
in the curly brackets captures the expected increase in the probability of
taking the “right” position due to the signal acquisition. Thus, the LHS
captures the expected benefit of acquiring information, where the RHS is
nothing more than the expected compensation cost.
1.5 Implications of the Optimal Contract
In this section, we explore the main implications of the optimal contract.
We focus on the most interesting case where the equity holder aims to
incentivize the manager to acquire information.
8If the realized state is good and the manager goes long, equity holder’s net return
is PG1 − P0 = e. In contrast, if the manager goes short, equity holder’s net return is
−PG1 + P0 = −e. Likewise, if the realized state is bad and the manager goes short, equity
holder’s net return is −PB1 + P0 = e. In contrast, if the manager goes long, equity holder’s
net return is PB1 − P0 = −e. Thus, independently of the state of the world, the net benefit
of taking the right over the wrong position is 2e.
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1.5.1 Premium for going against the flow & bias in the in-
vestment decision
Proposition 3 explores the relation between the optimal payment when
the manager “goes against the flow” and the optimal payment when the
manager “follows the flow”. By “following the flow” we define the case
where the manager takes the same position as the position that the equity
holder would take, had he not hired the manager. In this setting, “going
against the flow” means going long when the asset is overvalued (p < 0.5)
and going short when the asset it undervalued (p > 0.5).
Proposition 3: Premium for going against the flow.
Under the optimal contract:
(i) If p > 0.5, then wSB(sˆ∗) > wLG(sˆ∗).
(ii) If p < 0.5, then wLG(sˆ∗) > wSB(sˆ∗).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Hence, under the optimal contract, there is a premium for going against
the flow. Proposition 4 explores how sˆ∗ relates to: i) the optimal value of sˆ
if there is no agency problem (first best), sˆFB, and ii) the value of sˆ which
minimizes the cost of incentivizing information acquisition, sˆmin.
Proposition 4: Bias in the investment decision.
Under the optimal contract:
(i) If p ≥ 0.5, then sˆFB < sˆ∗ ≤ sˆmin.
(ii) If p ≤ 0.5, then sˆFB > sˆ∗ ≥ sˆmin.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
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The proof of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 can be captured in the follow-
ing figures, which illustrates Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. Figure 1.4 presents
the case where p > 0.5. Note that for these values of p, an investment
threshold sˆ′ ∈ [0, sˆFB] cannot be optimal, because switching to sˆ′′ = sˆ′ + η,
where η is a small positive number, decreases the expected compensation
cost and increases the expected revenue. Likewise, an investment threshold
sˆ′ ∈ [sˆmin, 1] cannot be optimal, because switching to sˆ′′ = sˆ′ − η decreases
the expected compensation cost and increases the expected revenue. Thus,
for p > 0.5, sˆ∗ ∈ (sˆFB, sˆmin]. Similar intuition applies for the case where
p < 0.5, which is illustrated in Figure 1.5.





ER(sˆ, p > 0.5)
EC(sˆ)
Figure 1.4. Bias in the investment decision - Case where p > 0.5, Flow: long
Proposition 4 captures the key feature of the optimal contract: the man-
ager goes against the flow more often than the first best. Proposition 4
is a consequence of Proposition 3 and the MLRP property. The intuition
behind the premium and the bias for going against the flow relies on the
interaction of unobservable information acquisition and the multi-tasking
nature of the problem. In order to incentivize the manager to acquire in-
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ER(sˆ, p < 0.5)
EC(sˆ)
Figure 1.5. Bias in the investment decision - Case where p < 0.5, Flow: short
formation, the equity holder should promise a positive payment only if the
ex-post right position is taken. However, the compensation contract – apart
from affecting the incentive of the manager to acquire information – also
affects his investment decision, which in turn, determines the portfolio’s
expected revenue.
In this environment, the portfolio’s revenue is maximized when the
payments which correspond to a short and long position are equal. A
critical property is that under the optimal contract, the manager’s utility
should coincide with his outside option. For equal payments, the outside
option of the manager is to follow the flow without acquiring information.
The equity holder can thus worsen outside option of the manager by low-
ering the payment when the flow is followed. Worsening outside option of
the manager enables the principal to incentivize information acquisition at
a lower cost– however, changing the ratio of payments comes at the cost of
decreasing the portfolio’s expected revenue; for a ratio of payments differ-
ent than one, the first best is no longer implemented. The optimal contract
thus solves the inherent trade-off between the cost of incentivizing learning
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and benefit of implementing an investment decision as close as possible to
the revenue-maximizing one. We show that for small deviations from the
first best, the decrease in the expected cost is greater than the decrease in
the expected revenue.
Corollary 2 explores the main implications of the bias in the invest-
ment decision on: i) the probability of going short or long, ii) the prob-
ability that the implemented position is revenue-maximizing, and iii) the
beliefs about the state of the world, after the position is implemented.
Corollary 2: Implications of the Optimal Contract compared to First Best.
If p > 0.5 (p < 0.5) and compared to the case where there is no agency problem,
under the optimal contract:
(i) The manager is more (less) likely to go short.
(ii) Given that a short position is implemented, it is less (more) likely to be
revenue-maximizing.
(iii) Given that a long position is implemented, it is more (less) likely to be
revenue-maximizing.
(iv) Given the implemented position, the beliefs about the asset being good are
higher (lower).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Part one implies that compared to the first best, it is less likely that
the manager will invest in an asset where prior beliefs indicate that it is
undervalued. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 4. The intu-
ition behind part two is that under the optimal contract and for p > 0.5,
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the manager is tempted by the premium to go short, even for signal re-
alizations where he believes that it is more likely that going long is the
revenue-maximizing position. Thus, for p > 0.5 and conditional on going
short, the probability of going short being the right position is lower than
in the case where the first best threshold is implemented. The intuition
behind part three is similar: the manager is willing to go long and forgo
the premium of the short position, only if he holds strong evidence that
the price will increase. Part four is a direct consequence of part two and
three.
1.5.2 Informational role of investment decision
Here we argue that the informational value of each position differs, de-
pending on whether the asset is considered overvalued or undervalued.
Note that an implication of part two and three of Corollary 2 is that, com-
pared to the first best, if prior beliefs indicate that the asset is considered
undervalued (p > 0.5): i) a short position is a weak indicator that the asset
is of low quality,9 whereas, ii) a long position is a strong indicator that the
asset is of high quality. In contrast, if the asset is considered overvalued
(p < 0.5), a short position is a strong indicator that the asset is of low qual-
ity, whereas a long position is a weak indicator that the asset is of high
quality.
Another implication of Corollary 2 is that the resulting bias in the in-
vestment decision can sustain extreme prior beliefs about the asset’s qual-
ity. For instance, if the market attributes a high probability to the asset
9This is because the conditional probability that the asset price will drop given a short
position exceeds the corresponding probability, when there is no agency problem.
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being of good quality (i.e., p has a high value), then the posterior beliefs
that the asset is of good quality, conditional on both short and long po-
sition, are higher compared to the first best. Intuitively, this is because a
high value of p leads to a high premium when the short position is chosen,
which in turn, tempts the manager to go short. As a result, after observing
a short position, investors do not radically downgrade their beliefs about
the probability that the asset is of good quality. This is because the short
position might be chosen not because of a low signal realization, but due
to its high premium. Similarly, after observing a long position, investors
upgrade radically their beliefs about the probability that the asset is good.
This relies on the fact that investors believe that, if the manager is willing
to forgo the premium that the short position entails, it must be that he
attributes a high probability on the asset being good.
Following a similar reasoning, if the market attributes a low proba-
bility to the asset being of good quality, then the posterior beliefs that the
asset is of good quality, conditional of both the short and long position, are
lower compared to the first best.
1.5.3 Link with empirical evidence and empirical predic-
tions
Similarly to this setting, financial analysts collect private information re-
garding the ex-ante unknown state of the world (profitability of a com-
pany), and issue a forecast regarding future earnings. By applying our
framework to this environment, we would expect that the analysts’ fore-
casts are biased against the publicly available information. The bias against
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the flow is consistent with the empirical evidence on financial analysts. For
instance, Bernhardt and Kutsoati (2001) and Pierdzioch et al. (2013) provide
evidence that analysts issue biased contrarian forecasts. In fact, Bernhardt
and Kutsoati (2001) show that the conditional probability that a forecast
exceeds realized earnings, given that the forecasts exceeds the consensus
forecast, is lower than the unconditional probability. Note that the under-
lying idea in Bernhardt and Kutsoati (2001) is similar to our setting: our
model predicts that in an environment where prior beliefs indicate it is
more likely that the price will drop, the conditional probability that the
asset price increases given a long position, is lower than the corresponding
probability when the first best threshold is implemented.
Also, Corollary 2 and the mechanism which was presented in the
section 1.5.2 , could provide a theoretical foundation of the empirical evi-
dence which indicate that investor over-react and/or under-react to finan-
cial analysts’ forecasts (Elgers et al., 2001, Elliot et al., 1995, Elliot et al.,
1995, Mendenhall, 1991, Sloan, 1996). Similarly to the forecasts of financial
analysts, the position of the manager is informative about his private sig-
nal. Hence, the implemented position can be used by market participants,
to infer the quality of the asset and the future price. Our model predicts
that rational investors should under-react when the manager’s position is
against the flow, and over-react when the manager’s position follows the
flow.
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1.5.4 Impact of information acquisition cost, c.
Proposition 5 summarizes the impact of the cost of acquiring information,
c, on the optimal contract and its main implications. We consider values of
c for which the equity holder finds it optimal to incentivize the manager to
acquire information.
Proposition 5: Impact of an increase in c
If p > 0.5 (p < 0.5), an increase in the cost of information acquisition from c to
c′, leads to:
(i) An increase (decrease) in the optimal threshold from sˆ∗ to sˆ′∗.
(ii) A higher bias |sˆ′∗ − sˆFB| > |sˆ∗ − sˆFB|.
(iii) A lower (higher) probability that an implemented short position is revenue-
maximizing.
(iv) A higher (lower) probability that an implemented long position is revenue-
maximizing.
(v) A lower expected probability of taking the revenue-maximizing position.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
We provide the underlying intuition behind Proposition 5 for the
case where p > 0.5. Similar intuition applies for the case where p <
0.5. The findings of Proposition 5 depend on the behavior of EC(sˆ) as c
increases. By Lemma 3, EC(sˆ) is convex, decreasing in sˆ for sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin),
increasing in sˆ for sˆ ∈ (sˆmin, 1] and linearly dependent in c. Thus, an
increase in cost c shifts the entire EC(sˆ) curve upwards, which leads to a
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steeper-sloped U-shape. This is captured in Figure 1.6, where sˆ is depicted
in the horizontal axis, the red line represents the ER(sˆ), the green line
represents EC(sˆ, c) and the blue line represents EC(sˆ, c′).













Figure 1.6. Impact of an increase in the information acquisition cost c
Recall that when p ≥ 0.5, a deviation from sˆFB to sˆ = sˆFB + η has a positive
and a negative effect. On the one hand, it decreases the expected compen-
sation cost (Lemma 3), but on the other hand, it decreases the expected
revenue (Lemma 4). Under the optimal value, sˆ∗, the two opposite forces
cancel each other, i.e., the benefit of decreasing the expected cost coincides
with the loss of decreasing the expected revenue. Notice that a steeper-
sloped U-shape for EC(sˆ), which follows an increase in c, strengthens the
incentive to increase sˆ. This is because, for a given deviation η from the
first best, the reduction in the expected cost is higher the steeper the slop
of U-shape is. This can be seen in Figure 1.6, where the distance A′B′ (AB)
captures the reduction in the expected cost before (after) the increase in c.
Thus, sˆ′∗ > sˆ∗, which combining with the fact that sˆFB is unaffected by the
change in c, leads to a higher bias compared to the first best.
Part three (four) is a consequence of part two of Proposition 5 and
part two (three) of Corollary 2. Finally, part five stems from the monotonic
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relation between the expected revenue and the probability of getting the
revenue-maximizing position. Notice that the lower probability of taking
the right position is not a consequence of the fact that the manager does
not acquire information (recall that Proposition 5 refers to the case where
incentivizing information acquisition is optimal). The underlined intuition
is that the distortion in the investment decision increases, which in turn,
diminishes the information which is incorporated into the implemented
position.
1.5.5 Impact of market prior beliefs, p.
Proposition 6 summarizes the impact of market beliefs, p, on the imple-
mented position. In particular, we explore the case where market prior
beliefs become more extreme, i.e., |p− 0.5| increases. We denote as sˆ∗ and
sˆ′∗ the equilibrium value of sˆ before and after the change in p. Similarly,
sˆFB and sˆ′FB correspond to the first best value of sˆ before and after the
change in p. We consider values of p for which incentivizing information
acquisition is optimal.
Proposition 6: Impact of more extreme prior beliefs.
If p > 0.5 (p < 0.5), an increase (decrease) in beliefs p leads to:
(i) A decrease (increase) in the optimal threshold from sˆ∗ to sˆ′∗.
(ii) Higher bias |sˆ′∗ − sˆFB| > |sˆ∗ − sˆFB|, when the signal structure is linear.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The intuition behind part one is straightforward. An increase (decrease)
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in p decreases (increases) sˆFB without affecting the threshold which mini-
mizes the expected cost, sˆmin. Hence, the second best sˆ∗ moves away from
sˆmin towards sˆ′FB.
Part two is less straightforward. We showed earlier that a deviation
from the first best by a given η implies a loss due to the lower expected
revenue, and a gain due to the lower expected compensation cost. As the
prior beliefs, and the corresponding value of sˆFB, become more extreme,
the convexity of the expected compensation cost implies that the gain due
to the lower expected cost increases. However, the decrease in the expected
revenue depends on the particular distribution of fθ(s).
In Proposition 6, we focus on the linear signaling structure, i.e., fθ(sˆ)′
is assumed to be constant. The advantage of this signaling structure is that
the loss of a given deviation from the first best is independent of the value
of p. Hence, as prior beliefs become more extreme, for a given deviation
η, the decrease in the cost is larger, whereas the decrease in the revenue is
unaffected. As a result, more extreme prior beliefs correspond to a higher
distortion in the investment decision, compared to the first best.
1.6 Concluding Remarks & Further Discussion
This paper examines the case where equity holders of a fund delegate an
investment decision to a fund manager. We explore an environment where
the return of the investment decision depends on the unknown state of
the world, and the information acquisition by the agent is unobservable
and unverifiable. We show that the optimal contract which incentivizes
the manager to acquire information promises a positive payment only the
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decision of the agent is proven correct. Also, we find that a key feature
of the optimal contract is that the manager takes contrarian actions more
often than the first best. Furthermore, we find that both the direction and
the extent of the distortion in the investment decision relates to market
beliefs. Besides, we show how these beliefs affect the informational role
of the investment decision. Finally, we show that the main findings are
robust to: i) a setup where the state of the world is imperfectly observed,
and ii) a setup where the equity holder allocates the tasks of information
acquisition and investment decision to two different agents.
In this section, we attempt to make the connection between the
benchmark setting and alternative environments. Recall that three are the
critical characteristics of the benchmark model: i) delegation of a deci-
sion by a principal to an agent, ii) the revenue-maximizing action is state-
dependent, and, iii) the agent can acquire costly and private information
about the ex-ante unknown state of the world. In what follows, we discuss
four environments which share, to some extent, these three characteristics,
and present the implications of the optimal contract in each setting. Table
1 provides the analogy between the benchmark case and the environments
we discuss.
Incentivizing Innovation
Similarly to Manso (2011), the benchmark model can also be used to char-
acterize the optimal compensation contracts which incentivize an agent
to innovate. For instance, suppose an environment where two strate-
gies/techniques are available; a conventional one, which leads to a fixed
return R, and an innovative one, which returns RS > R, if it is successful,
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and RF < R otherwise. By nature, the return of the innovative strategy
is ex-ante unknown to the agents, who, however, hold prior beliefs about
the return being RS, denoted by p. The main difficulty which arises in
this setup is that the principal and the agent cannot observe whether the
innovative strategy is successful, unless this strategy is implemented. This
difficulty is addressed in Appendix A.1.
In this environment, the optimal contract pays the agent only when
he adopts an innovative strategy which is successful or a conventional
strategy which is supported by the public signal. Besides, if prior be-
liefs indicate that the NPV of the innovative strategy is higher (lower) than
the NPV of the conventional strategy, the optimal compensation contract
results in under-implementation (over-implementation) of the innovative
strategy, compared to the first best.
Credit Rating Agencies
We argue in the Online Appendix that the analysis presented in the previ-
ous sections can also be applied to the rating process used by credit rating
agencies (CRAs). In practice, the rating process is characterized by delega-
tion of the evaluation of a company’s creditworthiness to an analyst, who
can obtain information before issuing a rating. Consistently with the lit-
erature on credit rating agencies, which recognizes reputation concerns as
the main objective of CRAs, we assume that the principal’s objective is to
maximize the probability of issuing a rating which corresponds to the ac-
tual type. In our setting, this objective translates into giving a good rating
to a creditworthy company, and a bad rating otherwise, where the credit-
worthiness of a company corresponds to the ex-ante unknown state of the
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world.
In this environment, the optimal compensation contract pays the
analysts only when the rating matches the actual type of the company.
Also, the optimal contract implies a premium for a rating against the flow.
This premium gives rise to more frequent bad (good) ratings compared
to the first best, when the company is ex-ante more (less) likely to be of
good type. Moreover, if the company is ex-ante more likely to be of good
type, then a bad rating is less (more) likely to be correct, whereas a good
rating is more (less) likely to be correct. A direct implication of the bias in
the issuance of ratings is that it can sustain extreme prior beliefs about a
company’s type.
Finally, we endogenize the company’s borrowing interest rates after
the rating is issued. We find that conditional on the rating, the interest
rate is lower (higher) than the first best when prior beliefs indicate that the
company is of good (bad) type. This finding could provide an explanation
for the emergence of long periods of low or high interest rates.
Product Design
The main role of a product manager is, first, to analyze the market, and
subsequently, decide about those product features which will accommo-
date the ex-ante unknown future demand. In this environment, the opti-
mal contract pays the product manager only if he designs a product which
eventually accommodates the demand. Also, the optimal contract leads to
over-investment in products and product features which are ex-ante more
likely to fail to accommodate the demand. Besides, conditional on adopt-
ing such product, it is less likely than the first best that the demand will be
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addressed. In contrast, conditional on adopting a product which is ex-ante
more likely to accommodate the demand, it is more likely than the first
best that it will succeed in accommodating the demand. Thus, this model
would predict an excessive supply of products which have a low ex-ante
probability of accommodating the demand, and, in turn, are very likely
not to accommodate the demand.
Portfolio Allocation II
Here we consider a different version of the portfolio allocation problem
where the manager considers investing either in a risky project or a safe
project. The return of the safe project is fixed, and normalized to zero,
whereas the return of the risky project depends on its quality, which is
unknown to both the equity holder and the manager. Also, the net return
of the risky project is positive if its type is good, and negative if the type is
bad. This environment is similar to Lambert (1986).
In this environment, the optimal contract pays the manager only in
the case he invests on a safe (risky) asset, and the type of the risky asset
is revealed to be bad (good). In any other case, the payment to the agent
is zero. Besides, if prior indicate that the NPV of the risky asset is higher
(lower) than the NPV of the safe asset, then the optimal compensation
contract gives rise to under-investment (over-investment) to the risky asset.
The resulting over-investment against the flow has implications on
the riskiness of the portfolio, which is captured by its variance. In particu-
lar, the riskiness is lower (higher) than the first best when the ex-ante NPV
of the risky asset exceeds (is lower than) the NPV of the safe asset.
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Portfolio II CRA Product Design Innovation
Principal Equity holders Manager Equity holders Venture Capitalist
Agent Manager Analyst Manager Researcher
State Type of risky Creditworthiness Demand Quality of innovation
Action Risky/safe Good/bad rating Features Conventional/ innovation




The Impact of Credit Rating
Agencies on Capital Markets
2.1 Introduction
The 2007-2008 financial crisis raised unprecedented scrutiny on credit rat-
ing agencies (CRAs). CRAs have been accused of failing to predict the
financial crisis (Mason and Rosner, 2007), and of following investors’ opin-
ions rather than leading them (Richard and Steward, 2003). However, the
main criticism regarding CRAs relates to the conflicts of interest, which
might arise in an issuer-pays regime (Mathis et al. 2009, Bouvard and Levy
2012). In this paper, I shift the attention from the CRA’s behavior to the
framework in which CRAs operate. I explore the impact of a CRA in an
environment which, similarly to capital markets, is characterized by infor-
mation asymmetries and lack of commitment. I explore a model where i)
there is no conflict of interest, ii) the CRA is truthful and issues ratings for
free, and iii) these ratings are accurate. I argue that even in this environ-
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ment, introducing a CRA might lead to i) under-financing of projects with
positive NPV that would otherwise be financed, and ii) higher expected
probability of default.
CRAs play a significant role in capital markets by affecting major
economic variables, such as interest rate and probability of default. The
main mechanism through which credit ratings affect such variables is by
providing information which shapes investors’ beliefs, and hence invest-
ment decisions. CRAs, however, differ from other information intermedi-
aries in a critical direction: unlike meteorologists, who predict the weather
without affecting it, CRAs produce ratings that do affect the quality of the
asset they rate. Kuhner (2001) points out that a credit rating can take the
form of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Similarly, Manso (2013), captures the
self-fulfilling nature of ratings, by showing that a rating deterioration may
trigger a “death spiral”. The feedback effect, which is inherent in capital
markets, lies at the heart of my model.
I develop a model of project’s financing where an entrepreneur is
privately informed about his cost of effort, and cannot commit to exerting
effort in the implementation of the project. In particular, the entrepreneur’s
cost is drawn from a “good” or a “bad” distribution, where the good dis-
tribution dominates the bad distribution in the first order stochastic dom-
inance sense. Thus, an entrepreneur whose cost is drawn from a good
distribution is of low expected cost (LEC), and an entrepreneur whose cost
is drawn from a bad distribution is of high expected cost (HEC). I focus
on the case where the planner would finance both types. The information
asymmetry about the entrepreneur’s cost is partly resolved by a CRA. The
combination of lack of commitment and information asymmetry allows
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me to endogenize the probability of default and the interest rate. In this
environment, a feedback effect arises: the interest rate is determined by
the expected probability of default, which in turn, determines the realized
probability of default.
I argue that introducing a truthful CRA which resolves, at zero cost,
part of the information asymmetry, may not result in a better outcome from
a social perspective. This is because the interaction information asymmetry
and lack of commitment results in a trade-off when a CRA is introduced
into the market. On the one hand, better information alleviates the infor-
mation asymmetry problem; on the other hand, it exacerbates the adverse
effect of non-commitment. The main findings suggest that the impact of
introducing a CRA depends on the features of the environment. In partic-
ular, the introduction of a CRA: (i) leads to a higher expected probability of
default when the entrepreneur is efficient enough to raise funds indepen-
dently of the presence of a CRA (mild information asymmetry), (ii) leads to
under-financing when financing of an HEC entrepreneur is feasible only if
he is pooled with an LEC entrepreneur (moderate information asymmetry),
and (iii) alleviates under-financing when financing of an LEC entrepreneur
is feasible only if he can be differentiated from an HEC entrepreneur (se-
vere information asymmetry). Besides, I characterize the level of accuracy
of the CRA’s ratings which leads to the best allocation of resources, and
show that some degree of inaccuracy might be optimal. Also, I consider
the case where the CRA charges a profit-maximizing fee. I find that this
fee adversely affects the probability of default, but it does not influence the
project’s financing opportunities.
The intuition behind the findings presented in the previous para-
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graph relates to the feedback effect in capital markets. In order to capture
the feedback effect, some insights of the model are required. First, I assume
that the project succeeds as long as effort is exerted. Thus, a critical role
in our model is played by threshold cˆ, which denotes the maximum value
of effort cost for which an entrepreneur exerts effort in the implementation
of his project. This threshold is negatively related to the interest rate the
entrepreneur is expected to pay. Suppose now that an investor considers
financing an entrepreneur. First, he forms his beliefs about the probability
of default, which in this setup coincides with the probability that the en-
trepreneur’s cost is above cˆ. Based on his beliefs, the investor demands an
interest rate which allows him to break even. This interest rate affects the
threshold cˆ, which in turn, affects investors beliefs about the probability of
default, and so on (feedback effect). We show that the increase in the inter-
est rate and the corresponding probability of default, due to the feedback
effect, is decreasing in the entrepreneur’s ex-ante efficiency. Thus, for mild
information asymmetry, when introducing a CRA, the negative effect on an
HEC entrepreneur dominates the positive effect on an LEC entrepreneur.
Along these lines, Kliger and Sarig (2000) use a natural experiment to show
that credit ratings affect the cost of capital, and Kisgen (2006) shows that a
firm’s structural decision is directly affected by credit ratings.
The intuition underlying the finding that a CRA may lead to under-
financing of positive NPV projects is similar. Consider a case where an
HEC entrepreneur has a bad rating and investors are not willing to finance
him. Suppose now there is no CRA and an HEC entrepreneur is mixed
with an LEC entrepreneur. As far as an HEC entrepreneur is concerned,
investors are now more optimistic about the entrepreneur’s creditworthi-
58
ness and require a lower interest rate. This lower interest rate decreases the
probability of default of an HEC entrepreneur, which decreases the interest
rate even more. This feedback effect can thus turn the financing of HEC
entrepreneur to a credit-worthy investment.
Finally, I address the impact of restricting a CRA to provide hard
evidence with its ratings. Notice that the hard-evidence assumption effec-
tively restricts the rating policy to truthful disclosure, which subsequently
diminishes the role of the CRA. Relaxing this assumption gives rise to a
model similar to the Bayesian Persuasion setting developed by Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2009). In this environment, I explore the optimal rating
rule when the CRA can commit in advance to this rule. I find that the
optimal rating rule is either a truthful revelation of the entrepreneur’s type
or a babbling equilibrium, where no information is revealed. Hence, both
“rating inflation” and “rating deflation” can be part of the optimal rating
policy. In addition, I show that restricting a CRA to provide hard evidence
can only worsen financing opportunities. In contrast, “rating inflation” and
“rating deflation” can improve the allocation of resources.
I argue that this paper has implications for the information disclo-
sure policy implemented by a government. Note that the introduction of
a CRA in capital markets can also be interpreted as a revelation of a sig-
nal about the creditworthiness of an agent or institution. For instance, a
key question after the recent crisis is whether the results of stress tests for
banks should be revealed (Goldstein and Leitner, 2013). The answer that
my analysis suggests is that concealing these results could improve the
allocation of resources, unless the market breaks down in the absence of
additional information. Moreover, the implications of this paper can be
59
applied to the sovereign debt in euro zone countries. Finally, my work
suggests that future research on the regulation of CRAs should take into
account feedback effect, which is inherent in capital markets.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 2.3 introduces the model. Section 2.4 explores the bench-
mark case. Section 2.5 presents the regime with and without a CRA. Sec-
tion 2.6 explores the impact of introducing a CRA into the market. Section
2.7 relaxes the assumption of hard evidence and explores the optimal rat-
ing rule when the CRA can pre-commit to it. In Section 2.8, I explore an
environment where a CRA can choose a profit-maximizing fee. Section 2.9
discusses and concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper relates primarily to two strands of the literature: the literature
dealing with the effect of CRAs on real economic variables, and the litera-
ture that recognizes the adverse effect of better information.
Much of the literature on CRAs focuses on the quality of the reported
ratings, rather than the impact of CRAs. There are three main approaches
in this strand. The first approach explores whether CRAs have incentive to
inflate their ratings. The second approach examines the way CRAs choose
to disclose their private information. The third approach highlights the
role of rating shopping by issuers on the quality of ratings.
The most popular way of addressing whether a CRA has incentive
to inflate its rating, is by testing the validity of the the reputation-concerns
argument. According to this, inflating the ratings would harm a CRA’s
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reputation, and ultimately force it out of the market; hence, such con-
flict of interests does not exist. Mathis et al. (2009) develop a model with
rating-contingent fees, and demonstrate that the reputation-concerns argu-
ment only works when a significant part of a CRA’s income comes from
sources other than rating complex projects. Bouvard and Levy (2012) also
test the reputation concerns argument. They show that a higher reputa-
tion for transparency is not always desirable because it demotivates low-
creditwothiness firms to ask for a rating.
The second approach links the quality of ratings with information
disclosure. Lizzeri (1999) adopts a mechanism design setting. He shows
that a monopolist CRA only reveals the minimum level of information,
but if there are multiple CRAs, information is disclosed fully. In contrast,
Faure-Grimaud et al. (2007) show that competition reduces information
revelation.
The third approach attributes rating inflation to behavioral biases of
investors and rating shopping by issuers. Bolton et al. (2012) develop a
model with the interaction of sophisticated and naive investors, and the
results show that a duopoly might be less efficient than a monopoly, be-
cause the entrepreneur has the opportunity to shop for a good rating to
exploit naive investors. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) obtain similar find-
ings, where the direct implication of rating shopping is the systemic bias
in disclosed ratings, even if each CRA produces unbiased ratings. Opp
et al. (2013) show that rating inflation can emerge if the face value - not the
informational value - of the rating that matters.
My central approach deviates from this literature; In the benchmark
setting, I focus on a seemingly best-case scenario, where the CRA always
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reports its private information truthfully, and hard evidence supports each
rating. In this environment, I explore the impact of CRAs on capital mar-
kets. Save for Boot et al. (2006), Kuhner (2001), Manso (2013) and to some
extent Mathis et al. (2009), the literature has ignored this effect. Boot et al.
(2006) propose that credit ratings can serve as a coordination mechanism
in situations where multiple equilibria exist. Mathis et al. (2009) show that
the behavior of CRAs can lead to reputation cycles, with implications for
credit spreads. Kuhner (2001) shows that when CRAs care about reputa-
tion, they are more likely to reveal their private information if their ratings
cannot become self-fulfilling ex-post.
Manso (2013) deals with the feedback effect of credit ratings. He
describes an environment where a single CRA repeatedly interacts with a
firm that holds performance-sensitive debt, and whose payout flows are
linked to its rating. This framework enables him to incorporate the feed-
back effect of credit ratings in a dynamic credit-rating model. He finds that,
when forming its rating policy, the CRA should focus not only on ratings
accuracy, but also on the effect of the ratings on the borrower’s probability
of survival.
This paper differs from Manso (2013) in three critical dimensions: (i)
the nature of the feedback effect, (ii) the information available to the CRA
and (iii) the main focus. First, this paper explores the feedback loop be-
tween the entrepreneur’s decision and the investors’ beliefs rather than the
feedback loop between project’s quality and credit rating. The second de-
parture from Manso (2013) is that the CRA has an information advantage
over potential investors. In Manso (2013) the cash flow process, which is
the only parameter which determines firm’s creditworthiness, is observed
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by all market participants. In contrast, in this paper, the CRA obtains a pri-
vate signal about the firm’s creditworthiness. That characteristic enables
me to provide micro-foundations for the impact of CRAs on the cost of
capital. Another departure from Manso (2013) concerns the determina-
tion of capital cost. In Manso (2013) the capital cost depends on ratings
exogenously, whereas in this paper, the capital cost is endogenously deter-
mined, capturing all the parameters of the model. Finally, regarding the
main focus of the paper, Manso (2013) is interested in exploring the effect
of the rating policy, i.e., the function which maps the cash flow into a rat-
ing, in the economy. This work focuses instead on the impact of providing
information via a CRA on capital markets.
In addition, my work pertains to the literature on the adverse welfare
consequence of information disclosure. In his seminal work, Hirshleifer
(1971) argues that more information leads to welfare reduction because it
destroys hedging opportunities. More recently, Amador and Weill (2010)
show that the effect of releasing partial information about a monetary or
productivity shock is two-fold: on the one hand, providing more informa-
tion benefits the economy; but on the other hand, it forces households to
value the newly released public information more and their private infor-
mation less. As a result, the situation leads to reduction of the endogenous
informational content of prices. Kondor (2013) shows that when the cor-
relation between the private information of different groups is low, the
release of public information increases disagreement among short-horizon
traders about the expected selling price. Kurlat and Veldkamp (2012) argue
that disclosure of information reduces an asset’s risk and hence its return.
As a result, high-risk, high-return investments disappear and investor wel-
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fare falls.
The mechanism through which better information can be harmful
differs from the existing literature. I suggest that the inefficient allocation
of resources is a consequence of the coexistence of asymmetric informa-
tion and lack of commitment. In this environment, resolving part of the
information asymmetry amplifies the distortion arises from lack of com-
mitment.
This paper also relates to the literature on Bayesian Persuasion. In
Section 2.7 I show that if the CRA is not obliged to provide supporting ev-
idence for its ratings, and can commit to a rating policy, then the emerging
setup is similar to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2009).
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2.3 Model
Environment: I consider a setting with three risk neutral players: an cash-
less entrepreneur, a CRA, and a representative investor. The entrepreneur
seeks capital to finance an investment project. The project is non-divisible,
and its implementation requires an investment equal to $1.1 The output
of the project depends on whether the entrepreneur exerts effort in its im-
plementation; if the entrepreneur exerts effort, the project succeeds with
probability one. Otherwise, the project fails with probability one.2 The
project returns R, in case of success, and zero otherwise.34 The outcome of
the project is observed by all parties, and R is common knowledge. Exert-
ing effort is costly, unobserved by investors, and the entrepreneur cannot
commit to it.
Entrepreneur’s types: The entrepreneur can be of two types, i ∈ {H, L},
where the type refers to the entrepreneur’s cost of exerting effort, de-
noted by c. In particular, the cost of type i is drawn from a distribu-
tion where fi(c) and Fi(c) denote the probability and density function,
respectively. Throughout this paper, I assume the distribution which corre-
sponds to type i = L dominates the distribution which corresponds to type
1Raising funds in return for a security is the reduced form of a setup where the
entrepreneur sells a security at a price P in order to finance a project of size 1. This is
because a direct consequence of a pooling equilibrium in the contracting stage is that
there is a loss for the efficient entrepreneur (LEC). Thus, the entrepreneur does not have
the incentive to raise more than the capital required for the investment, i.e. P = 1.
2The main findings are robust if we instead assume that exerting effort increases the
probability of success.
3This is without loss of generality as long as the return in case of failure, RF is lower
than R
4The main findings are robust to the case where R is drawn from a distribution which
is known to the entrepreneur and investors.
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i = H in the first order stochastic dominance sense i.e., for each c′ ∈ [0, c¯],
FL(c′) ≤ FH(c′). Thereafter, I refer to type i = L as low-expected-cost (LEC)
entrepreneur, and type i = H as high-expected-cost (HEC) entrepreneur.
Thus, an LEC entrepreneur can be interpreted as an efficient (in expec-
tation) entrepreneur, whereas an HEC entrepreneur as an inefficient (in
expectation) entrepreneur. I restrict the analysis to the case where both
types have positive ex-ante net present value, i.e., R > 1 + E[ci] for each
i ∈ {H, L}. Hence, if the aim of the planner is to maximize total surplus,
both types would be financed.
Information sets: The entrepreneur has private information about his type.
In contrast, investors hold prior beliefs about the entrepreneur’s type. In
particular, investors expect the entrepreneur to be of low expected cost
(LEC) with probability λ, and of high expected cost (HEC) with probability
1− λ. These beliefs are common knowledge. Besides, I assume that the
entrepreneur learns his realized cost, c, after carrying out the investment,
and only then he takes the effort decision. The rationale of this assumption
is that the cost of exerting effort in implementing a project depends not
only on the entrepreneur’s type, but also on the project itself. Thus, the
cost of exerting effort is not known until the agent starts implementing the
project.5
Unlike potential investors, the CRA can monitor the type of the en-
trepreneur. The intuition behind this assumption is the following. First, it
captures the empirical observation that CRAs have better information than
5We show in Appendix B that the model is qualitatively similar to a setting where
the entrepreneur observes a noisy signal of the realized cost, rather than the realized cost
itself.
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investors about the creditworthiness of an entrepreneur/firm. This is be-
cause they have access to critical economic indexes, and more experience
in monitoring. Second, this assumption reflects the idea that regardless of
the experience that CRAs may have, they cannot have better information
about the creditworthiness of a firm, than what the firm itself has.6
It is worth highlighting that this model is qualitatively equivalent to
a setting where: i) the role of the entrepreneur is played by a manager of
a firm, ii) the cost of effort coincides with the cost of allocating production
resources to the implementation of the project, and iii) the manager’s ob-
jective is to maximize the firm’s profitability.
Actions of each player: The entrepreneur faces three sets of actions. First,
he decides whether to ask for a rating. Second, he decides about the struc-
ture of the security he issues. Finally, he decides whether to exert effort in
the implementation of the project.
Investors’ only action is to choose whether to finance an entrepreneur
or not. We assume that capital markets are competitive, and that the inter-
est rate investors demand is normalized to zero.
In order to disentangle the impact of a CRA, we allow for different
sets of actions. In the benchmark setting we restrict the CRA to provide
truthful rating at zero rating fee. In Section 2.7, the CRA chooses its rating
6The reason the CRA only knows the type of the entrepreneur/firm, i.e., the distri-
bution from which the actual cost is derived and not the realized cost, relates to two
particular characteristics of the rating industry: the monitoring method and the cluster-
ing of ratings. Regarding the monitoring method, CRAs usually base their ratings on a
mix of indexes. Hence, two firms with similar index values are likely to receive a similar
rating, even though the indexes do not reflect other parameters that are vital for a firm’s
profitability. Regarding the clustering of ratings, one of the characteristics of the industry
is that CRAs issue ratings by following a specific rating scale, and refrain from giving
predictions about the exact economic outcome.
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policy, which maps the entrepreneur’s type to a rating. In Section 2.8, the
CRA chooses the rating fee.
Timing: The timing of the events is as follows:
1. Nature determines the type of the entrepreneur.
2. The entrepreneur chooses whether to ask for a rating.
3. Conditional on the entrepreneur asking for a rating, the CRA issues
a rating.
4. The entrepreneur observes his rating (if any), and chooses the secu-
rity design.
5. Investors observe the entrepreneur’s rating (if any) and security, and
then decide whether to invest.
6. Conditional on financing, the entrepreneur observes his realized cost,
and chooses whether to exert effort in the project’s implementation.
7. The output is realized, and the security is executed.
Equilibrium Concept: The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium, where the CRA, the entrepreneur, and investors, choose their cor-
responding actions in order to maximize expected profits/utility. Finally,
on-equilibrium beliefs are consistent.
2.4 Benchmark Case
In the benchmark case, I explore an environment where the CRA: i) can
monitor the type of the entrepreneur perfectly, ii) reveals its private infor-
mation truthfully, and iii) does not charge a rating fee. These assumptions
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suppress any conflict of interests, and allow me to isolate the impact of
better information, provided by a CRA, on capital markets. In Section 2.7,
I relax the hard evidence assumption, whereas in Section 2.8, I relax the
zero-fee assumption.
2.4.1 Entrepreneur’s Problem
First, the entrepreneur decides whether to ask for a rating. In doing so,
he takes into consideration: i) the expected rating, ii) what would be the
security that he would issue with and without a rating, and iii) when he
would exert effort.
A consequence of a rating fee equal to zero is that an LEC en-
trepreneur can costlessly differentiate himself, which allows him to promise
a lower return to investors. An implication of this remark is that an HEC
entrepreneur is indifferent between asking and not asking for a rating. This
finding relates to the signaling component of the decision of asking for a
rating. Note that if an HEC entrepreneur asks for a rating, his type is re-
vealed by the CRA with certainty. Also, if he does not ask for a rating,
the market will be able to infer his type, since anticipates that an LEC en-
trepreneur would always find it optimal to ask for a rating. Following the
previous reasoning, we can assume without loss of generality that both
types ask for a rating.
Second, the entrepreneur chooses the security design which maxi-
mizes his expected utility. It is shown in the Appendix that the optimal
security promises a payment (1+ r), if the project succeeds, and zero oth-
erwise. This simple form of the optimal security is a consequence of non-
69
verifiability of effort cost.
Third, conditional on raising capital and starting implementing the
project, the entrepreneur observes his actual cost of exerting effort c, and
decides whether to exert effort. Recall that the project is successful only
when the entrepreneur exerts effort. Thus, the entrepreneur’s utility, de-
pending on whether he exerts effort, is given by:
U(e f f ort) = R− (1+ r)− c
U(not e f f ort) = 0
Hence, the entrepreneur exerts effort as long as:
c ≤ R− (1+ r) ≡ cˆ (2.1)
Threshold cˆ is a critical variable of the model. The intuition behind this
threshold is straightforward: the entrepreneur exerts effort as long as the
benefit from doing so, R− (1+ r), exceeds the cost, c.
I define as “default” the event where the entrepreneur fails to pay
back his loan. In this setting, a default occurs when the project returns
zero, which coincides with the case where no effort is exerted. This leads
to the following definition of the probability of default.
Definition 1
The probability of default is defined as the probability of financing an entrepreneur
whose realized cost of effort exceeds cˆ:
Pr(de f ault) ≡ Pr(c > cˆ(r)) (2.2)
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Similarly, the probability of success is defined as the probability of financing an
entrepreneur whose realized cost of effort is below or equal to cˆ:
Pr(success) ≡ Pr(c ≤ cˆ(r)) (2.3)
Because cˆ is negatively related to the payment (1 + r), the probability of
default is positively related to (1 + r).7 To avoid the trivial case where an
entrepreneur can finance his project through risk-free debt, I restrict the
probability of default to strictly positive values. This is true if there exists
at least one value of c such that the entrepreneur does not exert effort even
if the interest rate is zero, i.e., c¯ > R− 1.
2.4.2 The Investors’ Problem
Investors form their beliefs about the probability of success, and subse-
quently require an interest rate that satisfies their participation constraint:
E[Pr(success)|Ω]× (1+ r) +E[Pr(de f ault)|Ω]× 0 ≥ 1 (2.4)
where the LHS of (2.4) is the investors’ expected benefit, whereas the RHS
of (2.4) is the capital they lend to the entrepreneur. More specifically, (1+
r) stands for the payment in case of success, whereas E[Pr(success)|Ω]
stands for investors’ beliefs about the probability of success, given their
7What matters for the main findings to go through, is that the effort threshold,
which determines the probability of default, is negatively related to the payment (1+ r).
Alternatively, this could be achieved by assuming that the project succeeds with cer-
tainty when the entrepreneur exerts costly effort and succeeds with probability q if
there is no effort. In such a setup the entrepreneur chooses to exert effort if and only
if c ≤ (R − (1 + r))(1 − q) which is associated to a probability of success equal to
Prob(c ≤ cˆ) + qProb(c > cˆ) = q + (1− q)E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ)|Ω].
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information set Ω. Similarly, E[Pr(de f ault)|Ω] stands for investors’ beliefs
about the probability of default. Following Definition 1, the investors’s
participation constraint becomes:
E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ)|Ω]× (1+ r) ≥ 1 (2.5)
Thus, investors are willing to finance an entrepreneur as long asE[Prob(c ≤
cˆ)|Ω] ≥ (1+ r)−1. If the previous condition does not hold, the market col-
lapses.
2.4.3 Equilibrium Condition
Recall that the entrepreneur exerts effort as long as:
c ≤ R− (1+ r) ≡ cˆ(r) (2.6)
Note that investors’ participation constraint is binding, as a consequence
of the assumption that capital markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, the
equilibrium interest rate is the minimum r which solves:
E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ(r))|Ω] = (1+ r)−1 (2.7)
The inherent feedback effect can be seen in the previous fixed-point equa-
tion; the interest rate r which solves (2.7) depends on the threshold cˆ, which
in turn, depends on the interest rate r via (2.6).
It is worth highlighting that it is the investors’ beliefs about the prob-
ability of default - not the probability of default itself - that determine the
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interest rate.
For notational convenience, I denote E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ(r))|Ω] as s˜(cˆ(r)).
Thus, s˜(cˆ(r)) captures investors’ beliefs about the probability of success,
given their information set Ω. Note the there might be more than one
combinations of r and cˆ(r) which solve (2.7). The combination, however,
which maximizes entrepreneur’s expected utility is the one which corre-
sponds to the lowest interest rate.
The previous analysis highlights the importance of investors’ beliefs
about the default probability on the determination of the equilibrium in-
terest rate. The introduction of a CRA affects investors’ beliefs as follows:
when investors observe a bad rating, they anticipate that the entrepreneur
is of HEC type. Consequently, they downgrade their beliefs about the prob-
ability of success compared to the case where there is no CRA. Similarly,
when investors observe a good rating, anticipate that the entrepreneur is of
LEC type. Subsequently, they upgrade their beliefs about the probability
of success, compared to the case with no CRA. As a result, investors re-
quire a higher (lower) interest rate to finance an HEC (LEC) entrepreneur,
compared to the regime without a CRA.
2.5 Regime with and without a CRA
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium in two different regimes: (i)
a regime without a CRA, and (ii) a regime with a CRA. Recall that the
only distributional assumption is First Order Stochastic Dominance, i.e.,
for each c′ ∈ [0, c¯], FH(c′) ≤ FL(c′).
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2.5.1 Regime without a CRA
The Investors’ Problem: Investors’ beliefs about the probability of success
are given by:
s˜I I(cˆ(r)) =
Pr(c ≤ cˆ(r)|i = L)E[Pr(i = L)|Ω] + Pr(c ≤ cˆ(r)|i = H)E[Pr(i = H)|Ω]
(2.8)
Given that investors have no additional information, their beliefs about the
entrepreneur’s type coincide with their prior beliefs. Note that Prob(c ≤
cˆ(r)|i = L) = FL(cˆ(r)) and Prob(c ≤ cˆ(r)|i = H) = FH(cˆ(r)), where FL(.)
is the c.d.f of the cost of an LEC entrepreneur, and FH(.) is the c.d.f of the
cost of an HEC entrepreneur. Thus,
s˜I I(cˆ(r)) = λFL(cˆ(r)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r)) (2.9)
Market survival and equilibrium interest rate: I show in Appendix B
that the market survives as long as there exists an interest rate, r, such as
s˜I I(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)−1. Also, the equilibrium interest rate, which is denoted
by r∗I I , is minimum interest rate which solves:
(1+ r)−1 = λFL(cˆ(r)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r)) (2.10)
2.5.2 Regime with a CRA
In this section, I introduce a CRA that has perfect monitoring, and its rat-
ings are, by assumption, truthful. The CRA affects the equilibrium interest
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rate by shaping investors’ beliefs via changing their information set. As a
result, the equilibrium interest rates are conditional on the rating.
The Entrepreneur’s Problem: We argue in section 2.4 that an LEC en-
trepreneur always asks for a rating, whereas an HEC entrepreneur is indif-
ferent between asking and not asking for a rating since, in both cases, his
type is disclosed with certainty. Without loss of generality, we assume that
when an LEC entrepreneur is indifferent, he asks for a rating.
Recall that the threshold cˆ depends on the interest rate, which de-
pends on investor’s beliefs about the probability of success, which in turn,
rely on the rating. Thus, as long as the interest rate differs depending on
the rating, the resulting threshold also varies. Thus, there are two critical
values: cˆ(rGR), if the rating is good, and cˆ(rBR), if the rating is bad.
The Investors Problem: Conditional on the rating, investors form their
beliefs about the probability of success. s˜(cˆ(rGR)) denotes investors’ beliefs
when the rating is good, and s˜(cˆ(rBR)) when the rating is bad, where:
s˜(cˆ(rGR)) =
Pr(c ≤ cˆ(rGR)|i = L)Pr(i = L|GR) + Pr(c ≤ cˆ(rGR)|i = H)Pr(i = H|GR)
s˜(cˆ(rBR) =
Pr(c ≤ cˆ(rBR)|i = L)Pr(i = L|BR) + Pr(c ≤ cˆ(rBR)|i = H)Pr(i = H|BR)
Note that Pr(i = L|GR) = 1 and Pr(i = H|BR) = 1, as the CRA has
perfect monitoring and reports its private information truthfully. Hence, I
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can re-write investors’ beliefs as follows:
s˜(cˆ(rGR)) = Pr(c ≤ cˆ(rGR)|i = L) = FL(cˆ(rGR))
s˜(cˆ(rBR)) = Pr(c ≤ cˆ(rBR)|i = H) = FH(cˆ(rBR))
Market survival and equilibrium interest rate: Conditional on a good
rating, the market survives as long as there exists an interest rate, r, such
as s˜(cˆ(rGR)) ≥ (1+ r)−1. Similarly, conditional on a bad rating, the market
survives as long as there exists an interest rate, r, such as s˜(cˆ(rBR)) ≥
(1+ r)−1. Also, the equilibrium interest rate which corresponds to a good
rating, denoted by r∗GR, is minimum interest rate which solves:
(1+ r) = (FL(cˆ(r)))−1 (2.11)
Similarly, the equilibrium interest rate which corresponds to a bad rating,
denoted by r∗BR, is the minimum interest rate which solves:
(1+ r) = (FH(cˆ(r)))−1 (2.12)
2.6 Impact of introducing a CRA
2.6.1 Comparison
In Section 2.5, I characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
market to survive. Besides, I characterized the equilibrium conditions for
the regimes with and without a CRA. This section compares those regimes
regarding three critical market variables: the probability of project financ-
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ing, the expected probability of default, and the expected interest rate.
2.6.1.1 Impact on Project Financing
A fundamental aspect of capital markets is financing opportunities. The
following Proposition explores the impact of introducing a CRA on the
probability of raising capital. Recall that a social planner, whose objective
is to maximize net surplus, would finance both types of entrepreneurs.
This is because both types correspond to positive NPV projects.
Proposition 1 (Probability of Financing)
(i) If there is r such as FL(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)−1 and λFL(cˆ(r))+ (1−λ)FH(cˆ(r)) <
(1+ r)−1, introducing a CRA alleviates under-financing.
(ii) If there is r such as FH(cˆ(r)) < (1+ r)−1 and λFL(cˆ(r))+ (1−λ)FH(cˆ(r)) ≥
(1+ r)−1, introducing a CRA leads to under-financing.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is captured in Figure 2.1 and 2.2.
These figures illustrate investors’ beliefs about the probability of success,
as a function of r, in three cases: i) when the entrepreneur holds a good
rating (dash-dotted line), ii) when the entrepreneur holds a bad rating
(dense-dotted line), and iii) when there is no rating/CRA (loose-dotted
line).8 The solid curve depicts the inverse of the payment 1 + r. Recall
that cˆ = R − (1− r). An implication of the First Order Stochastic Dom-
inance assumption is that the graphical illustration of FL(cˆ(r)) lies above
8We present the case where the entrepreneur is of an LEC or an HEC type with equal
probability, and the cost of effort is uniformly distributed.
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E[Pr(c < cˆ)|GR] = FL(cˆ(r))
E[Pr(c < cˆ)|NR] = λFL(cˆ(r)) + (1− λ)FH (cˆ(r))
E[Pr(c < cˆ)|BR] = FH (cˆ(r))
(1+ r)−1
Figure 2.1. CRA alleviates under-financing




E[Pr(c < cˆ)|GR] = FL(cˆ(r))
E[Pr(c < cˆ)|NR] = λFL(cˆ(r)) + (1− λ)FH (cˆ(r))
E[Pr(c < cˆ)|BR] = FH (cˆ(r))
(1+ r)−1
Figure 2.2. CRA leads to under-financing.
the graphical illustration of FH(cˆ(r)). Recall that for the market to survive,
there should be at least one value of r, such as the solid curve is above the
line which corresponds to investors’s beliefs.
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Part one and two of Proposition 1 is depicted in Figure 2.1 and 2.2,
respectively. Figure 2.1 illustrates the case where asymmetric information
is severe, and an LEC entrepreneur can raise capital only if he can dif-
ferentiate himself. Hence, introducing a CRA alleviates under-financing.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the case where information asymmetry is moderate,
and an HEC entrepreneur can raise capital only if he is pooled with an
LEC entrepreneur. Thus, introducing a CRA prevents pooling, and leads
to under-financing of an HEC entrepreneur, even though finance him is
socially optimal.
The intuition behind the last observation relates to the fact that an
entrepreneur cannot commit to exerting effort. Also, we argue later in this
section, that the distortion due to lack of commitment is greater, the lower
ex-ante efficiency is. Hence, pooling an HEC with an LEC entrepreneur
alleviates the resulting distortion. This is evident in the case where an
HEC entrepreneur cannot be funded in isolation, though he can be funded
by being pooled with an LEC entrepreneur. The reason is that pooling
leads investors to upgrade their beliefs about the probability of success,
which in turn, reduces the interest rate they require. If the lower interest
rate alters the choice of exerting effort from unprofitable to profitable, then
investors anticipate this, and they are willing to finance the entrepreneur.
2.6.1.2 Impact on Probability of Default
Once the equilibrium interest rate is derived, I can compute the expected
interest rate and the expected probability of default. The expected inter-
est rate (probability of default) consists of the interest rate (probability of
default) of each type of entrepreneur, i, weighted by the probability that
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the entrepreneur is of type i. Recall that, as ratings are perfectly accurate,
a good rating is associated with an LEC entrepreneur and a bad rating is
associated with an HEC entrepreneur. I present the effect of introducing a
CRA on these variables for both an LEC and an HEC entrepreneur; how-
ever, my main goal is the effect at the expected/market level.
Proposition 2 (Probability of Default)
If information asymmetry is mild, i.e., there exists r such as FH(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)−1
(the market survives independently of whether a CRA exists), then the relation
among the equilibrium probabilities of default is:
1− FL(cˆ(r∗GR)) < 1− FL(cˆ(r∗I I)) < 1− FH(cˆ(r∗I I)) < 1− FH(cˆ(r∗BR)) (2.13)
In addition, the expected probability of default in absence of a CRA is lower than
the expected probability of default when a CRA exists:
λ(1− FL(cˆ(r∗I I))) + (1− λ)(1− FH(cˆ(r∗I I))) <
λ(1− FL(cˆ(r∗GR))) + (1− λ)(1− FH(cˆ(r∗BR))) (2.14)
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2.3 illustrates Proposition 2 and 3. The distance of point G (B) from
the vertical axis captures the equilibrium interest rate which corresponds
to a good rating, and the distance of G (B) from the horizontal axis cap-
tures the probability of success of an LEC (HEC) entrepreneur. Also, the
distance of point A from the vertical axis captures the expected equilibrium
interest rate, and the distance of A from the horizontal axis captures the
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E[Pr(c < cˆ)|GR] = FL(cˆ(r))
E[Pr(c < cˆ)|NR] = λFL(cˆ(r)) + (1− λ)FH (cˆ(r))
E[Pr(c < cˆ)|BR] = FH (cˆ(r))
(1+ r)−1
Figure 2.3. Interest rate and default probability with and without CRA.
probability of success, in the regime with a CRA. Similarly, point N indi-
cates the expected equilibrium interest rate and the expected probability of
success when there is no CRA. The first part of the proposition is a conse-
quence of the FOSD assumption. The second part relates to the convexity
of (1 + r)−1: in Figure 2.3, point N is always above point A.9 Thus, the
expected probability of success (default) is higher in the regime without a
CRA.
2.6.1.3 Impact on Interest Rate
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Interest Rates)
If information asymmetry is mild, i.e., there exists r such as FH(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)−1
(the market survives independently of whether a CRA exists), then the relation
9In G: (1 + r∗GR)
−1 = FL(cˆ(r∗GR)), in B: (1 + r
∗
BR)
−1 = FH(cˆ(r∗BR)) and in N: (1 +
r∗GR)




among the equilibrium interest rates is given by:
(1+ r∗GR) < (1+ r
∗
I I) < (1+ r
∗
BR) (2.15)
In addition, the expected equilibrium interest rate in the absence of a CRA is
always lower than the expected equilibrium interest rate when a CRA exists:
(1+ r∗I I) < λ(1+ r
∗
GR) + (1− λ)(1+ r∗BR) (2.16)
Proof. See Appendix.
Similarly to proposition 2, part one follows directly from the FOSD
assumption, whereas part two relates to the convexity of (1+ r)−1.
Here I shed light on the intuition behind Proposition 2 and 3. The
main message of Proposition 2 and 3 is that introducing a CRA has a neg-
ative effect on an HEC, and a positive effect on an LEC entrepreneur. I
show that the former always offsets the latter in the case where asymmet-
ric information is not severe enough to lead to a market breakdown. These
findings arise from the feedback effect in capital markets and its asymmet-
ric impact on entrepreneurs of different quality. In order to understand this
asymmetry, it is crucial first to understand how the feedback effect works
in practice.
After investors observe the rating and form their beliefs about the
expected cost of effort and the probability of default, they demand an in-
terest rate which allows them to break even. The raised funds adjusted by
the interest rate (capital cost) need to be paid back by the entrepreneur.
For an entrepreneur who was indifferent between exerting and not exert-
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ing effort, adding the capital cost makes exerting effort unprofitable, and
thus the effort threshold, cˆ, drops. The lower effort threshold coincides
with a higher probability of default, which results in investors demanding
a higher interest rate. This feedback loop continues until the interest rate
converges to its equilibrium value.
Note that every loop leads to continuous updates in beliefs about
the probability of default, and the demanded interest rate. The magnitude,
however, of the increase in the probability of default and the interest rate
after each loop, diminishes. This is a consequence of the always decreasing
expected cost, conditional on exerting effort.
The previous reasoning implies that the change in the interest rate
and the probability of default, due to this feedback mechanism, is smaller
for more efficient entrepreneurs, i.e., the equilibrium interest rate is a con-
vex function of the expected value of the cost of effort. A direct conse-
quence of this remark is that the negative effect on an HEC entrepreneur
dominates the positive effect on an LEC entrepreneur.
2.6.1.4 Optimal Level of Rating Precision
The main message of Propositions 1-3 is that better monitoring does not
necessarily correspond to better allocation of resources. For example, con-
sider an environment where CRA receives a signal about the entrepreneur’s
type, and the social planner can affect the precision of this signal. This
could be achieved through, for instance, regulating the evidence that an
entrepreneur should provide to the CRA during the evaluation process.
A question which arises naturally is what would be the precision level
that maximizes financing opportunities. To explore this, I allow for the
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following modifications: I assume that the CRA receives a binary signal,
σ = {GS, BS}, which reveals the true state with probability α, i.e.,
Prob(i = L|GS) = Prob(i = H|BS) = α
where α ∈ (0.5, 1] is common knowledge.10 To avoid any unnecessary
complications, I assume, without loss of generality, that the CRA reveals
his private signal truthfully, i.e., the CRA gives a good rating, if the signal
is good, and a bad rating, if the signal is bad. The level of optimal precision
is given in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: (Optimal Level of Precision)
The level of precision α that maximizes an entrepreneur’s financing opportuni-
ties does not necessarily coincide with 1 (perfectly precise signal). If an HEC
entrepreneur’s financing is feasible only if there is some pooling with an LEC en-
trepreneur, the financing opportunities are maximized for a value of α which is
weakly smaller than one. The optimal level of precision, α∗, solves:
FL(cˆ(r˜BR))(1− α∗) + FH(cˆ(r˜BR))α∗ = (1+ r˜BR)−1 (2.17)
Proof. See Appendix.
The following Corollary summarizes the impact of introducing a CRA. Fig-
ure 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate findings of Corollary 1, for the case where the cost
is uniformly distributed.
10For α = 1 the signal is perfectly informative.
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Corollary 1 (Impact of better Information)
The introduction of a CRA:
(i) leads to a higher expected probability of default and interest rate, when both
an LEC and an HEC entrepreneur can be financed independently of whether
a CRA exists. (Area A)
(ii) leads to under-financing, when an HEC entrepreneur’s financing is feasible
only if he is pooled with an LEC entrepreneur. (Area B)
(iii) alleviates under-financing, when the LEC entrepreneur’s financing is feasible
only if he can be differentiated by an HEC entrepreneur. (Area C)
The intuition behind Corollary 1, which summarizes the main find-
ings, relates to the co-existence of asymmetric information and a lack of
commitment to exerting effort. In this environment, resolving part of the
information asymmetry amplifies the impact of non-commitment. Thus,
there is an inherent trade-off in introducing a CRA; on one hand, the CRA
alleviates the information asymmetry problem, but on the other hand, ex-
acerbates the adverse effect of non-commitment. It can be shown that, if the
entrepreneur can commit to exerting effort, then better information always
improves the allocation of resources, an outcome that may not be true if the
entrepreneur is unable to commit. The net effect of a CRA on the allocation
of resources depends on the relative extent of each problem. For instance,
if the information asymmetry is severe (such the market collapses in the
absence of a CRA), introducing a CRA improves the allocation of resources.
Antithetically, if the information asymmetry is mild, the positive effect of
the CRA in resolving part of the asymmetry is dominated by the negative
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effect due to lack of commitment. This is captured in Figure 2.4 and 2.5,
where, as the probability of the entrepreneur being LEC, λ, increases, area
B spreads over area C.
cL ∼ U[0, c¯], cL ∼ U[γc¯, c¯], R = 5 & λ = 0.5
x-axis: c¯, y-axis: γ
Figure 2.4. Equilibrium existence regions
cL ∼ U[0, c¯], cL ∼ U[γc¯, c¯], R = 5 & λ = 0.8
x-axis: c¯, y-axis: γ
Figure 2.5. Equilibrium existence regions
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2.7 Optimal Rating Policy
In the previous analysis, I assumed that the ratings should be accompanied
by hard evidence. This assumption restricts the rating policy to truthful
disclosure. Even though this assumption is useful in capturing the impact
of better information, it diminishes the role of a CRA. In this section, I
relax the hard-evidence assumption, and explore the CRA’s optimal rating
policy. The rationale behind relaxing the assumption of hard evidence is
that, although it is true that CRAs provide supporting evidence with the
ratings, there are cases where this evidence does not reveal perfectly the
type of the firm.
The CRA’s objective when designing the rating rule is to maximize
expected profits,
E[Π|ΩCRA] = E[(P− d)D|ΩCRA]
where P, d and D stand for the rating fee, the cost of acquiring a signal,
and the demand for ratings, respectively.
In order to disentangle the rating policy from the decision of acquir-
ing a private signal and the rating fee determination, I assume that the
CRA receives a perfect signal about the entrepreneur’s type at cost d = 0,
and that it is a price taker. In this environment, the objective of maximiz-
ing expected profit coincides with the objective of maximizing the expected
demand for ratings:
E[D|Ω] = E[λIL + (1− λ)IH|Ω]
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where IL(IH) equals one if an LEC (HEC) type ask for a rating, and zero
otherwise. Note that the entrepreneur asks for a rating if he expects that
having a rating will enable him to raise capital at a lower cost. Thus, the
objective of maximizing demand pins down to designing a rating rule, such
that the entrepreneur asks for a rating independently of his type.
This setup is similar to the persuasion setting developed in Ka-
menica and Gentzkow (2009), where a sender (CRA) observes a private sig-
nal (type of entrepreneur), and then sends a message (rating) to a receiver
(investor). Subsequently, the receiver takes an action (decides whether to
finance and the interest rate in case of financing), which affects the payoff
of both the sender and receiver.
The persuasion game is relevant when the message is pivotal. In this
setting, the message is pivotal if it can affect financing opportunities: an
HEC entrepreneur cannot raise capital if his type is known.
To avoid any unnecessary complications, I assume that the signal can
be of two values, good and bad (σ˜ = {GS, BS}) and that it perfectly reveals
the type of the entrepreneur, i.e. Pr(i = L|GS) = 1 and Pr(i = H|BS) =
1. The rating policy is a mapping from a signal realization to a rating,
where the rating can take two values, good and bad (R˜ = {GR, BR}).
Thus, the rating policy consists two parameters, αG and αB, where αG =
Prob(GR|GS) and αB = Prob(BR|BS).11
As long as both ratings are issued in equilibrium, the market sur-
vives if there exists an r, such that the following conditions hold:
Pr(i = L|GR)FL(cˆ(r)) + Pr(i = H|GR)FH(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)−1 (2.18)
11Truthful disclosure is implemented when αG = αB = 1.
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Pr(i = L|BR)FL(cˆ(r)) + Pr(i = H|BR)FH(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)−1 (2.19)
where condition (2.18) refers to the case where a good rating is issued,
whereas condition (2.19) refers to the case where a bad rating is issued. By
implementing the Bayes rule, I can re-write conditions (2.18) and (2.19) as
follows:
αGλ
αGλ+ (1− αB)(1− λ)FL(cˆ(r))+
(1− αB)(1− λ)
αGλ+ (1− αB)(1− λ)FH(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)
−1
(1− αG)λ
(1− αG)λ+ αB(1− λ)FL(cˆ(r))+
αB(1− λ)
(1− αG)λ+ αB(1− λ)FH(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)
−1
Recall that by the FOSD assumption, FL(cˆ(r)) > FH(cˆ(r)) for any r. This
property implies that the market survives as long as the probability that
the investors attribute to the entrepreneur being of LEC type is sufficiently
large. I define as λˆ the minimum probability that investors should attribute
to the entrepreneur being of LEC type, such as financing takes place. λˆ
solves:
λˆFL(cˆ(r)) + (1− λˆ)FH(cˆ(r)) = (1+ r)−1
Thus, a CRA can achieve project financing for both types (ILEC = IHEC = 1)
as long as αG and αB are chosen in a way that investors’ beliefs about the
probability that the entrepreneur is of LEC type exceed λˆ, independently
of the rating. This translates into the CRA choosing a combination of αG
and αB such that:
Min{ αGλ
αGλ+ (1− αB)(1− λ) ,
(1− αG)λ
(1− αG)λ+ αB(1− λ)} ≥ λˆ
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A question which arises naturatelly is to what extent the CRA can affect
investor’s beliefs, and more specifically, what is the maximum λˆ, denoted
as λˆmax, that could be achieved by a CRA when it can pre-commit to a
rating policy. λˆmax solves the following problem:
Maximize
αG,αB
Min{Pr(i = L|GR), Pr(i = H|BR)}
subject to 0 ≤ αG ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ αB ≤ 1 and αG ≥ αB.
Note that the constraint αG ≥ αB relates the the signaling component of
the decision to ask for a rating, and in particular to off-equilibrium beliefs.
This condition guarantees that an LEC entrepreneur has stronger incentive
than an HEC entrepreneur to ask for a rating. Otherwise, there could be
an equilibrium when neither an LEC nor an HEC entrepreneur asks for a
rating. The solution to the maximization problem satisfies the following
equation:
α∗G = 1− α∗B (2.20)
Note that the equilibrium that maximizes financing opportunities is a bab-
bling equilibrium. In a babbling equilibrium the updated beliefs equal the
prior beliefs in a regime without CRA, i.e.,
λˆmax ≡ Pr(LEC|α∗G, α∗B, GR) = Pr(LEC|α∗G, α∗B, BR) = λ
Proposition 5: Optimal Rating Policy
The optimal rating policy when CRA’s objective is to maximize its profit is:
i) α∗G = α
∗
B = 0.5 (babbling equilibrium), if there is a value of r such that
λFL(cˆ(r)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r)) ≥ (1+ r)−1,
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ii) α∗G = α
∗
B = 1 (truthful disclosure), otherwise.
Rating Inflation, Rating Deflation and their Impact
A value of α∗B smaller than one implies that the CRA inflates its rating,
i.e., an HEC entrepreneur receives a rating which corresponds to an en-
trepreneur of a higher level of creditworthiness. In addition, a value of
α∗G smaller than 1 implies that the CRA deflates its rating, i.e., an LEC en-
trepreneur receives a rating which corresponds to an entrepreneur of a
lower level of creditworthiness. The intuition is straightforward: by giving
bad rating to an LEC type, the CRA prevents a significant downgrade in
investors’ beliefs when the observe a bad rating. Hence, the entrepreneur
can raise capital even after a bad rating, thus, he has incentive to ask for a
rating.
Also, regarding the allocation of resources, we show that once we al-
low for the feedback effect inherent in capital markets, rating inflation and
deflation might lead to financing of an entrepreneur with positive NPV,
that would not be financed if the rating were truthful. The message of this
finding is that, if information asymmetry is not severe, restricting CRAs to
provide hard evidence with their ratings might have a negative effect on
the probabilities of project financing and default.
Corollary 2: Impact of Rating Inflation/Deflation
When the CRA can pre-commit to a rating rule, rating inflation/deflation can be
part of the equilibrium even if the fee is not rating-contingent. Besides, rating




In this section I allow the CRA to choose a profit-maximizing fee. A direct
consequence of the positive rating fee is that it modifies the implementa-
tion threshold, cˆ. The comparison with the case where the rating fee is
restricted to zero allows me to isolate the distortion that a rating fee incurs.
The CRA’s Problem: The CRA anticipates that only an LEC entrepreneur
has incentive to ask for a rating; thus, it chooses the rating fee P, such
that an LEC entrepreneur is indifferent between having and not having a
rating. The functional form of the profit-maximizing fee, denoted as Pmax
and specified below, is related to the entrepreneur’s outside option, which
is determined by whether financing is feasible without a rating. If having
a rating is not necessary for raising capital, the CRA will charge a fee
that makes an LEC entrepreneur indifferent between asking for a rating
and differentiating himself, or not asking for a rating and pooled with an
HEC entrepreneur. In contrast, when the absence of a good rating leads to
no financing, the entrepreneur’s outside option is zero. Hence the profit-
maximizing CRA extracts all the surplus, i.e., it charges the maximum fee
for which an equilibrium exists. The following conditions characterize the
profit maximizing rating fee:12
Pmax ≡
 P
max = (rI I−rˆR)
(1+rˆR)
If rating not necessary for financing
P¯max : F(cˆ|P = P¯max) = 0.5 If rating necessary for financing
(2.21)
12P¯max = arg max P s.t.(1+ rˆR)−1 = F(cˆ|P = P¯max)
92
The Entrepreneur’s Problem: The entrepreneur’s problem is more compli-
cated than before: now, before facing the problem of the security design or
whether to exert effort, the entrepreneur has to choose whether to ask for
a rating. An HEC entrepreneur has no incentive to ask for a rating because
by doing so, he would reveal his type.
I first explore the incentives of an LEC entrepreneur in the case
where the market does not collapse in the absence of a good rating. The
decision of an LEC entrepreneur to ask for a rating depends on which of
the following two forces dominates. On one hand, asking for a rating dif-
ferentiates him from an HEC entrepreneur, and allows him to promise a
lower interest rate, rˆR instead of rI I . On the other hand, asking for a rat-
ing implies that he needs to borrow a higher amount to cover - apart from
the investment cost- the rating fee, Pmax. Thus, an LEC entrepreneur faces
a trade-off between repaying a smaller loan (1, instead of 1 + Pmax) with
higher interest rate, or a larger loan with a lower interest rate.13 Thus,
in an environment where a rating is not necessary for financing, the en-
trepreneur chooses the action which leads to the highest expected utility,
where:
U(without rating) = max{R− (1+ rI I)− c, 0} (2.22)
U(with rating) = max{R− (1+ rˆR)(1+ Pmax)− c, 0} (2.23)
where the max function reflects the fact that the entrepreneur always has
the choice not to exert effort. Thus, an LEC entrepreneur asks for a rating
13Here I implicitly assume that there is a lag between the time that the CRA gives the
rating and the time CRA is paid. Due to rational expectations of the CRA, such setup is
feasible if the entrepreneur can commit to paying the fee after the loan is taken.
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as long as:
(1+ rˆR)(1+ Pmax) ≤ (1+ rI I) (2.24)
and exerts effort as long as:
c ≤ cˆ ≡ max{R− (1+ rI I), R− (1+ rˆR)(1+ Pmax)} (2.25)
I now proceed to the case where the market collapses in the absence of
a good rating. In this case, the CRA will charge a fee which extracts all
the surplus of the entrepreneur. Following the previous analysis, and the
CRA’s problem, I re-write the implementation threshold of an LEC en-
trepreneur, cˆL, as:
cˆL ≡
 cˆL = R− 1+ r
∗
I I If rating & rating not necessary
ˆ¯cL = R− (1+ r¯R)(1+ P¯max) If rating & rating necessary
(2.26)
The related threshold for an HEC entrepreneur is:
cˆH ≡ R− (1+ rNR) (2.27)
The Investors’ Problem: Investors know whether project financing is feasi-
ble without the rating, and update their beliefs after observing whether the
entrepreneur holds a rating. Because the CRA reports its private informa-
tion truthfully, and charges a fee that an LEC entrepreneur buys a rating
in equilibrium: Prob(i = L|GR) = 1 and Prob(i = H|NR) = 1. Hence,
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investors’ beliefs are as follows:
˜s(.) =

s˜(rR) = FL(cˆ(r∗R)) If GR & rating not necessary for financing
s˜(rR¯) = FL(cˆ(r¯
∗
R)) If GR & rating necessary for financing
s˜(rNR) = FH(cˆ(rNR)) If No Rating
(2.28)
Investors would be willing to finance an entrepreneur who holds a rating
as long as s˜(rR) ≥ (1+ rR)−1, if rating is necessary, and as long as s˜(rR¯) ≥
(1+ rR¯)
−1, if rating is not necessary for raising capital. Similarly, investors
would be willing to finance an entrepreneur with no rating as long as
s˜NR ≥ (1+ rNR)−1.
2.8.1 Equilibrium Interest rates
The combined problems of the CRA, the entrepreneur, and investors, de-
termine the equilibrium interest rates r∗R and r
∗
NR, for an entrepreneur with







−1 If rating & rating not necessary
(1+ r¯∗R) = FL(cˆ(r¯
∗
R))
−1 = 2 If rating & rating necessary
(2.29)
(1+ r∗NR) = FH(cˆ(r
∗
NR)) (2.30)
Note that the interest rate r∗R of an LEC entrepreneur is affected by the
probability of the entrepreneur being LEC. A higher λ, or a lower cost
of an HEC entrepreneur, reduces the interest rate r∗I I , improves the out-
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side option of an LEC entrepreneur, and results in a lower rating fee and
interest rate. Moreover, a higher the fee increases the probability of default.
Proposition 6: (Effect of Profit Maximizer CRA)
The profit-maximizing fee is negatively related to the probability λ and the cost of
effort. Also, allowing the CRA to charge the profit-maximizing fee increases the
interest rate and the probability of default of an LEC entrepreneur, but it does not
affect the probability of project financing.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.9 Concluding Remarks and Future Research
In this paper, I argue that the reason for potential inefficiencies emerging
from credit rating agencies might be more pathological than the literature
recognizes. I evaluate the impact of a CRA, in a setup of project financing,
which is characterized by the coexistence of information asymmetry and
lack of commitment. I show that even in an ideal environment, where
a CRA has access to perfect monitoring and reveals its rating truthfully,
introducing a CRA might lead to a higher probability of default and hurt
financing opportunities of positive-NPV projects. Moreover, I evaluate the
regulation policy of requiring CRAs to provide hard evidence with their
ratings. I argue that this policy might have an adverse effect on project’s
financing opportunities. Finally, I show that rating inflation or deflation
might lead to better allocation of resources.
My findings have implications for the optimal information rating
policy of a government or a central bank. For instance, a key question after
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the recent crisis is whether the results of stress tests for banks should be
publicized. My analysis suggests that concealing these results might im-
prove the allocation of resources. This is a consequence of the finding that
the amplification in the probability of default of bad banks might domi-
nate the beneficial effect on good banks. Goldstein and Leitner (2013) 14
arrive at a similar conclusion by adopting a different setting. Corollary 1
could also relate to the recent debate on the borrowing interests rates that
countries in the eurozone face. Interest rates differ across countries due
to differences in credit risk; this has resulted in some peripheral countries
borrowing with high spreads, which kept rising over time and eventually
led to some countries being close to default. This paper suggests that a
policy that requires countries with low credit risk to guarantee for coun-
tries with high credit risks, could improve the allocation of resources and
decrease the expected probability of default.
My analysis suggests that future research on CRAs’ behavior should
account for the inherent in capital markets feedback effect. Note that this
feedback effect implies a self-fulfilling effect of ratings: keeping the efficiency
of an entrepreneur fixed, the probability of default which corresponds to
a bad rating exceeds the one which corresponds to a good rating. The
literature has overlooked this self-fulfilling effect of ratings -a concept that
could be applied in future work in the context of testing CRAs’ arguments
on reputation concerns.
The mechanism explained in the previous paragraph opens the door
to policy considerations, and it raises concerns regarding CRAs’ regulation.
14Disclosure of some information may be necessary to prevent a market breakdown,
but disclosing too much destroys risk-sharing opportunities
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A message from this paper is that regulation of CRAs has yet to consider




Security Design with Endogenous
Implementation Choice
3.1 Introduction
Crowdfunding (CF) is a new method for financing projects by raising cap-
ital from a large pool of investors, performed via an internet platform.
The forecasts for capital raised in 2015 through CF platforms exceeds $34
billion, when the venture capital (VC) industry invests an average of $30
billion each year.1 CF started as a method for raising capital from crowds
whose contributions were driven mostly by non-monetary incentives (non-
equity CF). However, since April 2012, it entered a new era: the Jump-start
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act legalized equity CF by relaxing a series
of restrictions regarding the sale of securities. The aim of this paper is to
shed light on the role of securities on the allocation of resources, and to
show that rewarding the non-implementation of a project is always part of
1“2015 Crowdfunding industry report”, Massolution (2015).
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the optimal security.
A key characteristic of CF is the easier access to potential capital.
This relates to the fundamental idea in crowdfunding: it is the crowd,
rather than a venture capitalist or a bank that decides about the creditwor-
thiness of a project. Simplifying the process of accessing potential capital
has a critical impact on the type of entrepreneurs and projects that this
method attracts. On the plus side, crowdfunding is more open to inno-
vative ideas. On the downside, it might attract entrepreneurs who: i) are
associated with negative-NPV projects, ii) have little experience, and as a
result, no record regarding their ability, and iii) have limited liability.2
This paper is based on two observations. First, compared to VC,
investors in CF do not participate in the determination of the terms of fi-
nancing. In CF platforms, entrepreneurs offer a take-or-leave-it security to
potential investors. Thus, the determination of the optimal security when
raising capital is a signaling rather than a screening problem. This signal-
ing problem has been studied thoroughly in the security design literature,
where prominent examples are Myers and Majluf (1984) and Nachman
and Noe (1994). This brings us to the second observation which regards
the main characteristics of the capital seeking party. In particular, we rec-
ognize that the representative entrepreneur in CF platforms differs from
a typical large company; hence, applying the main findings of the secu-
rity design literature in this environment is not straightforward. Following
the previous two observations, the goal of this paper is to characterize the
optimal security issued by an entrepreneur which shares the same charac-
2Agrawal et al. (2013) provide a very detailed introduction to the incentives of the in-
vestors, entrepreneurs, and platforms in CF. Valanciene and Jegeleviciute (2013) highlight
the main benefits and drawbacks of CF.
100
teristics as a representative entrepreneur in CF platforms, and explore its
main implications on the allocation of resources.
We study a setup where a cashless entrepreneur seeks capital to fi-
nance an investment project. The entrepreneur is either of high-productivity
(a good type) or of low productivity (a bad type). The entrepreneur is pri-
vately informed about her type whereas potential investors only hold be-
liefs about the entrepreneur’s type. Asymmetric information between the
entrepreneur and potential investors gives rise to a signaling game when
the former issues securities to raise capital. We differ from the security
design literature in two crucial dimensions. First, to capture better the
crowdfunding example, we do not restrict our analysis to entrepreneurs
which are associated with projects of positive net present value. In par-
ticular, we assume that the good type corresponds to a project of positive
NPV, whereas the bad type corresponds to a project of negative NPV. Sec-
ond, we relax the implicit or explicit assumption in the security design
literature that the entrepreneur is obliged to implementing the project af-
ter raising funds; in our model, whether the project is implemented is
determined endogenously. These two features not only enrich the security
design problem by allowing the security to be also contingent on the im-
plementation choice, but also enables us to explore the allocational impact
of the optimal security.
The first set of findings refers to the characterization of the optimal
security. We find that the unique equilibrium in the contracting game is
a pooling equilibrium where the bad type offers the same security as the
good type. The optimal security is characterized by two components: a
payment scheme if the project is implemented, and a fixed payment if the
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project is not implemented. The payment scheme is similar to the standard
debt; the investors become the claimants of the return of the project if that
fails, whereas they receive a predetermined amount otherwise. The pay-
ment in case of non-implementation is such as the bad type’s expected util-
ity when not implementing the project coincides with her expected utility
when implementing the project. The intuition behind a debt-like contract
is two-fold. First, offering a security where the entrepreneur’s return is
zero when the project fails -which is more likely when the entrepreneur is
of bad type- is aligned with the incentive of the good type to separate from
the bad type. This idea is similar to the intuition of Nachman and Noe
(1994). Second, a debt-like security minimizes the expected utility of the
bad type when implementing the project. Worsening the bad type’s option
of implementing the project effectively minimizes the cost of preventing
the bad type from implementing her project, which in turn, minimizes the
negative externality imposed by the bad to the good type.
The second set of findings relates to the implications of the optimal
security in the allocation of resources. We show that, once we endogenize
the choice of project implementation, the market survives, and a positive-
NPV entrepreneur implements her projects, independently of the extent of
information asymmetry. Besides, the optimal security achieves separation
in the implementation of the project; the negative-NPV type never imple-
ments her project. These findings differ significantly from the case where
the entrepreneur is obliged to project implementation, which leads to either
under-implementation or over-implementation. Finally, we show that com-
mitment to project implementation is never profitable for the entrepreneur.
This is because preventing a negative-NPV type from implementation mit-
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igates its negative externality to the positive-NPV type. These findings
highlight that focusing on securities that do not allow for the possibility of
non-implementing the project has negative ramifications on welfare.
In Section 5 we develop a richer environment where the entrepreneur
chooses her productivity level in equilibrium. We derive the equilibrium
productivity level, and explore how it relates to the assumption that the
entrepreneur is obliged to project implementation. In particular, we are
interested in examining whether the finding of rewarding an entrepreneur
when not implementing her project could weaken her incentive to invest
in increasing her productivity, given that productivity is irrelevant when
the project is not implemented. To explore this, we allow the entrepreneur
to take a costly action, which is unobservable to investors and increases
her productivity. We find that allowing the project implementation to be
at the entrepreneur’s discretion increases the entrepreneur’s expected pro-
ductivity. This follows from the finding that high productivity is rewarded
more due to the better allocation of resources, which, effectively, leads
to a steeper incentive pay. This analysis indicates that allowing for non-
implementation of projects is aligned with the CF platform’s incentives of
attracting high productivity projects.3
Relevant Literature
Our work pertains mainly to the literature on security design under
asymmetric information, initiated by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Nach-
man and Noe (1994), and followed by DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and De-
3The revenue of platforms comes from a commission of 4-5% on the amount raised.
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Marzo (2005). Technically, our setup is closer to Nachman and Noe (1994),
apart from two major modifications: first, the entrepreneur might be as-
sociated with a negative-NPV project, and second, we relax the (implicit)
assumption that the entrepreneur is obliged to implement the project. Al-
lowing for the project implementation to be at the entrepreneur’s discretion
differentiates our work from the papers in this strand of the literature.
Besides, this work relates to the literature which explores the ques-
tion of security design in an environment which is characterized by moral
hazard. Prominent examples include Innes (1990), Crémer et al. (1998),
Hartman-Glaser et al. (2012). We differ from this strand of the literature
with respect to the form of the hidden action. In our paper, the hidden
action refers to the decision of the agent to invest in her productivity level.
Regarding the finding of alleviating adverse selection, our paper relates to
Brennan and Kraus (1987). In our model, alleviating adverse selection is
achieved by endogenizing the choice of project implementation. In con-
trast, Brennan and Kraus (1987) is interested in financial settings which
alleviate adverse selection.
This paper is also related to the literature which highlights the op-
timality of CEO’s severance pay, known as “golden parachutes”. “Golden
parachutes” refers to the compensation of a CEO when her executive is
terminated, as a result of a merger or takeover. Similarly to our paper,
the idea behind the optimality of severance pay to an informed agent is
that it might prevent her from taking an action, which results in an ineffi-
cient allocation of resources. In our setup, the inefficient allocation comes
from implementing a negative-NPV project, whereas in the CEO example,
comes from taking an investment decision which differs from the profit-
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maximizing one. For example, Inderst and Mueller (2010) show that the
rewarding an agent to quit could be optimal, as long as it is accompa-
nied by a steep incentive pay. In a slightly different environment, Levitt
and Snyder (1997) argue in favor of rewarding a CEO to reveal bad news
which could, in turn, lead the principal to cancel an inefficient project.
As opposed to Levitt and Snyder (1997), where the possibility of a project
cancellation leads to lower effort and productivity, we find that rewarding
non-implementation of the project results in higher productivity. This is a
critical departure from the literature on “golden parachutes”: in our setup,
the optimality of this payment not only does not fade off when the pro-
ductivity is endogenous, but it is reinforced. Also, in the technical part,
a major difference of our work from the literature on CEO’s compensa-
tion contracts is that, in our setup, it is the informed party who offers the
contract. Hence, we explore a signaling rather than a screening problem.
A key finding of our paper is that allowing entrepreneurs to decide
whether to implement their project, and to include this decision in the
security, prevents market breakdown. Preventing market breakdown is
also one of the main goals in Philippon and Skreta (2010), Tirole (2012) and
Camargo et al. (2014), who focus on the role of the optimal government
intervention, rather than financial securities.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model.
Section 3.3 explores the case where the entrepreneur is obliged to project
implementation. Section 3.4 explores the case where the project imple-
mentation is at the entrepreneur’s discretion. Section 3.5 presents the case
where the productivity of the entrepreneur is endogenously determined.
Section 3.6 discusses and concludes.
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3.2 The Model
Environment: We consider an environment where a cashless, risk-neutral
entrepreneur seeks capital to finance a project. The project is non-divisible,
and its implementation requires an investment equal to I. The entrepreneur
raises capital by potential investors, in exchange for securities. We assume
that capital market is perfectly competitive, and that investors demand a
net return normalized to zero. Once the necessary capital is raised, and
the project is implemented, a flow x is generated. We allow for a binary
cash flow, i.e., x = {S, F}, where S > F. Thus, x = S can be interpreted as
the cash flow when the project succeeds, and x = F as the cash flow when
the project fails. In order to be consistent with the crowdfunding example,
we assume that the entrepreneur does not have any wealth other than the
project’s return. Also, both the entrepreneur and investors are protected
by limited liability.
Entrepreneur’s types & Information sets: The entrepreneur can be of two
types, bad or good, i.e., t ∈ T = {B, G}. We assume that the good (bad)
type generates a success with probability pG (pB), where pG > pB. A
good type can be interpreted as a high-productivity entrepreneur, whereas
a bad type can be interpreted as a low-productivity entrepreneur, where
the productivity is determined by the probability of success of the project.
The entrepreneur has private information regarding her type. In contrast,
investors hold prior beliefs about the entrepreneur’s type. In particular,
investors expect the entrepreneur to be of good type, with probability λG,
and of bad type, with the complementary probability λB = 1− λG. Both
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the probability of success of each type, and investors’ beliefs regarding the
entrepreneur’s type are common knowledge.
It is worth highlighting a critical departure of our paper from other
papers on the security design literature such as Nachman and Noe (1994).
In this paper, we do not restrict the analysis to projects of positive net
present value. Instead, we assume that the bad type corresponds to a
negative-NPV project, whereas the good type corresponds to a positive-
NPV project, i.e.,
pGS + (1− pG)F > I > pBS + (1− pB)F. (3.1)
Finally, we do not impose any restriction on the ex-ante NPV of the project:
λG[(pGS + (1− pG)F] + λB][pBS + (1− pB)F]− I
i.e., conditional on investor’s prior beliefs, the entrepreneur’s project can
have positive, negative or zero NPV. We explore each case separately.
A possible concern behind this assumption, is why an entrepreneur
would choose to implement a negative-NPV project. The answer to this
relates to the combination of two characteristics, which closely reflect what
is documented in the crowd-funding industry: i) the project is funded fully
by a third party, and ii) the entrepreneur has limited liability. A direct con-
sequence of these two characteristics is that although the entrepreneur’s
project has negative expected net return, the entrepreneur’s expected util-
ity is always non-negative. Note that allowing for a negative-NPV project
has implications for the planner’s problem: if the aim of the planner is to
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maximize total welfare, only type t = G is worth financing.
Contracting game: The information asymmetry between the entrepreneur
and investors, regarding the type of the former, turns the choice of the se-
curity design into a signaling game. A significant part of the literature on
security design, such as Myers and Majluf (1984) and Nachman and Noe
(1994) assumes, either implicitly or explicitly, that once financing takes
place, the entrepreneur is obliged to project implementation.4 The goal
of this paper is to show that this assumption plays a critical role when
the entrepreneur shares the same characteristics as the representative en-
trepreneur in crowdfunding platforms. In particular, we are going to show
that this assumption leads to an inefficient allocation of resources, and if
information asymmetry is severe, to a market breakdown. Hence, apply-
ing the main findings of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Nachman and Noe
(1994) to a crowdfunding environment might be problematic.
Endogenizing the implementation choice enriches the contracting
game; the security is contingent not only on the realized cash flow, but
also on the implementation choice. We denote by g a security which con-
sists of two sets of payments, g(x) and g¯. g(x) denotes the payment when
the project is implemented and the realized cash flow is x. In contrast, g¯
denotes the payment if no implementation takes place. Thus, the security
is defined by the triple: g(S), g(F), g¯. Finally, given the price Pg of the secu-
4In fact, Nachman and Noe (1994) allow for securities which are contingent only on
the realized cash flow.
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rity, the assumption of limited liability imposes the following restrictions:
0 ≤ g(x) ≤ Pg − I + x, if the project is implemented
0 ≤ g¯ ≤ Pg, if the project is not implemented
where g(x) ≥ 0 and g¯ ≥ 0 capture investors’ limited liability, whereas
g(x) ≤ Pg − I + x and g¯ ≤ Pg capture the entrepreneur’s limited liability.
We denote by G the set of admissible securities, i.e., securities which are
characterized by g(x) and g¯, and satisfy the limited liability assumption.
Entrepreneur’s Maximization problem: An entrepreneur of type t ∈ T
issues a security gt, which consists of gt(x) and g¯t, in order to maximize
her expected utility:
V(t, gt, Pgt) = max{Et[Pgt − I + x− gt(x)], Pgt − g¯t} (3.2)
where Pgt represents the price of security gt. Note that Et[Pgt − I + x −
gt(x)] is the entrepreneur’s expected utility when implementing her project,
whereas Pgt − g¯t is her expected utility in the case where the project is not
implemented. The max function indicates that the entrepreneur will choose
the option which maximizes her expected return. Note that Pgt cannot be
lower than I, otherwise there would be insufficient funds for the imple-
mentation of the project. This remark, combined with the limited liability
assumption, imply that V(t, gt, Pgt) is non-negative, independently of the
type of the entrepreneur.
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Timing: The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The entrepreneur of type t ∈ T sells a security gt at price Pgt .
2. The entrepreneur decides whether to implement, by investing I.
3. If the project is implemented, its cash flow x is realized.
4. Contract is executed.
Equilibria characterization: A candidate for an equilibrium is a triple of
functions e∗ = (g∗, µ∗, P∗), where: i) g∗ : T 7→ G, where g∗t is the security
design chosen by the type t, ii) µ∗ : G 7→ ∆T, and µ∗g is the market’s
posterior beliefs given that the security g is offered by the entrepreneur,
and iii) P∗ : G 7→ R+. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a triple e∗ =
(g∗, µ∗, P∗), which satisfies the following conditions:
• Sequential Rationality: For each t ∈ T, g∗t maximizes V(t, gt, Pgt), sub-
ject to the constraints that g ∈ G and P∗g ≥ I.
• Beliefs Consistency: When security g is such that g = g∗t for some
t ∈ T, g is “on the equilibrium” and µ is determined by Bayes’ rule.
When g is such that g 6= g∗t for every t ∈ T, g is “off the equilibrium”,
then it is only required that µg ∈ ∆t.
• Competitive Rationality: P∗G = Eµ∗g[g], for all g ∈ G.
Regarding the “off-equilibrium beliefs”, we adopt the D1 refinement crite-
rion discussed in Cho and Kreps (1987). D1 places zero weight on a type
t = t′ deviating to an off-equilibrium design if there exists a type t = t′′
who has strong incentive to deviate, whenever type t = t′ has weak incen-
tive to deviate.
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3.3 Entrepreneur obliged to project implementa-
tion
In order to evaluate the impact of endogenizing the choice of project imple-
mentation, we use the case where the entrepreneur is obliged to implement
the project, as a benchmark. To this end, we start by characterizing the op-
timal security, under the assumption that the entrepreneur is obliged to
project implementation. This environment is consistent with the setup in
Nachman and Noe (1994), except for the modification that we allow for a
negative-NPV project. Note that, in this case, the security g is character-
ized only by the payment scheme g(x); the payment g¯ becomes irrelevant.
To avoid any confusion, when the entrepreneur is obliged to implement
the project, we denote the security as g′ and the corresponding payment
scheme as g(x)′. In contrast, when the choice of project implementation is
endogenous, we denote the security as g, and the corresponding payment
scheme as g(x).
Lemma 1
In equilibrium, the bad type offers the same security as the good type (pooling
equilibrium).
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. If the bad type offered
a different security, she would reveal herself, given that “on the equilib-
rium beliefs” should be correct. In that case, the bad type would not
be able to raise capital, because investors anticipate that she corresponds
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to a negative-NPV project. Hence, the only equilibrium in the contract-
ing game, is an equilibrium where the bad type offers the same security
as the good type. Consequently, investors posterior beliefs about the en-
trepreneur’s type, coincide with their prior. Also, given that the bad type
mimics the good type, we can focus on the maximization problem of the
good type.
Lemma 2
In equilibrium, the price of a security g, Pg equals I.
Lemma 2 is a consequence of a pooling equilibrium, where the bad type
mimics the good type. The rationale behind Lemma 2 is that the good type,
when raising capital, suffers a negative externality from the bad type. This
cross-subsidization implies that the good type ends up paying a higher
capital cost, than the one that would correspond to her type. As a re-
sult, it is never optimal for the entrepreneur to raise more capital than the
amount that is necessary for undertaking the project. Consequently, the
entrepreneur would never offer a security g′, whose corresponding price
exceeds the cost of financing the project, i.e. Pg ≤ I. Since the project is
non-divisible, Pg = I. Given Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the optimal secu-




pG(S− g(S)′) + (1− pG)(F− g(F)′) s.t.
λG[(pGg(S)′ + (1− pG)g(F)′] + λB[pBg(s)′ + (1− pB)g(F)′] = I (3.3)
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0 ≤ g(S)′ ≤ S (3.4)
0 ≤ g(F)′ ≤ F (3.5)
where (3.3) is the investors’ participation constraint, which is binding,
given that capital markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. In
particular, the LHS of (3.3) captures investors’ expected return, whereas
the RHS captures the amount investors pay for the security, denoted by Pg,
which, following the Lemma 2, equals I. The last two constraints capture
the limited liability of the entrepreneur and investors.
Before deriving the optimal security, we explore under what condi-
tions the market survives. Given that the equilibrium in the contracting
game is pooling, the market collapses and no financing takes place if there
is no feasible security which satisfies investors’ participation constraint:




Note that if the market collapses, the entrepreneur’s expected utility is
zero. In contrast, if the market survives, the expected utility of the en-
trepreneur is non-negative. Hence, the market collapses if, even for the
maximum feasible payments (g(S)′ = S, g(F)′ = F), the cost of financing
exceeds its expected revenue, i.e.,
λG[(pGS + (1− pG)F] + λB[pBS + (1− pB)F] < I (3.6)
Condition (3.6) holds if the prior probability that investors attribute to the
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I − [pBS + (1− pB)F]
(pG − pB)(S− F) (3.7)
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal security when the entrepreneur is
obliged, by assumption, to project implementation.
Proposition 1
If λG ≥ λminG , financing takes place, and the optimal security is given by:
g∗(F)′ = F , g∗(S)′ = I − F
λG pG + λB pB
+ F
If λG < λminG , no financing takes place (market collapses).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition behind the optimal security relates to the core idea in Nach-
man and Noe (1994). Namely, the good type tries to separate herself from
the bad type, by offering a contract which promises the maximum feasible
payment when the cash realization is low, because this cash flow is more
likely to arise when the entrepreneur is of bad rather than good type.
Note that there are two types of distortions depending on the value
of λG. If λG < λminG , there is under-implementation compared to the first
best: the positive-NPV type does not raise the necessary capital to imple-
ment her project. In contrast, if λG ≥ λminG , the market survives, and there
is over-implementation: the negative-NPV type implements her project.
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3.4 Endogenous project implementation
This section explores the case where the choice to implement the project is
at the entrepreneur’s discretion, and this choice is contractible. We showed
that restricting the entrepreneur to implement the project leads to under-
implementation, when the market collapses, and over-implementation, when
the market survives. The goal of this section is to show that endogeniz-
ing the choice of project implementation: i) increases the entrepreneur’s
expected utility, independently of her type, ii) improves the allocation of
resources, and iii) prevents the market from collapsing. Besides, we show
in Section 3.5 that endogenizing project’s implementation strengthens the
incentive of the entrepreneur to invest in her productivity.
Recall that the entrepreneur issues a security g which consists of
three payments; g(S), if the project is implemented and it succeeds, g(F),
if the project is implemented and it fails, and g¯, if the project is not imple-
mented. Similarly to the case where the entrepreneur is obliged to project
implementation, the bad type offers the same security as the good type,
i.e., Lemma 1 goes through. Besides, following Lemma 1, Lemma 2 holds
as well. Although there is pooling at the contracting stage, endogenizing
the choice of project implementation might lead to separation at the stage
of project implementation. Four are the possible scenarios regarding the
implementation of the project:
• Scenario 1: Both types implement their project. As long as beliefs are
consistent, this equilibrium is effectively the same as the equilibrium
when the entrepreneur is obliged to project implementation.
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• Scenario 2: Neither the good nor the bad type implements her project.
• Scenario 3: Only the bad type chooses to implement the project. This
scenario can not emerge in equilibrium because it violates investors’
participation constraint. Even for the maximum feasible payments,
i.e., g(F) = G, g(S) = S, g¯ = Pg, investors would make zero profits if
the entrepreneur is of good type, and negative profits otherwise.
• Scenario 4: Only the good type chooses to implement the project.
This is the only case where separation can be achieved, in the sense
that the implementation choice differs depending on the entrepreneur’s
type. The following analysis shows that this scenario can emerge in
equilibrium.
We postpone exploring scenario 1 and 2 for the end of this section, and we
start with analyzing scenario 4. We are interested in finding the security
which maximizes the expected utility of the good type, subject to the con-
straint that only the good type implements the project. Compared to the
case where the entrepreneur is obliged to project implementation, the max-
imization problem is augmented by one incentive compatibility condition
for each type. The maximization problem of the good type is given by:
Maximize
g(S),g(F),g¯
EU(impl|t = G) s.t.
EU(impl|t = G) ≥ EU(not impl|t = G) (ICCG)
EU(impl|t = B) ≤ EU(not impl|t = B) (ICCB)
λG[pGg(S) + (1− pG)g(F)] + λB g¯ ≥ I (PCI)
0 ≤ g(S) ≤ S , 0 ≤ g(F) ≤ F, 0 ≤ g¯ ≤ I (LL)
116
where,
EU(impl|t = G) = pG(S− g(S)) + (1− pG)(F− g(F))
EU(impl|t = B) = pB(S− g(S)) + (1− pB)(F− g(F))
EU(not impl|t = G) = EU(not impl|t = B) = I − g¯
ICCG (ICCB) strands for the incentive compatibility constraint of the good
(bad) type, whereas, PCI stands for the investors’ participation constraint.
We show in Appendix C that under the optimal security, ICCB is
binding, i.e. if the entrepreneur is of a bad type, her expected utility when
not implementing the project equals her expected utility when implement-
ing the project. If this is not the case, there is always a deviation to a higher
level g¯ and a lower level of g(S), which does not violate the incentive con-
straints, and it is strictly preferred by the good type. Also, we show in
Appendix C that ICCG is slack. Finally, PCI is binding, as an implication
of the perfectly competitive capital market. Then, by substituting ICCB
into PCI , and solving with respect to g(S), we obtain:
g∗(S) = λB(−FpB + F + pBS) + λG I
λG pG + λB pB
−
R︷ ︸︸ ︷
λG(1− pG) + λB(1− pB)
λG pG + λB pB
g∗(F)
(3.8)
Condition (3.8) implies that the entrepreneur could increase g(F) by e and
decrease g(S) by R× e without violating investors’ participation constraint.
Increasing g(F) by e decreases the entrepreneur’s expected utility by (1−
pG)× e, whereas decreasing g(S) by R× e increases the entrepreneur’s ex-
pected utility by pG×R× e. It can be shown that pG×R× e > (1− pG)× e
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as long as pG > pB. Hence, under the optimal security, g∗(F) reaches its
maximum value, i.e. g∗(F) = F. Substituting g∗(F) = F into (3.8), we
derive the optimal value of g∗(S), and subsequently, by substituting g∗(F)
and g∗(S) into ICCB, we derive g¯∗. Note also that the security of Lemma 3
is the unique security which survives the Intuitive Criterion.
Lemma 3: Optimal security in scenario 4.
g∗s4(F) = F
g∗s4(S) =
λG(I − F(1− pG)) + λB pBS
λG pG + λB pB
g¯∗s4 = I − pB(S− g∗s4(S))
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition behind g∗s4(F) = F is two-fold. First, similarly to the intu-
ition in Proposition 1, offering a security which promises the maximum
feasible payment when the realized cash flow is low, is aligned with the
entrepreneur’s incentive to separate from the bad type. This is because a
low cash flow is more likely to arise if the entrepreneur is of bad rather
than good type. Second, compared to any other security which satisfies
investors’ participation constraint, g(F) = F minimizes the expected util-
ity of the bad type when implementing the project. Worsening the bad
type’s option of implementing the project, allows the good entrepreneur to
minimize the negative externality imposed by the bad type. Subsequently,
mitigating the cross-subsidization, enables the good entrepreneur to offer
a lower payment when the project is implemented and generates a success.
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Here, we show that scenario 1 cannot be an equilibrium. In scenario
1, similarly to the case where the entrepreneur is obliged to project imple-
mentation, both types implement their project. Thus, g¯ is never realized.
Although g¯ does not affect the entrepreneur’s utility directly, it plays a crit-
ical role when it comes to beliefs’ formulation. Hence, for values of g¯ for
which the bad entrepreneur prefers implementing the project, the maxi-
mization problem in scenario 1 is effectively the same as the maximization
problem when the entrepreneur is obliged to project implementation. As
a result, g∗s1(F) = g
∗(F)′ and g∗s1(S) = g
∗(S)′. However, the good type is
better-off under scenario 4 because g∗s4(S) ≤ g∗(S)′ and g∗s4(F) = g∗(F)′.
Thus, scenario 1 can not emerge in equilibrium: the good type has incen-
tive to deviate to scenario 4, by choosing g¯, such as the bad type prefers
not implementing her project.
Similar intuition applies to scenario 2. In this scenario, the expected
utility of investors equals −Pg + g¯. Following Lemma 2 and the assump-
tion of perfectly competitive markets, Pg = g¯. In this equilibrium, as-
suming that such an equilibrium exists, the entrepreneur’s utility is zero.
However, the good type is better-off under scenario 4 because she achieves
positive expected utility. Thus, scenario 2 can not emerge in equilibrium:
the good type always has the incentive to deviate to scenario 4, by offering
the security characterized in Lemma 3.
Corollary 1
Independently of her type, the entrepreneur is better-off when the project imple-
mentation is endogenous and contractible.
Proof. See Appendix C.
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Hence, the optimal security, provided in Lemma 3, is the unique optimal
security. Note that the improvement in the entrepreneur’s expected utility
does not come at the cost of lower expected utility for investors; under
both setups, the investors’ participation constraint is binding. This Pareto
improvement stems from a more efficient allocation of resources, due to
the finding that the negative-NPV type does not implement her project.
Market breakdown when project implementation is endogenous
When the entrepreneur is allowed to choose whether to implement her
project, and to offer securities contingent on this choice, the market sur-
vives if there is at least one feasible security g ∈ G, such as the investors’
participation constraint is satisfied:





where the LHS of (3.9) denotes the expected revenue, whereas the RHS
denotes the cost of investors. Recall that for a security to be feasible, it
must satisfy limited liability, i.e., 0 ≤ g(S) ≤ S, 0 ≤ g(F) ≤ F, 0 ≤ g¯ ≤ I.
We now explore relation (3.9) for the optimal security of Lemma 3, which
is, by construction, feasible. Hence, (3.9) becomes:
λB g¯∗s4 + λG[pGg
∗
s4(S) + (1− pG)g∗s4(F)] ≥ I (3.10)




s4(F) into (3.10), we
obtain that the LHS of (3.10) equals I. Thus, (3.9) is satisfied for the security
of Lemma 3. Note that if the investors’ participation constraint is not satis-
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fied (market breakdown), the entrepreneur’s expected utility is zero. Recall
also that the entrepreneur’s expected utility under the security of Lemma
3 is non-negative. Hence, we can conclude that the market never collapses,
because compared to that case, the entrepreneur is better-off when offering
the security of Lemma 3, which always satisfies the investor’s participation
constraint.
Corollary 2
If the implementation choice is endogenous and contractible, there always exists
a security which satisfies investors’ participation constraint (market always sur-
vives), and the positive-NPV project is implemented.
The reason the market always survives is that, once we endogenize the
implementation choice, the positive-NPV project is always implemented,
whereas the negative-NPV project is not. The intuition behind this finding
can be captured in the following example. To simplify the algebra, suppose
an environment where the bad type always fails (pB = 0). In this case, the
best strategy for the good type is to offer a security which pays g(F) = F.
Such a payment leaves no surplus to the bad type when implementing the
project. Consequently, the bad type is willing to forgo implementation as
long as g¯ ≤ I. Note that the combination of g(F) = F with g¯ = I min-
imizes the loss of investors when financing a bad type, which effectively,
minimizes the distortion imposed by the bad type to the good type. Elim-
inating the cross-subsidization enables the good type to offer a payment
in case of success which equals the fair payment, i.e., the payment which
corresponds to her type, g(S) = (I−F(1−pG))pG .
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It is worth highlighting that the extent of the decrease in cross-
subsidization is negatively related to the probability of success of the bad
type, pB. This is because there is a monotonic relation between pB and
the cost of preventing the bad type from implementation. This relation is
captured by the binding ICCB.
The previous example captures the main idea of this paper; once the
choice of project implementation is endogenous and contractible, the good
entrepreneur can offer a security which, effectively, provides insurance to
investors against the event of financing a bad entrepreneur. This insurance
allows the entrepreneur to offer a lower payment in the case where the
project is implemented and succeeds.
The combination of Lemma 3, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 leads to
Proposition 2, which characterizes the optimal security when the choice of
implementing the project is endogenous and contractible.5
Proposition 2:
When the choice of project implementation is endogenous and contractible, project’s
financing always takes place, and the unique optimal security is given by:
g∗(F) = F
g∗(S) = λG(I − F(1− pG)) + λB pBS
λG pG + λB pB
g¯∗ = I − pB(S− g∗(S))
5Note that the optimal security resembles “Repurchase Agreements” (REPOs). REPOs
is a form of borrowing where a party sells a security which agrees to buy it back after a
given period. In the language of our model, the repurchase price would be equal to g¯.
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3.5 Endogenizing Entrepreneur’s Productivity
The main source of revenues of crowdfunding platforms is a commission
of 4-5% on the total capital raised. Thus, one of the main objectives of
crowdfunding platforms is to attract high-productivity entrepreneurs.6 We
showed in the previous section that endogenizing the choice of project im-
plementation implies that a subset of entrepreneur’s types does not pro-
ceed with the implementation of the project. Hence, a question which
arises naturally is whether this characteristic could demotivate entrepreneurs
to invest in their productivity, given that it does not affect the expected
return in case of non-implementation. If this concern is valid, it could po-
tentially cancel out the benefits of preventing implementation of negative-
NPV projects.
In this section, we shed light on this concern by allowing the en-
trepreneur to invests in her productivity, before seeking capital to finance
her project. The final goal of this exercise is two-fold. First, to develop
a richer environment, where the entrepreneur chooses her productivity in
equilibrium. Second, to explore the impact of endogenizing the choice of
project implementation on the entrepreneur’s productivity.
Environment & Technology: For the sake of tractability, and in order to be
consistent with the previous analysis, we allow for the simplest investment-
in-productivity technology: the entrepreneur is of low productivity (t = B)
unless she takes a costly action, which upgrades her to a high-productivity
6This is also consistent with the fact that it is a reputation-based industry.
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entrepreneur (t = G).7 This action can be interpreted as the acquisition
of skills or relevant information, which would increase the probability of
developing a successful project. In this setting, the probability that the
entrepreneur invests in her productivity coincides with λG, which is now
determined endogenously.
Endogenizing λG leads to a game consisting of two stages: the
investment-in-productivity stage, and the contracting/implementation stage.
The second stage is effectively the same as in the case where the probabil-
ity λG is exogenous. The first stage refers to the entrepreneur’s decision to
take a costly action, which determines her productivity.
Information Sets: In order to maintain the setting of asymmetric infor-
mation in the contracting stage, we assume that investors cannot observe
whether the agent has invested in her productivity level. For instance, sup-
pose that the entrepreneur’s project is a new application for a smartphone.
In this case, the entrepreneur can acquire costly information regarding sim-
ilar applications, which will enable her to design a better application, and
increase its probability of success. We assume that the cost of acquiring
skills, c, is not verifiable, and as opposed to the entrepreneur who observes
c, investors only hold beliefs about it. In particular, investors anticipate
that c is drawn from an interval [c, c¯], according to a continuous prob-
ability density function φ(c), with Φ(c) standing for the corresponding
cumulative distribution function. The rationale behind this assumption is
that the entrepreneur, mainly because of her expertise, knows the cost of
7The results are robust to any technology where taking the costly action increases the
probability of becoming a high-productivity entrepreneur.
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increasing the project’s productivity, whereas investors have an imperfect
estimate about it. Thus, the investment decision, which is denoted as d, is
a mapping from c to the type t ∈ T.
.
Timing: The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The entrepreneur observes her cost, and decides whether to invest in
her productivity.
2. The type t ∈ T of the entrepreneur is determined.
3. The entrepreneur of type t ∈ T sells a security gt at price Pgt .
4. The entrepreneur decides whether to implement the project.
5. If the project is implemented, its cash flow x is realized.
6. Contract is executed.
Thus, compared to the benchmark model, the game is augmented by the
investment-in-productivity stage.8
3.5.1 Derivation of probability λG.
A property of the equilibrium is that investors’ beliefs about λG are cor-
rect. Note also that the probability that the entrepreneur invests in her
productivity, i.e., λG, depends on the security, which in turn, depends on
λG through investors’ beliefs. Hence, the optimal security and the optimal
value of λG, are determined jointly in equilibrium.
8Note the entrepreneur offers the security after investing in her productivity. However,
as long as c is not verifiable, the equilibrium security is the same independently of whether
the entrepreneur offers the security before or after investing in her productivity.
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We solve the game backwards. We start from the contracting stage,
by taking investors’ beliefs about λG as given. Then, we proceed with the
investment-in-productivity stage, by taking the security g as given.
3.5.1.1 Contracting stage
Recall that the entrepreneur’s decision to invest in her productivity is un-
observable. Thus, this stage is identical to the contracting stage at Section
3.4, apart from a critical modification: probability λG is now replaced by
the beliefs of investors about the probability that the entrepreneur has in-
vested in her productivity, denoted by λ˜G. Hence, by Proposition 2, the
security which maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected utility, subject to
the constraint that λG = λ˜G, is captured in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4
g∗(F) = F , g¯∗ = I − pB(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))
g∗(S, λ˜G) =
λ˜G(I − F(1− pG)) + λ˜B pBS
λ˜G pG + λ˜B pB
3.5.1.2 Investment-in-productivity stage
When the entrepreneur considers investing in her productivity, she antici-
pates that the payments in the financing stage will be given by Lemma 4.
Thus the entrepreneur’s expected utility in each case is:
EU(invest) = pG(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)) + (1− pG)(F− g∗(F))− c
EU(not invest) = pB(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)) + (1− pB)(F− g∗(F))
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Since g∗(F) = F, the entrepreneur invest in her productivity as long as:
c︸︷︷︸
cost
≤ (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))︸ ︷︷ ︸
benefit
≡ cˆ (3.11)
where cˆ can be interpreted as the investment threshold. Figure 3.1 repre-
sents the relationship between λ˜G (on the horizontal axis) and the benefit
of investing in productivity (dashed curve), for four different distributions
of c. As expected, there is a negative relation between the probability λ˜G,
and the payment in case of success that investors are willing to accept to
finance an entrepreneur. In addition, the higher the λ˜G, the stronger the
entrepreneur’s incentive to invest in productivity. This is captured in equa-
tion (3.11).
3.5.1.3 Equilibrium existence and uniqueness of interior equilibrium
We start the analysis by focusing on equilibria for which λ˜∗G ∈ (0, 1), there-
after, “interior equilibria”. We analyze the equilibrium conditions when
the project implementation is at the entrepreneur’s discretion- similar in-
tuition applies when the entrepreneur is obliged to implement the project.
We consider monotone or threshold equilibria in which the investment strat-
egy is monotonic in c. In an interior threshold equilibrium, the following
conditions need to hold:
cˆ∗ = (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜∗G)) (3.12)
Pr(c ≤ cˆ∗) = λ˜∗G (3.13)
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Figure 3.1. Cost and benefit of investing in productivity.
Condition (3.12) provides the critical value cˆ for which the entrepreneur is
indifferent between investing and not investing. Condition (3.13) relates to
the fact that investor’s beliefs should be correct. In particular, the probabil-
ity that investors attribute to the entrepreneur being of good type coincides
with the probability that the entrepreneur’s cost is below cˆ. Besides, for in-
vestors’ beliefs to be correct, the entrepreneur must prefer investing when
c ≤ cˆ, and not investing otherwise. An implication of a threshold equilib-
rium is that cˆ depends on g∗(S, λ˜G), which in turn, depends on cˆ. Thus,
the optimal values cˆ∗ and g∗(S, λ˜∗G), are determined jointly in equilibrium.
Recall that Pr(c ≤ cˆ∗) ≡ Φ(cˆ∗). In order to illustrate graphically the
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equilibrium existence, it is more informative to use the inverse of Φ(cˆ):
Φ−1(λ˜G) = cˆ
where Φ(cˆ) is invertible as a continuous and strictly increasing function.
Hence, every interior equilibrium in the investment-in-productivity stage
satisfies the following condition:
Φ−1(λ˜G) = (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)) (3.14)
where Φ−1(λ˜G) is depicted by the solid curve in Figure 3.1. Note that
Φ−1(λ˜G) is strictly increasing in λ˜G, as a consequence of the fact that Φ(cˆ)
is strictly increasing in cˆ. Thus, relation (3.14) characterizes value of λ˜G
where the dashed and the solid curve intersect. Relation (3.14), however,
is not a sufficient condition for an interior equilibrium to exist. For ex-
ample, point A in panel A of Figure 3.1 satisfies (3.14) but it can not be
an equilibrium; for cost cˆA + e, with e > 0, and as long as the beliefs are
consistent, the expected benefit exceeds the cost. Hence, for cost cˆA + e the
entrepreneur has incentive to invest in productivity, which contradicts the
definition of a threshold equilibrium: in a threshold equilibrium, the en-
trepreneur invests in her productivity only if c ≤ cˆA. Thus, for an interior
equilibrium to exist, the solid curve should cross the dashed curve from
below. Following that, the unique interior equilibrium is given by point E
in panel A of Figure 3.1.
Note that there could be more than one combinations of λ˜G and
g∗(S, λ˜G) which satisfy (3.14) and the solid curve crosses the dashed curve
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from below. If this the case, the unique interior equilibrium is the one
which corresponds to the maximum λ˜G. This is because the expected util-
ity of the entrepreneur is increasing in λ˜∗G, due to the impact of the latter
on g∗(S, λ˜∗G).
We conclude this subsection with the case where there is no interior
equilibrium. If it is very costly to invest in productivity, the only equilib-
rium in the investment stage is for λ˜G = 0, for which the market collapses
(Panel C). In contrast, if the cost of investing is very low, the unique equilib-
rium is for λ˜G = 1 (Panel D). Lemma 5 presents the sufficient conditions for
interior equilibrium to exist, where the payment g∗(S, λ˜G) is determined
in Lemma 4.
Lemma 5: Interior and corner equilibrium - sufficient conditions
• If there is no c ∈ [c, c¯] which satisfies:
c ≤ (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G = Φ(c))) (3.15)
then, the unique equilibrium is for λ˜G = 0, for which the market collapses.
• If c¯ satisfies:
c¯ > (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G = Φ(c¯)) (3.16)
then, the unique equilibrium is for λ˜G = 1.
• If (3.16) is violated, and there exists c ∈ [c, c¯] which satisfies (3.15), then the
unique interior equilibrium is characterized by the maximum λ˜G ∈ (0, 1)
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which solves:
Φ−1(λ˜G) = (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)) (3.17)
Proof. See Appendix C.
3.5.2 Optimal security when types are endogenously deter-
mined
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal security when the choice
of project implementation is endogenous and the entrepreneur has to op-
tion to invest in her productivity level before financing takes place. In
order to allow for an environment of asymmetric information between the
entrepreneur and potential investors, we focus our analysis on the case
where the type of the entrepreneur is uncertain, i.e., there exists an inte-
rior equilibrium in investment-in-productivity stage. The combination of
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, leads to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3
As long an interior equilibrium exists, the optimal security is given by:
g∗(F) = F
g∗(S, λ˜∗G) =
λ˜∗G(I − F(1− pG)) + (1− λ˜∗G)pBS
λ˜∗G pG + (1− λ˜∗G)pB
g¯∗ = I − pB(S− g∗(S, λ˜∗G))
131
where λ˜∗G is the maximum λ˜G ∈ (0, 1) which solves:
Φ−1(λ˜G) = (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)) (3.18)
For the sake of completeness we present in Proposition 4 the optimal se-
curity when the entrepreneur is obliged, by assumption, to the project im-
plementation. Similarly to the previous case, we focus our analysis on the
case where there is uncertainty about the type of the entrepreneur.
Proposition 4
As long as an interior equilibrium exists, the optimal security is given by:
g∗(F)′ = F , g∗(S, λ˜∗G)
′ = I − F
λ˜∗G pG + (1− λ˜∗G)pB
+ F
where λ˜∗G is the the maximum λ˜G ∈ (0, 1) which solves:
Φ−1(λ˜G) = (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)′) (3.19)
Proof. See Appendix C.
3.5.3 Impact of endogenizing project implementation on
entrepreneur’s productivity
In this subsection, we explore the impact of relaxing the assumption that
the entrepreneur is obliged to project implementation on probability λ˜G.
This finding is summarized in Proposition 5.
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Proposition 5:
Allowing for the project implementation to be endogenous and contractible, in-
creases the probability that an entrepreneur invests in her productivity.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition behind this finding is straightforward: being produc-
tive is rewarded more when the project implementation is endogenous,
due to the steeper incentive pay. Thus, for any given value of the cost c,
the entrepreneur’s incentive to invest in her productivity is stronger.
Figure 3.2 allows us to illustrate the main idea behind Proposition 5.
Figure 3.2, similarly to Figure 3.1, represents the relationship between λ˜G
(on the horizontal axis) and the benefit of investing in productivity. The
dashed curve illustrates the benefit when the choice of project implemen-
tation is endogenous, whereas the dotted curve illustrates the benefit when
the entrepreneur is obliged to the project implementation. Note that the
dashed curve starts from the origin (excluding the origin point), highlight-
ing the finding that the market survives as long as λ˜G > 0. In contrast, the
dotted curve starts from λ˜minG , which is the minimum value of λ˜G for which
the market survives.9 The dashed curve is always above the dotted curve,
capturing the finding presented in Corollary 1, that for any given value of
λ˜G, g∗(S, λ˜G)′ ≥ g∗(S, λ˜G).
Panels A to D illustrate four different distributions of c, where in
each case, point “E” denotes the equilibrium when the project implemen-
tation is endogenous, whereas point “e” denotes the equilibrium when the





maximum value of λ˜G which solves (3.18) and as λ˜′
∗
G the maximum value
of λ˜G which solves (3.19). Notice that only panels A and B represent en-
vironments where there is uncertainty about the type of the entrepreneur.
The previous analysis gives rise to the following cases regarding the rela-
tionship between λ˜∗G and λ˜′
∗
G.




G : The probability that the entrepreneur invests
in her productivity is higher when the project implementation is at the en-
trepreneur’s discretion. (panel A).
• λ˜∗G > λ˜′
∗
G = 0: The market survives only in the environment where the
choice of project implementation is endogenous. (panel B)
• λ˜∗G = λ˜′
∗
G = 0: The entrepreneur never invests in her productivity, and the
market collapses independently of whether the choice of project implementa-
tion is endogenous (panel C).
• λ˜∗G = λ˜′
∗
G = 1: The entrepreneur invests in her productivity with certainty,
independently of whether the choice of project implementation is endogenous
(panel D).
To conclude, we show in this section that allowing the entrepreneur
to choose whether to implement her project, and to offer securities contin-
gent on this choice, leads to a higher expected productivity. This finding
has implications for the crowdfunding example. In particular, Proposition
5 suggests that allowing the entrepreneur to offer securities contingent on
the implementation choice, is aligned with the objective of crowdfunding
platforms is to attract productive entrepreneurs/projects.
134







(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))
(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)′)
Φ−1(λ˜G)
Panel A






(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))
(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)′)
Φ−1(λ˜G)
Panel B





(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))
(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)′)
Φ−1(λ˜G)
Panel C





(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))
(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)′)
Φ−1(λ˜G)
Panel D
Figure 3.2. Equilibrium in the invest-in-productivity stage.
3.6 Conclusion and Further Discussion
In this paper, we develop a simple model of investment financing, where
the entrepreneur shares the same characteristics as the representative en-
trepreneur in crowd-funding platforms. In particular, the entrepreneur
has private information regarding her productivity, is protected by lim-
ited liability, and is associated with a negative-NPV project with positive
probability.
The main message of this work is that, allowing the entrepreneur to
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offer contracts contingent on the choice of project implementation, leads to
a better allocation of resources, prevents market breakdown and strength-
ens the entrepreneur’ incentive to invest in her productivity. Hence, this
work indicates that crowd-funding platforms should promote the use of
these securities.
The findings of this work can also be applied to the literature on ven-
ture capital financing. In venture capital financing, similar to our model,
the entrepreneur is privately informed about the productivity of her project.
A key difference between the two settings is that, in venture capital financ-
ing, it is the uninformed party (venture capitalist) who offers a security.
This work suggests that, rewarding the non-implementation of a project,
could prevent an entrepreneur from wasting the venture capitalist’s re-
sources in negative NPV projects.
Besides, Section 3.5 suggests that, by rewarding the non-implementation
of a project, the venture capitalists would be able to offer a steeper incen-
tive pay, in case of implementation. In turn, the steeper incentive pay could
motivate the entrepreneur to undertake costly, hidden actions to increase
the probability of success.
Lastly, our work has implication for the literature on the compen-
sation contracts of CEOs, and more specifically, on the literature which
highlights the optimality of severance pay. An insight of our paper is that
allowing for a severance pay could be optimal, since it can prevent a CEO





A.1 Imperfect State Realization
The previous analysis relies on the assumption that the state of the world
is observable and contractible. There are many situations, however, where
the state of the world is imperfectly revealed. For instance, suppose that the
asset that the fund manager trades is a stock of Company “Z”. In that case,
rather than observing the realized quality of an asset, which in this exam-
ple corresponds to the profitability of Company “Z”, the equity holder and
the manager might observe an imperfect public signal about the profitabil-
ity of company “Z”, such as earnings forecasts or credit rating announce-
ments. Another case that the state of the world might not be contractible
is when its realization takes place after the contract is terminated.
The goal of this section is two-fold. First, to derive the optimal com-
pensation contract in an alternative setup where the payments can only be
137
contingent on an imperfect signal about the state of the world. Second, to
examine whether the main features and implications of the optimal con-
tract are similar to the ones in the benchmark model.
We explore an environment where neither the equity holder of a
fund nor the fund manager observes the realized state of the world. In-
stead, we allow the principal and the agent to have access to a public sig-
nal which is revealed after the decision is taken, and imperfectly reveals
the actual state of the world. In particular, we allow for a binary public
signal i.e., σ = {b, g}, where:
Pr(σ = g|θ = G) = qG
Pr(σ = g|θ = B) = qB
with qG > qB. The intuition is straightforward; compared to the case where
the state is θ = B, when the state is θ = G, it is more likely that the public
signal will be σ = g. For instance, a good credit rating is more likely when
Company “Z” is of good rather than bad quality. Likewise, compared to
the case where the state is θ = G, when the state is θ = B, it is more likely
that the public signal will be σ = b. Note that the benchmark model can
be thought as a special case of the imperfect state realization case, if we
restrict the values of qG and qB to be equal to one and zero, respectively.
The difference in the compensation contract is that instead of the
payments being contingent on the realized state, θ, they are contingent on
the realized public signal, σ, i.e., Wˆ ′ : d× σ 7→ R+, where d = {S, L} and
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σ = {b, g}. The contract is characterized by the following quadruple:
Wˆ ′ = {wSg, wSb, wLg, wLb}
In order to derive the optimal compensation contract, we follow the same
four-step process we followed in the case where the state of the world is
contractible.
A.1.1 Step 1: Decision Rule DR
We show in Appendix A.1.3 that Lemma 1 extends to the case where the
state of the world is imperfectly observed. Hence, similarly to the case
where the state of the world is contractible, the decision rule that the equity
holder aims to implement is given by a threshold sˆ, such as:
DR =

long if s > sˆ
short if s < sˆ
Proof. See Lemma 1B in Appendix A.3.
A.1.2 Step 2: Constrained-optimal compensation contract
that implements sˆ
In this step, we derive the most cost-efficient contract of implementing a
given threshold sˆ.
Proposition 1B: Constrained Optimal Contract
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For sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin] the constrained optimal contract is given by:
w∗Sb(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)(1− p)qB + fG(sˆ)pqG
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c
w∗Lg(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)− fG(sˆ)p(−1+ qG)




For sˆ ∈ [sˆmin, 1] the constrained optimal contract is given by:
w∗Sb(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)qB − fG(sˆ)pqG
( fB(sˆ)(−1+ FG(sˆ)) + fG(sˆ)(1− FB(sˆ)))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c
w∗Lg(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(1− qB) + fG(sˆ)p(−1+ qG)




where sˆmin solves fG(sˆmin) = fB(sˆmin).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1B is the analog of Proposition 1. The proof and the intuition
is identical to ones in Proposition 1. Also, we show in Appendix A.3 that
the relationship between the optimal payments and sˆ, which is captured in
Lemma 2, extends to this setup. Lemma 3 also extends to this setup. Thus,
EC(sˆ) is U-shaped, and minimized for fG(sˆ) = fB(sˆ).
A.1.3 Step 3: Expected revenue ER(sˆ)
A critical remark is that the expected portfolio revenue of a given threshold
sˆ is determined by the actual state of the world, rather than the public
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signal about the state of the world. Hence, the second step is identical to
the corresponding step in the benchmark model. The behavior of ER(sˆ)
with respect to the implemented threshold sˆ is given by Lemma 4 and is
illustrated in Figure 1.3.
A.1.4 Step 4: Optimal Threshold sˆ∗
the optimal value of sˆ denoted as sˆ∗ equates the expected marginal revenue
(∂ER(sˆ)∂sˆ ) with the expected marginal cost (
∂EC(sˆ)
∂sˆ ), where ER(sˆ) is defined
in Lemma 2 whereas EC(sˆ) is defined in Lemma 3B.
A.1.5 Optimal Compensation Contract
The optimal contract is given by the constrained optimal contract of Propo-
sition 1B, subject to the constraint the sˆ satisfies the optimality condition
which is provided in Lemma A.4.
Proposition 2B: Optimality Contract, Wˆ∗(sˆ∗)
If p ≥ 0.5, the optimal value sˆ, sˆ∗ solves:
2e{−p fG(sˆ) + (1− p) fB(sˆ)} =
−
[
((−1+ p)qB − pqG)((−1+ p)(−1+ qB)FB(sˆ)− p(−1+ qG)FG(sˆ)))γ(sˆ)




and the optimal payments are given by:
w∗Sb(sˆ
∗) = fB(sˆ
∗)(1− p)qB + fG(sˆ∗)pqG




∗)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)− fG(sˆ∗)p(−1+ qG)




If p ≤ 0.5, the optimal value sˆ, sˆ∗ solves:
2e{−p fG(sˆ) + (1− p) fB(sˆ)} =
−
[
(1− (1− p)qB − pqG)((1− p)qB(1− FB(sˆ)) + pqG(1− FG(sˆ)))γ(sˆ)




and the optimal payments are given by:
w∗Sb(sˆ
∗) = fB(sˆ
∗)(−1+ p)qB − fG(sˆ∗)pqG
( fB(sˆ∗)(−1+ FG(sˆ∗)) + fG(sˆ∗)(1− FB(sˆ∗)))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c
w∗Lg(sˆ
∗) = fB(sˆ
∗)(−1+ p)(1− qB) + fG(sˆ∗)p(−1+ qG)
((1− FB(sˆ∗)) fG(sˆ∗) + fB(sˆ∗)(−1+ FG(sˆ∗)))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)
where γ(sˆ) ≡ ( fG(sˆ) f ′B(sˆ)− fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
A.1.6 Bias in the investment decision
A crucial remark of the previous analysis is that EC(sˆ) has similar behav-
ior (U-shaped, and minimized for fG(sˆ) = fB(sˆ)) independently of whether
the principal and the agent observe the state of the world or a public signal
which is informative about the state of the world. Recall also that ER(sˆ)
is unaffected by whether the state of the world or a public signal, is ob-
served. Hence, the analysis of how the optimal threshold sˆ∗ relates to the
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first best threshold sˆFB is qualitatively the same with the benchmark model.
Proposition 4B: Bias in the investment decision.
Under the optimal contract:
(i) For p ≥ 0.5, then sˆFB < sˆ∗ ≤ sˆmin
(ii) For p ≤ 0.5, then sˆFB > sˆ∗ ≥ sˆmin
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition is identical to the intuition of Proposition 4. Hence, the main
finding that under the optimal contract, that the manager adopts contrarian
actions more often than the first best, remains.
A.1.6.1 Impact on the investment decision
Proposition 7 explores the impact of of qG and qB the informativeness of the
public signal, which is captured by qG and qB, on the investment decision
and the emerging bias. Recall that qG and qB is the probability of observing
a good public signal when the state is good and bad, respectively.
Proposition 7: Impact of qG and qB on investment decision.
(i) If p > 0.5, sˆ∗ is decreasing in qB and increasing in qG.
(ii) If p < 0.5, sˆ∗ is increasing in qB and decreasing in qG.
(iii) The bias |sˆ∗ − sˆFB| is decreasing in qB and increasing in qG.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
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Proposition 7 relies on Lemma 6 and on the observation that the expected
revenue of implementing sˆ is independent of qG or qB. Thus, qG and qB
affect sˆ∗ through their impact on expected cost EC(sˆ). An implication
of Lemma 6 is that an increase in qG and/or a decrease in qB moves the
graphical illustration of EC(sˆ) upwards, and leads to a steeper-sloped U-
shape. The intuition behind Lemma 6 relies on the fact that as the dif-
ference qG − qB increases, the quality of monitoring improves, and as a
result, the equity holder can incentivize the manager to acquire informa-
tion through lower payments. The intuition behind Proposition 7 is similar
to the intuition behind Proposition 5. Namely, for a given deviation η from
the first best sˆFB, a higher qB and/or a lower qG leads to a larger reduction
in the expected cost, which in turn, strengthens the incentive to deviate.
Proposition 6 is captured in Figure A.1 and A.1.






EC(sˆ, qG = 0.6, qB = 0.4)
EC(sˆ, qG = 0.9, qB = 0.4)
Figure A.1. Impact of higher qG.
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EC(sˆ, qG = 0.6, qB = 0.4)
EC(sˆ, qG = 0.6, qB = 0.1)
Figure A.2. Impact of lower qB.
A.2 Allocating tasks to different agents
In Section 1.4, we argue that as long as p 6= 0.5, there is a trade-off because
the threshold sˆ which minimizes the cost of incentivizing the agent to ac-
quire information differs from the threshold which maximizes the portfolio
revenue. Two questions which arise naturally are whether allocating the
tasks to two different individuals would increase equity holder’s profits,
and whether the optimal contract would exhibit the key feature of “bias
against the flow”.
To this end, we allow for two agents: an analyst and a manager, each
of them performing one task. The analyst acquires information and sends
a message to his manager. The manager receives the analyst’s message
and subsequently takes an investment decision. In this environment, the
analyst’s contract is contingent on the realized state of the world (θ) and
his message, which we denote as s˜, i.e., WˆA : s˜× θ 7→ R+. Regarding the
manager’s compensation contract, we can focus, without loss of general-
ity, on contracts contingent on the analyst’s message and the manager’s
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investment decision, i.e., WˆM : s˜× d 7→ R+.
Lemma 7: Equilibrium Messages.
Under the optimal contract, the analyst sends a message s if his private signal
belongs in partition [0, sˆ], and a message s¯ if his private signal belongs in partition
(sˆ, 1].
Proof. Recall that what matters for taking the revenue-maximizing posi-
tion is whether Pr(θ = G|s) is greater or lower than one-half, given that
the principal’s best respond solely depends on that. Following the spirit
of Lemma 1, for the incentives of the equity holder and the analyst to be
aligned, it is sufficient for the equity holder to offer a contract where two
messages are issued in equilibrium. Message s corresponds to partition
[0, sˆ], whereas message s¯ corresponds to partition (sˆ, 1], where sˆ ∈ (0, 1).
Notice that it is never optimal for the principal to offer a contract where
more than two messages are issued in equilibrium; allowing for more
messages would never lead to higher revenue, whereas it would increase
the cost of incentivizing information acquisition. This is because more
messages would imply a higher number of incentive compatibility con-
straints.
Lemma 8 states that the analyst’s optimal contract in this environment
would coincide with the optimal contract of the manager in the bench-
mark model, which is characterized in Proposition 2.
Lemma 8: Analyst’s optimal contract.
w(s, B)∗ ≡ wSB(sˆ∗), w(s¯, G)∗ ≡ wLG(sˆ∗), w(s, G)∗ ≡ wSG(sˆ∗) and w(s¯, B)∗ ≡
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wLB(sˆ∗)
Proof. Lemma 8 is a consequence of Lemma 7. The main difference is that
instead of incentivizing the manager to acquire information and follow an
investment decision rule, which is characterized by a threshold sˆ, the prin-
cipal incentivizes an analyst to acquire information and follow a disclosure
rule, which is characterized by the same threshold sˆ.
The main message of Lemma 8 is that the optimal compensation con-
tract, and thus the cost of incentivizing an agent to acquire information, is
the same independently of whether this agent is in charge of taking an in-
vestment decision. Thus, the feature of the “bias against the flow” emerges
even when the principal allocates the tasks to two different individuals.
To complete the analysis of this environment, we should also characterize
the optimal compensation contract of the manager. This contract is given
by Lemma 9.
Lemma 9: Manager’s optimal contract.
w(s, S)∗ = w(s¯, L)∗ = e and w(s, L)∗ = w(s¯, S)∗ = 0, where e→ 0.
Proof. Since the manager has no private information, the incentives of the
principal and the manager are aligned if the principal offers an arbitrarily
small payment e when the manager takes the revenue-maximizing posi-
tion, and zero otherwise.
To conclude, we show in this section that, as long as information
acquisition is unobservable, delegating the tasks to different agents leads
to the same investment decision, and it does not improve the profitability
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of the equity holder: the equity holder also incurs the cost of incentivizing
the manager to implement the revenue-maximizing investment decision.
A.3 Proofs
A.3.1 First Best
We start by analyzing the case where there is no agency problem, i.e., the
equity holder is also the manager of the fund. First, we derive the expected
profit of the equity holder when no information is acquired. Second, we
derive the expected profit for the case where equity holder acquires infor-
mation. Finally, we characterize the condition such as information acquisi-
tion is optimal.
Case where no information is acquired: In the absence of information
acquisition the expected revenue of going short and long is given by:
EΠ[short] = p(P0 − PG1 ) + (1− p)(P0 − PB1 ) = (1− 2p)e (A.3)
EΠ[long] = p(PG1 − P0) + (1− p)(PB1 − P0) = (2p− 1)e (A.4)
Thus, short (long) is the revenue-maximizing action when the asset is con-
sidered overvalued (undervalued), i.e., when p < 0.5 (p > 0.5).
EΠ[no signal] = max{(2p− 1), (1− 2p)} × e (A.5)
Case where information is acquired: First, we characterize the optimal
investment decision for each signal realization, s. The equity holder goes
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long if:
EΠ[long|s] > EΠ[short|s] =⇒
[Pr(G|s)− Pr(B|s)]e > [−Pr(G|s) + Pr(B|s)]e (A.6)
whereas he goes short otherwise.1 Since Pr(G|s) is strictly increasing in
s, there is a unique signal realization s = sˆFB such that EΠ[long|sˆFB] =











EΠ[short|s] f (s)ds +
∫ 1
sˆFB
EΠ[long|s] f (s)ds− c
(A.8)
In section 1.4.4 we showed that the expected revenue of acquiring a signal,
given a threshold sˆ, is:
ER(sˆ) = e{p(1− 2FG(sˆ)) + (1− p)(2FB(sˆ)− 1)}
Thus, the expected profit of acquiring a signal, given the first best threshold
sˆFB, is:
EΠ[signal|sˆFB] = e{p(1− 2FG(sˆFB)) + (1− p)(2FB(sˆFB)− 1)} − c (A.9)
1The implicit assumption w.l.o.g. is that if the equity holder is indifferent, he goes
short.
149
As a result, the equity holder acquires information as long as:
EΠ[signal|sˆFB] ≥ EΠ[no signal]
which is satisfied for values of c such as:
c ≤ [p(1− 2FG(sˆFB))+ (1− p)(2FB(sˆFB)− 1)−max{(2p− 1), (1− 2p)}]× e
(A.10)
where the LHS of (A.10) captures the cost of acquiring information, whereas
the RHS captures the expected benefit of acquiring information net of the
equity holder’s outside option.
A.3.2 Useful Lemmas
We provide Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, which are going to be useful for
the remaining proofs.
A.3.2.1 Lemma A.1
Lemma A.1: For each sˆ ∈ S, the following relation holds:
γ1 ≡ f ′B(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ) < 0
Proof. Crucial for the determination of the sign of γ1 is f ′G(sˆ) and f
′
B(sˆ),






∂sˆ . Although we have made no as-
sumption about f ′G(sˆ) and f
′
B(sˆ), they are indirectly constrained by MLRP.





is decreasing in sˆ. Thus, we explore the sign of γ1 for all possible rela-
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tions between f ′G(sˆ) and f
′
B(sˆ), by taking into consideration the constraints
imposed by MLRP.
(i) Case 1: f ′G(sˆ) > f
′
B(sˆ) > 0
For this relation, γ1 < 0, since fB(sˆ) > fG(sˆ) and f ′G(sˆ) > f
′
B(sˆ) > 0.
(ii) Case 2: f ′G(sˆ) > 0 > f
′
B(sˆ)
For this relation, γ1 < 0, since its first term is negative and its second
term is positive.
(iii) Case 3: 0 > f ′G(sˆ) > f
′
B(sˆ)
For this relation, γ1 < 0. The proof is less straightforward since the








show that γ1 < 0 by following the method of contradiction. Suppose
that γ1 > 0, i.e.,
f ′B(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ) > 0 (A.11)


























Thus, relation (A.13) implies that the percentage decrease in the fB(sˆ)
as sˆ moves from sˆ0 to sˆ1 = sˆ0 + h is smaller than the percentage de-
151
crease in fG(sˆ) as sˆ moves from sˆ0 to sˆ1 = sˆ0 + h. If this is true, then







However, relation (A.14) contradicts with the MLRP assumption, ac-
cording to which, fG(sˆ)fB(sˆ) is increasing in sˆ. Hence, γ1 < 0.
Finally, for the sake of completeness, we list the remaining cases of
the relationship between f ′G(sˆ) and f
′
B(sˆ), which are irrelevant, since
they violate the MLRP assumption.
(iv) Case 4: f ′B(sˆ) > f
′
G(sˆ) > 0
The MLRP is violated since for this relation, the ratio fG(sˆ)fB(sˆ) is decreas-
ing in sˆ.
(v) Case 5: f ′B(sˆ) > 0 > f
′
G(sˆ)
The MLRP is violated since for this relation, the ratio fG(sˆ)fB(sˆ) is decreas-
ing in sˆ.
(vi) Case 6: 0 > f ′B(sˆ) > f
′
G(sˆ)
The MLRP is violated since for this relation, the ratio fG(sˆ)fB(sˆ) is decreas-
ing in sˆ
Thus, for the relevant cases (cases i - iii), γ1 is negative independently of
the value of sˆ.
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A.3.2.2 Lemma A.2














which can be rearranged as:
fG(s1) fB(s0) ≥ fG(s0) fB(s1) (A.15)



























1− FB(s0) . (A.17)
Notice that s0 and s1 in (A.16) and (A.17) are arbitrary. Thus, combining









A.3.3.1 Proof of Lemma 1 (Monotonic investment rule)
The proof of Lemma 1 is identical to the proof of Lemma 1B once we set
qG = 1, qB = 0, and we replace wSb with wSB, wSg with wSG, wLb with wLB,
and wLg with wLB.
A.3.3.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 is identical to the proof of Proposition 1B once
we set qG = 1, qB = 0, and we replace wSb with wSB, wSg with wSG, wLb
with wLB, and wLg with wLB.
A.3.3.3 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of Lemma 2 is identical to the proof of Lemma 2B once we set
qG = 1, qB = 0, and we replace wSb with wSB, wSg with wSG, wLb with wLB,
and wLg with wLB.
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A.3.3.4 Proof of Lemma 4
In section 4.4 we showed that the expected revenue from acquiring a signal,
given a threshold sˆ, is:
ER(sˆ) = e{p(1− 2FG(sˆ)) + (1− p)(2FB(sˆ)− 1)}.
Thus, the first order condition is given by:
∂ER(sˆ)
∂(sˆ)
= 2e{ fB(sˆ)(1− p)− fG(sˆ)p} = 0 (A.18)







The second derivative of ER(sˆ) is given by:
∂2ER(sˆ)
∂(sˆ)2
= f ′B(sˆ)(1− p)− f ′G(sˆ)p. (A.20)















which implies that the following should hold:
f ′B(sˆ
FB) f ′G(sˆ
FB)− f ′G(sˆFB) fB(sˆFB) < 0. (A.22)
Recall that in Lemma A.1 we proved that f ′B(sˆ) f
′
G(sˆ)− f ′G(sˆ) fB(sˆ) < 0 for
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any sˆ. Thus, (A.22) holds.
We now explore the behaviour of ER(sˆ) for sˆ > sˆFB and sˆ < sˆFB. We start





















where η(sˆ′) > 0 and increasing in sˆ′ by the MLRP. Also, by rearranging the
first derivative of the expected revenue with respect to sˆ, we obtain:
∂ER(sˆ′)
∂(sˆ′)




and, by substituting (A.23) into (A.24):
∂ER(sˆ′)
∂(sˆ′)
/ fB(sˆ) = e{(1− p)− ( (1− p)p + η(sˆ
′))p} = −eη(sˆ′)p < 0.
(A.25)
Hence, for any sˆ′ > sˆFB, ER(sˆ) is decreasing and concave in sˆ′, since
η(sˆ′) > 0 and increasing in sˆ′.

























/ fB(sˆ) = e{(1− p)− ( (1− p)p − η
′(sˆ′))p} = eη′(sˆ′)p > 0. (A.27)
Hence, for any sˆ′ > sˆFB, ER(sˆ) is increasing and concave in sˆ since η′(sˆ′) >
0 and decreasing in sˆ′.
A.3.3.5 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 is identical to the proof of Proposition 2B once
we set qG = 1, qB = 0, and we replace wSb with wSB, wSg with wSG, wLb
with wLB, and wLg with wLB.
A.3.3.6 Proof of Proposition 3





























> 1 =⇒ wSB(sˆ∗) > wLG(sˆ∗)













< 1 =⇒ wSB(sˆ∗) < wLG(sˆ∗)
A.3.3.7 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 is identical to the proof of Proposition 4B once
we set qG = 1, qB = 0, and we replace wSb with wSB, wSg with wSG, wLb
with wLB, and wLg with wLB.
A.3.3.8 Proof of Corollary 2
We focus on the case where p > 0.5. Similar intuition applies for the case
where p < 0.5. Recall that by Proposition 4, for p > 0.5, sˆ∗ > sˆFB, whereas
for p < 0.5, sˆ∗ < sˆFB.
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Part one: Recall that for a given sˆ, the expected probability that a short
position is chosen, is:
Pr(short|sˆ) = pPr(s ≤ sˆ|G) + (1− p)Pr(s ≤ sˆ|B)
= pFG(sˆ) + (1− p)FB(sˆ)
where FG(sˆ) and FB(sˆ) are increasing in sˆ. Thus, as sˆ∗ > sˆFB,
Pr(short|sˆ = sˆ∗) > Pr(short|sˆ = sˆFB)
Part two: The probability that a short position is revenue-maximizing is
given by:
Pr(B|short) = Pr(short|B)(1− p)
Pr(short|B)(1− p) + Pr(short|G)p =
FB(sˆ)(1− p)
FB(sˆ)(1− p) + FG(sˆ)p




(−1+ p)p[FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ)]
[FB(sˆ)(−1+ p)− FG(sˆ)p]2
where, by Lemma A.1, is negative for any value of sˆ. Recall that, if p > 0.5,
sˆ∗ > sˆFB, thus:
Pr(B|short, sˆ = sˆ∗) < Pr(B|short, sˆ = sˆFB) (A.29)
whereas, if p < 0.5, sˆ∗ < sˆFB, thus:
Pr(B|short, sˆ = sˆ∗) > Pr(B|short, sˆ = sˆFB) (A.30)
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Part three: The probability that a long position is revenue-maximizing, is
given by:
Pr(G|long) = Pr(long|G)p
Pr(long|G)p + Pr(long|B)(1− p)
=
(1− FG(sˆ))p
(1− FG(sˆ))p + (1− FB(sˆ))(1− p) (A.31)




(−1+ p)p[(1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)(1− FG(sˆ))]
[FB(sˆ)(−1+ p)− FG(sˆ)p + 1]2
where, by Lemma A.1, it is positive for any value of sˆ. Recall that, if
p > 0.5, sˆ∗ > sˆFB, thus:
Pr(G|long, sˆ = sˆ∗) > Pr(G|long, sˆ = sˆFB) (A.32)
whereas, if p < 0.5, sˆ∗ < sˆFB, thus:
Pr(G|long, sˆ = sˆ∗) < Pr(G|long, sˆ = sˆFB) (A.33)
Part four: This part is a direct consequence of part two and three, and in
particular, of relations (A.29) and (A.32) if p > 0.5, and (A.30) and (A.33)
for p < 0.5.
A.3.3.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Part one: In this part we show that if p > 0.5 (p < 0.5), an increase
(decrease) in the cost of acquiring information from c to c′ increases (de-
creases) the optimal threshold from sˆ∗ to sˆ′∗. Similar intuition applies for
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the case where p < 0.5. First, we explore the case where the cost of ac-
quiring information is c. Given that the principal chooses sˆ∗, it must be
the case that his expected profit of implementing sˆ′∗ is not higher than the
expected profit of implementing sˆ∗, i.e.,
EΠ(sˆ′∗) ≤ EΠ(sˆ∗) =⇒
ER(sˆ′∗)−ER(sˆ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
DR
≤ EC′(sˆ′∗)−EC′(sˆ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
DC′
(A.34)
where EC′(.) denotes the expected compensation before the increase in the
cost of acquiring information, and ER(.) denotes the expected portfolio
revenue.
Second, we explore the case where the cost of acquiring information
is c′ > c. Given that the principal chooses sˆ′∗, it must be the case that his
expected profit of implementing sˆ′∗ is higher than the expected profit of
implementing sˆ∗, i.e.,
EΠ(sˆ′∗) ≥ EΠ(sˆ∗) =⇒
ER(sˆ′∗)−ER(sˆ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
DR
≥ EC′′(sˆ′∗)−EC′′(sˆ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
DC′ ′
. (A.35)
where EC′(.) denotes the expected compensation after the increase in the
cost of acquiring information. We prove part one by the method of contra-
diction. Suppose that sˆ′∗ < sˆ∗. Then, by Lemma 2, DR > 0 and by Lemma
4, DC′ > 0 and DC > 0. Relations (A.34) and (A.35) are not mutually
exclusive as long as:
DC ≥ DR ≥ DC′ =⇒
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EC′(sˆ′∗)−EC′(sˆ∗) ≥ EC′′(sˆ′∗)−EC′′(sˆ∗). (A.36)
Notice that (A.36) never holds because by EC(sˆ) is convex in sˆ and lin-
early dependent on the cost of acquiring information (Lemma 3). Thus,
an increase in c leads to a steeper-sloped U-shape of EC(sˆ). As a result,
(A.34) and (A.35) are mutually exclusive, hence, the the initial hypothesis
that sˆ′∗ < sˆ∗ is not valid. Thus, sˆ′∗ > sˆ∗.
Part two: Part one implies that as c increases, sˆ∗ moves towards sˆmin. Recall
that sˆFB is not related to c. Thus, the bias |sˆ∗ − sˆFB| is increasing in c.
Part three and four: Part three and four are a direct implication of part one.
The proof of part three and four is similar to the proof of part two and
three of Corollary 2.
Part five: The expected precision is denoted as Φ(sˆ), where:
Φ(sˆ) = Pr(short|sˆ)Pr(B|short) + Pr(long|sˆ)Pr(G|long)
= FB(sˆ)(1− p) + (1− FG(sˆ))p (A.37)
Recall that the expected portfolio return is given by:
ER(sˆ) = e{p(1− 2FG(sˆ)) + (1− p)(2FB(sˆ)− 1)}.
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Thus, an increase in c increases the bias |sˆ∗ − sˆFB|, which corresponds to
lower ER(sˆ) and Φ(sˆ).
A.3.3.10 Proof of Proposition 6
Part one: Note that EC(sˆ) is not a function of p. Thus, only ER(sˆ) is af-
fected by a change in p. Lemma A.3 explores the impact of a change in p
on ER(sˆ).
Lemma A.3: Relationship between p and ER(sˆ).
(i) ∂ER(sˆ)∂sˆ is decreasing in p.
(ii) ∂
2ER(sˆ)




= 2e{−p fG(sˆ) + (1− p) fB(sˆ)} < 0
∂( ∂ER(sˆ)∂sˆ )
∂p
= 2e{− fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)} < 0
since both fG(sˆ) and fB(sˆ) are positive.
∂2ER(sˆ)
∂sˆ2
= 2e{−p( f ′G(sˆ) + f ′B(sˆ)) + f ′B(sˆ)}




Coming back to the proof of the first part of Proposition 6, we denote
∂ER(sˆ)
∂sˆ as EMR(sˆ), and
∂EC(sˆ)
∂sˆ as EMC(sˆ). Given that EMR(sˆ) decreases
in p, the intersection of EMR(sˆ) with EMC(sˆ), which defines the equilib-
rium value sˆ∗, moves towards lower values of sˆ as p increases.






ER(sˆ, p = 0.6)
ER(sˆ, p = 0.8)
EC(sˆ)
Figure A.3. Impact of more extreme prior beliefs
Part two: From Proposition 4, we know that if p > 0.5, sˆFB < sˆ∗ ≤ sˆmin.
For those values of sˆ∗, and conditional on a linear signaling structure, the
following four properties hold: i) EMR(sˆ) is linear in sˆ ∈ [0, 1], ii) the
slope of EMR(sˆ) is independent of p iii) EMR(sˆ) is negative for sˆ > sˆFB
and positive otherwise, iv) EMC(sˆ) is increasing, and v) concave for sˆ ∈
[0, sˆmin] . These properties are captured in the Figure ??, where the blue and
red line represent EMR(sˆ) before and after the increase in p, whereas the
red curve depicts the EMC(sˆ). Point A (B) denotes the first best sˆ before
(after) the increase p, whereas point A∗ (B∗) denotes the equilibrium value
of sˆ before (after) the increase p. Thus, the distance AA∗ is the bias before
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the increase in p, whereas the distance BB∗ is the bias after the increase in
p. Given that the aforementioned properties hold, it is always the case that
the distance BB∗ is greater than the distance AA∗.
A more intuitive approach is that for a given deviation η from the
first best, the drop in ER(sˆ), is independent of the value of sˆFB, thus the
value of p, whereas the drop in EC(sˆ) is decreasing in p. Hence, the
incentive to deviate is stronger, the lower the value of p is.
A.3.4 Imperfect State Realization Case
A.3.4.1 Proof of Lemma 1B (Monotonic investment rule)
The expected profit of the equity holder when the manager goes short or
long, given that the latter observes a signal s, is given by:
EΠ[short|s] =
Pr(G|s)(−e− wSgqG − wSb(1− qG)) + Pr(B|s)(e− wSb(1− qB)− wSgqB)
EΠ[long|s] =
Pr(G|s)(e− wLgqG − wLb(1− qB)) + Pr(B|s)(−e− wLgqB − wLb(1− qB))
given that Pr(B|s) = 1− Pr(G|s), we can rearrange the previous relations
as:
EΠ[short|s] =
(−2e− wSg(qG − qB) + wSb(qG − qB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AS




(2e− wLg(qG − qB) + wLb(qG − qB))︸ ︷︷ ︸
AL
Pr(G|s) + (−e− wLb(1− qB)− wLgqB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BL
Suppose now that for s = s′ the principal prefers the agent to go long.
Then, it must hold:
EΠ[long|s′] ≥ EΠ[short|s′] =⇒
ALPr(G|s′) + BL ≥ ASPr(G|s′) + BS (A.39)
where,
AL − AS = 4e− wLg(qG − qB) + wLb(qG − qB) + wSg(qG − qB)− wSb(qG − qB)
BS − BL = 2e− wSb(1− qB) + wLb(1− qB)− wSgqB + wLgqB
(A.40)
A useful remark is that the principal’s net gain of taking the right position
over taking the wrong position is 2e.2 Hence, the maximum value that a
payment can reach is 2e. A payment higher than 2e would imply negative
profits for the principal, as a result, the principal would not find profitable
to incentivize the agent to acquire information. This remark implies that
even in the extreme case where wLb and wLg reach their minimum value
and wSb and wSg reach their maximum values, BS − BL is positive. Hence,
under the optimal contract, BS− BL, is always positive. Following the same
2If the realized state is good and the manager goes long, equity holder’s net return
is PG1 − P0 = e. In contrast, if the manager goes short, equity holder’s net return is
−PG1 + P0 = −e. Likewise, ff the realized state is bad and the manager goes short, equity
holder’s net return is −PB1 + P0 = e. In contrast, if the manager goes long, equity holder’s
net return is PB1 − P0 = −e. Thus, independently of the state of the world, the net benefit
of taking the right over the wrong position is 2e.
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intuition, it can be shown that AL − AS is also positive. Thus, (A.39) can
be expressed as:
AL − AS ≥ BS − BLPr(G|s) . (A.41)
Besides, given that Pr(G|s) is increasing in s, if relation (A.41) holds for
s = s′, then it also holds for any s ≥ s′, i.e., EΠ[long|s′]−EΠ[short|s′] is
increasing in s. Also, by MLRP, there exists a unique s, denoted as sˆ, such
as (A.41) binds. Thus, the decision rule that the equity holder prefers the
manager to implement, is such as the latter goes short for s ≤ sˆ and long
otherwise.
A.3.4.2 Proposition 1B: Minimization Problem when state imperfectly
observed
Constraints for implementing DR
Similarly to the analysis of section 1.4.2, the manager implements DR
as long as his preferences are aligned with the preferences of the equity
holder. This alignment pins down to the following three conditions, which
are the analogue of (1.3), (1.4)and (1.5) in the benchmark model.
DG = wLg − wSg ≥ 0 (A.42)
DB = wSb − wLb ≥ 0 (A.43)
Pr(g|sˆ)[wLg − wSg] = Pr(b|sˆ)[wSb − wLb] (A.44)
Information acquisition constraints
When the manager does not acquire information, his utility of going long
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and short is given by:
EV[long] = {pqG + (1− p)qB}wLg + {p(1− qG) + (1− p)(1− qB)}wLb
EV[short] = {pqG + (1− p)qB}wSg + {p(1− qG) + (1− p)(1− qB)}wSb
Hence, the manager’s expected utility if no information is acquired is given
by:
EV[no signal] = max{EV[long],EV[short]}
The manager’s expected utility of acquiring information, given a threshold




EC[short|s] f (s)ds +
∫ 1
sˆ
EC[long|s] f (s)ds− c. (A.45)
where the expected compensation of going long and short given a signal
realization s, is given by:
EC[long|s] = Pr(g|s)× wLg + Pr(b|s)× wLb (A.46)
EC[short|s] = Pr(g|s)× wSg + Pr(b|s)× wSb (A.47)
After substituting (A.46) and (A.47) into (A.45), and applying the Bayes
rule, we obtain:







)wSg} f (s)ds+∫ sˆ
0














)wLg} f (s)ds+∫ 1
sˆ





)wLb} f (s)ds (A.48)
which simplifies to:
EV[signal|sˆ] = −c+
{pqGFG(sˆ) + (1− p)qBFB(sˆ)}wSg+
{(1− p)(1− qB)FB(sˆ) + p(1− qG)FG(sˆ)}wSb+
{pqG(1− FG(sˆ)) + (1− p)qB(1− FB(sˆ))}wLg+
{(1− p)(1− qB)(1− FB(sˆ)) + p(1− qG)(1− FG(sˆ))}wLb (A.49)
Hence, the information acquisition constraints lead to:
EV[signal|sˆ] ≥ EV[long] =⇒
{−pqGFG(sˆ)− (1− p)qBFB(sˆ)}(wLg − wSg)+
+ {(1− p)(1− qB)FB(sˆ) + FG(sˆ)p(1− qG)}(wSb − wLb)) ≥ c (A.50)
EV[signal|sˆ] ≥ EV[short] =⇒
{pqG(1− FG(sˆ)) + (1− p)qB(1− FB(sˆ))}(wLg − wSg)+
+ {−(1− p)(1− qB)(1− FB(sˆ))− p(1− qG)(1− FG(sˆ))}(wSb − wLb) ≥ c
(A.51)
Cost Minimization Problem
Following the previous analysis, the cost minimization problem of incen-
tivizing information acquisition, given an decision rule characterized by a
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subject to (A.42), (A.43), (A.44), (A.50), (A.51), wSg ≥ 0, wSb ≥ 0, wLg ≥
0, wLb ≥ 0, where EC(sˆ) is:
EC(sˆ) =
{pqGFG(sˆ) + (1− p)qBFB(sˆ)}wSg+
{(1− p)(1− qB)FB(sˆ) + p(1− qG)FG(sˆ)}wSb+
{pqG(1− FG(sˆ)) + (1− p)qB(1− FB(sˆ))}wLg+
{(1− p)(1− qB)(1− FB(sˆ)) + p(1− qG)(1− FG(sˆ))}wLb (A.52)
A.3.4.3 Proof of Proposition 1B
Proof that w∗Sg(sˆ) = 0
Substituting constraints (A.43) and (A.42) into (A.44) implies:
DB =
{pqG fG(sˆ) + (1− p)qB fB(sˆ)}
{p(1− qG) fG(sˆ) + (1− p)(1− qB) fB(sˆ)}DG (A.53)
By substituting (A.53) into (A.50) and rearranging, we obtain:
DG ≥ fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)− fG(sˆ)p(−1+ qG)
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c (A.54)
where the RHS of (A.54) is positive, as an implication of Lemma A.2.
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Substituting (A.53) into (A.51) and rearranging, we obtain:
DG ≥ fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)− fG(sˆ)p(−1+ qB)
(−(1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ) + fB(sˆ)(1− FG(sˆ)))(1− p)p(qB − qG) c (A.55)
where the RHS of (A.55) is positive, as an implication of Lemma A.2.
The previous analysis shows that incentive constraints of the max-
imization problem are satisfied as long as DG satisfies (A.54) and (A.55).
Hence, the equity holder would never find it optimal to offer a contract
where wSg is positive, because, by decreasing wLg and wSg by the same
amount, the incentive constraints are unaffected, and the expected com-
pensation is lower.
Proof that w∗Lb(sˆ) = 0
Substituting constraints (A.43) and (A.42) into (A.44) implies:
DG =
{p(1− qG) fG(sˆ) + (1− p)(1− qB) fB(sˆ)}
{pqG fG(sˆ) + (1− p)qB fB(sˆ)} DB (A.56)
By substituting (A.56) into (A.50) and rearranging, we obtain:
DB ≥ fB(sˆ)(1− p)qB + fG(sˆ)pqG
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c (A.57)
where the RHS of (A.57) is positive, as an implication of Lemma A.2.
By substituting (A.56) into (A.51) and rearranging, we obtain:
DB ≥ fB(sˆ)(1− p)qB + fG(sˆ)pqG
( fB(sˆ)(1− FG(sˆ))− (1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c (A.58)
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where the RHS of (A.58) is positive, as an implication of Lemma A.2.
The previous analysis shows that incentive constraints of the maximization
problem are satisfied as long as DB satisfies (A.56) and (A.57). Hence, the
equity holder would never find it optimal to offer a contract where wLb is
positive, because, by decreasing both wSb and wLb by the same amount, the
incentive constraints are unaffected, and the expected payment is lower.





{(1− p)(1− qB)FB(sˆ) + FG(sˆ)p(1− qG)}wSb ≥ c (A.59)
{pqG(1− FG(sˆ)) + (1− p)qB(1− FB(sˆ))}wLg−
{(1− p)(1− qB)(1− FB(sˆ)) + p(1− qG)(1− FG(sˆ))}wSb ≥ c (A.60)
{pqG fG(sˆ) + (1− p)qB fB(sˆ)}wLg =
{p(1− qG) fG(sˆ) + (1− p)(1− qB) fB(sˆ)}wSb (A.61)
wSb ≥ 0 , wLg ≥ 0
Redundant constraints
Simple algebra implies that (A.59) is redundant by (A.60) as long as:
fG(sˆ) ≥ fB(sˆ)
which holds for s ∈ [sˆmin, 1]. Consequently, for s ∈ [0, sˆmin], (A.60) is re-
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dundant by (A.59).
Case where s ∈ [sˆmin, 1]
In this case, (A.59) becomes redundant. By substituting (A.61) into (A.60)
and rearranging, we obtain:
wLg ≥ fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(1− qB) + fG(sˆ)p(−1+ qG)((1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ) + fB(sˆ)(−1+ FG(sˆ)))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c.
Note that under the optimal contract, (A.60) binds, otherwise the equity
holder could increase his profit by decreasing wLg until (A.60) is binding.
Thus,
w∗Lg(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(1− qB) + fG(sˆ)p(−1+ qG)
((1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ) + fB(sˆ)(−1+ FG(sˆ)))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c.
The last step is to substitute w∗Lg(sˆ) into (A.61) to derive the optimal value
of w∗Sb(sˆ) which is:
w∗Sb(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)qB − fG(sˆ)pqG
( fB(sˆ)(−1+ FG(sˆ)) + fG(sˆ)(1− FB(sˆ)))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c.
Case where s ∈ [0, sˆmin]
In this case, (A.60) becomes redundant. By substituting (A.61) into (A.59)
and rearranging, we obtain:
wLg ≥ fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)− fG(sˆ)p(−1+ qG)(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c.
Note that under the optimal contract, (A.59) binds, otherwise the equity




fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)− fG(sˆ)p(−1+ qG)
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c.
The last step is to substitute w∗Lg(sˆ) into (A.61) to derive the optimal value
of w∗Sb(sˆ), which is:
w∗Sb(sˆ) =
fB(sˆ)(1− p)qB + fG(sˆ)pqG
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG) c.
A.3.4.4 Proof of Lemma 2B
Part one: The derivative of wSb(sˆ) and wLg(sˆ) with respect to sˆ (for sˆ ∈




(pqGFG(sˆ) + (1− p)qBFB(sˆ))γ1(sˆ)
(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))2
∂wLg(sˆ)
∂sˆ
= −c ((1− p)(−1+ qB)FB + p(−1+ qG)FG(sˆ))γ1(sˆ)
p(−1+ p)(qB − qG)(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))2
where γ1(sˆ) ≡ [ f ′B(sˆ) fG(sˆ) − fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ)]. Recall that qG ≥ qB. Also, we
show in Lemma A.1 that γ1 < 0. Hence, both wSb(sˆ) and wLg(sˆ) are de-
creasing in sˆ for sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin].
Part two: The derivative of wSb(sˆ) and wLg(sˆ) with respect to sˆ (for sˆ ∈




(pqG(1− FG(sˆ)) + (−1+ p)(FB(sˆ)− 1))(−γ1(sˆ))







(p(1− qG)FG(sˆ) + (−1+ p)(−1+ qB)FB(sˆ) + qb(1− p) + pqB − 1) γ1(sˆ)
p(−1+ p)(qB − qG)(−(1− FG(sˆ)) fB(sˆ) + fG(sˆ)(1− FB(sˆ)))2
(A.62)
where ∂wSb(sˆ)∂sˆ ≥, given that qG ≥ qB and γ1 < 0. Defining the sign of
∂wLg(sˆ)
∂sˆ
is less straightforward. Notice that ∂K1/∂qG < 0. Hence, in order to show
that K1 is negative, it suffices to show that K1 < 0 for the minimum value
of qG, i.e., qG = qB. Replacing qG with qB in K1 leads to negative K1, thus,
K1 < 0 for any admissible value of qG. Also, by Lemma A.1, γ1 < 0, hence,
both wSb(sˆ) and wLg(sˆ) are increasing in sˆ for sˆ ∈ [sˆmin, 1].
Part three: Part three is a direct consequence of part one and two.
Part four: We first provide the intuition behind part one, which is going
to act as a stepping stone for part four. The intuition behind part one
(and part two) builds on three remarks. First, the manager is willing to
implement sˆ, as long as:
Pr(G|sˆ)/Pr(B|sˆ) = wSb/wLg. (A.63)
Second, under the optimal contract, the manager’s expected utility when
acquiring information should be equal to his outside option of not acquir-
ing information, given by:
max{EV(not expl+ long),EV(not expl+ long)} = max{pwLg, (1− p)wSb}
175
Third, the opportunity cost of not taking the revenue-maximizing position
is wLg, when the manager goes short and the revenue-maximizing position
is long, and wSb, when the manager goes long and the right position is
short.
Given these remarks, in order to shed light on the intuition behind
part one, we explore the ramifications of a deviation in the implementation
threshold from sˆmin to sˆ′ < sˆmin.3 Suppose that p = 0.5 and that the
principal aims to implement sˆ = sˆmin. Relation (A.63) holds, as long as
wSb(sˆmin) = wLg(sˆmin). This implies that the manager’s outside option is
equal to 0.5wLg(sˆmin) and the cost in case of taking the wrong position
is wSb(sˆmin). Suppose now that the principal aims to implement a lower
threshold, sˆ′ < sˆmin, for which Pr(G|sˆ′)/Pr(B|sˆ′) < Pr(G|sˆmin)/Pr(B|sˆmin).
For relation (A.63) to be satisfied, it must be that:
wSb(sˆ′)/wLg(sˆ′) = Pr(G|sˆ′)/Pr(B|sˆ′).
Note that Pr(G|sˆ′)/Pr(B|sˆ′ < wSb(sˆmin)/wLg(sˆmin). There are four ways to
achieve this.
(i) wLg(sˆ′) > wLg(sˆmin) & wSb(sˆ′) = wSb(sˆmin): In this case, the man-
ager’s outside option improves, whereas the cost of taking the wrong
position is unaffected. Thus, the outside option now exceeds the man-
ager’s utility when he acquires information. Hence, this case is not
feasible.
(ii) wSb(sˆ′) < wSb(sˆmin) & wLg(sˆ′) = wLg(sˆmin): In this case, the man-
ager’s utility from acquiring information drops, given that the reward
3Similar intuition applies for part two.
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when the agent goes short drops, whereas the manager’s outside op-
tion is unaffected. Thus, manager’s utility when acquiring informa-
tion falls below the manager’s outside option. Hence, this case is not
feasible.
(iii) wLg(sˆ′) < wLg(sˆmin) & wSb(sˆ′) < wSb(sˆmin): This case is not feasible.
If this case were feasible, it would imply that the equity holder when
implementing sˆmin would be able to increase his profits by decreasing
both wLg(sˆmin) and wLg(sˆmin) without violating (A.63). However, such
a profitable deviation would contradict with the initial hypothesis that
wLg(sˆmin) and wLg(sˆmin) are the optimal payments.
(iv) wLg(sˆ′) > wLg(sˆmin) & wSb(sˆ′) < wSb(sˆmin): In this case, both the
manager’s outside option and the cost of taking the wrong position
increase. For wLg(sˆ′) small enough and for wSb(sˆ′) large enough, the
two opposing forces cancel each other. Hence, this is the only feasible
case.
Summarizing the previous analysis, we show that as the value of
sˆ decreases, the value of fG(sˆ)fB(sˆ) , and effectively of
Pr(g|sˆ)
Pr(b|sˆ) , decreases as well.
Hence, the equity holder, in order to incentivize the manager to take a long
position for s ∈ (sˆ, 1], should offer a high relative payment wSbwLg . This can
only happen if the equity holder increases wLg. This increase, however, im-
proves the manager’s outside option, and tempts him to go long without
acquiring costly information. Hence, in order to prevent the manager from
going long without acquiring information, the equity holder should in-
crease the opportunity cost of not taking the revenue-maximizing position,
i.e., offer a higher payment wSb.
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Following the reasoning of the previous paragraph, the convexity of
w∗Lg(sˆ) and w
∗
Sb(sˆ) can be seen in the following example. Suppose that we
start from a case where the principal implements sˆ = 0.5, and the opti-
mal payments are denoted by w∗Lg(0.5) and w
∗
Sb(0.5). Suppose now that
the equity holder aims to implement sˆ = 0.49. In order to incentivice the
manager to go long for s ∈ (0.49, 0.50), the equity holder should increase





= Pr(b|sˆ=0.49)Pr(g|sˆ=0.49) . At the same time,
the increase in wLg triggers the manager to go long without acquiring in-
formation. Thus, in order to prevent the manager from going long without
acquiring information, the equity holder should also increase wSb to w′Sb.
However, after this increase,
w′Lg
w′Sb
< Pr(b|sˆ=0.49)Pr(g|sˆ=0.49) , thus the principal should
also increase w′Lg to w
,,
Lg, which will in turn, trigger another increase in
w′Sb to w
,,
Sb and so on. Notice that each loop leads to smaller increases
in wLg and wSb because the opportunity cost of not taking the revenue-
maximizing position wSb becomes very high. This process converges to the
equilibrium, where the equilibrium payments are denoted by w∗Lg(0.49)
and w∗Sb(0.49).
Suppose now that the equity holder aims to implement sˆ = 0.48.
In order to incentivice the agent to go long for s ∈ (0.48, 0.49), the eq-







Pr(G|sˆ=0.48) . Recall that
fG(sˆ)
fB(sˆ)
, and effectively Pr(g|sˆ)Pr(b|sˆ) , is increasing in sˆ due to
the MLRP assumption. Hence, the combination of MLRP and the finding
that w∗Sb(0.49) > w
∗
Sb(0.50) implies that the increase w
+
Lg − w∗Lg(0.49) will
be higher than than the increase w′Lg − w∗Lg(0.5). This implies that the in-
centive to go long without acquiring information is stronger than before,
thus, wSb should increase significantly, which in turn, leads to a higher
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wLg, such as the equity holder has incentive to go long for s ∈ (0.48, 0.49).
Thus, the equilibrium payments should increase more when the equity
holder deviates from sˆ = 0.49 to sˆ = 0.48, compared to the deviation from
sˆ = 0.5 to sˆ = 0.49, i.e., w∗Lg(0.49) − w∗Lg(0.50) > w∗Lg(0.48) − w∗Lg(0.49),
and w∗Sb(0.49)− w∗Sb(0.50) > w∗Sb(0.48)− w∗Sb(0.49).
The last paragraphs refer to the part of Lemma 2B which explores
deviations to lower values of sˆ. Similar intuition applies for the case where
the principal considers shifting from implementing sˆ = sˆmin to implement-
ing sˆ = sˆ′′ > sˆmin.
A.3.4.5 Expected cost of implementing sˆ
Corollary 1B derives EC(sˆ) which arises from Proposition 1B. Lemma 3
extends to this setup.
Corollary 1B: Expected compensation cost of implementing sˆ, EC(sˆ)
For sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin], the expected compensation cost is given by:
EC(sˆ) ≡ EC(sˆ)− =
( fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)− p(−1+ qG) fG(sˆ))((−1+ p)qB(−1+ FB(sˆ))− pqG(−1+ FG(sˆ)))
+ ( fG(sˆ)pqG + qB(1− p) fB(sˆ))((−1+ p)(−1+ qB)FB(sˆ)− p(−1+ qG)FG(sˆ))
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− FG(sˆ) fB(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)
 c (A.64)
For sˆ ∈ [sˆmin, 1], the expected compensation cost is given by:
EC(sˆ) ≡ EC(sˆ)+ =
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
p fG(sˆ)((−1+ qG)(qB − pqB + pqG) + (1− p)(qB − qG)FB(sˆ))
+ (−1+ p) fB(sˆ)((−1+ qB)((−1+ p)qB − pqG) + p(qB − qG)FG(sˆ))
((−1+ FG(sˆ) fB(sˆ) + (1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG))
 c
(A.65)
A.3.4.6 Proof of Proposition 2B
The optimal contract consists of two parts: i) the optimal payment scheme,
given sˆ, and, ii) an optimality condition for sˆ. The first part is character-
ized in Proposition 1B. The optimality condition for sˆ, given by (1.30), is
characterized in Lemma A.4.
Lemma A.4: Optimality Conditions
For sˆ ≤ sˆmin , optimal value sˆ, sˆ∗ solves:





((−1+ p)qB − pqG)((−1+ p)(−1+ qB)FB(sˆ)− p(−1+ qG)FG(sˆ))γ1(sˆ)





For sˆ ≥ sˆmin , optimal value sˆ, sˆ∗ solves:






(1− (1− p)qB − pqG)(1− p)qB(1− FB(sˆ)) + pqG(1− FG(sˆ)))γ1(sˆ)





where γ1(sˆ) ≡ [ f ′B(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ)].
We show in Proposition 4B, that for p > 0.5 (p < 0.5), it is never
optimal to choose a threshold sˆ ∈ (sˆmin, 1] (sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin)). Hence, for p ≥ 0.5,
the optimality condition is (A.66), whereas, for p ≤ 0.5, the optimality
condition is (A.67). The combination of this observation with Lemma A.4
and Proposition 1B, leads to Proposition 2B.
A.3.4.7 Proof of Proposition 4B
Proposition 4B emerges naturally from Lemma 3B and Lemma 4. For in-
stance, if p > 0.5, we know that sˆFB < sˆmin. Also, sˆ∗ cannot belong to
[0, sˆFB] as by switching to a higher threshold the expected revenue in-
creases, and the expected cost decreases. Similarly, sˆ∗ cannot belong to
[sˆmin, 1] as by switching to a lower threshold the expected revenue in-
creases, and the expected cost decreases. Hence, sˆ∗ ∈ (sˆFB, sˆmin). A more
formal proof is provided below.





By Lemma 3B, ∂EC−(sˆ)/∂sˆ is negative, and ∂EC+(sˆ)/∂sˆ is positive. Also,
by Lemma 4, ∂ER(sˆ)/∂sˆ is positive for s < sˆFB and negative for s > sˆFB.
Hence, for p ≥ 0.5, for an equilibrium to exist it must be that ∂ER(sˆ)/∂sˆ =
EC−(sˆ)/∂sˆ. Since ∂EC−(sˆ)/∂sˆ is negative, then ∂ER(sˆ)/∂sˆ has to be neg-
ative, which is true only if s > sˆFB. Similar intuition applies for the case
where p ≤ 0.5.










Figure A.4. Bias in the investment decision
A.3.4.8 Lemma 6
Lemma 6 explores the relationship between EC(sˆ) and qG and qB.
Lemma 6: Relationship between EC(sˆ) and qG, qB.
(i) EC(sˆ) is decreasing in qG.
(ii) EC(sˆ) is increasing in qB.
(iii) ∂EC(sˆ)∂sˆ is increasing in qG for sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin) and decreasing in qG for sˆ ∈
(sˆmin, 1]
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(iv) ∂EC(sˆ)∂sˆ is decreasing in qB for sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin) and increasing in qB for sˆ ∈
(sˆmin, 1]
Proof. Part one: We explore the derivative of EC(sˆ) with respect to qG and




fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)qB + fG(sˆ)p(qB(1− qB) + p(qG − qB)2)




fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)qB + fG(sˆ)p(qB(1− qB) + p(qG − qB)2)
fG(sˆ)(1− FB(sˆ))− fB(sˆ)(1− FG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)2




− c fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)qB + fG(sˆ)p
e1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(qB + (−1+ p)q2B − 2pqBqG + pq2G)
fG(sˆ)(1− FB(sˆ))− fB(sˆ)(1− FG(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qG − qB)2




− c fB(sˆ)(−1+ p)(−1+ qB)qB + fG(sˆ)p
e1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(qB + (−1+ p)q2B − 2pqBqG + pq2G)
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− FG(sˆ) fB(sˆ))(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)2
which is positive as an implication of Lemma A.2. Note that e1 is increas-
ing in qB. Hence, it is easy to show that for the maximum feasible value of
qB, i.e., qG, e1 is negative.
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((−1+ p)(−1+ qB)qBFB(sˆ) + p(qB + (−1+ p)q2B − 2pqBqG + pq2G)FG(sˆ)))
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))2(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)2
where γ(sˆ) ≡ ( fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ) − f ′B(sˆ) fG(sˆ)). Note that the denominator is
always negative. Also, by Lemma A.1, γ(sˆ) > 0. Notice that ∂L1/∂qG > 0.
Hence, if L1 is positive for the minimum feasible value of qG, i.e. qG = qB,
then L1 is positive for any feasible value of qG, where:










(−qB + q2B + p2q2B + 2p2qBqG − p2q2G + (−1+ p)(−1+ qB)qBFB(sˆ) + p(qB + (−1+ p)q2B − 2pqBqG + pq2G)FG(sˆ))
((1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)(1− FG(sˆ)))2(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)2
(A.68)
where the denominator is always negative. Also, by Lemma A.1, γ(sˆ) > 0.
Notice that ∂L3/∂qG < 0. Hence, if L3 is negative for the minimum feasible
value of qG, i.e. qG = qB, then L3 is negative for any feasible value of qG,
where:












((−1+ p)((−1+ p)q2B − 2(−1+ p)qBqG + qG(−1+ pqG))FB(sˆ)− p(−1+ qG)qG FG(sˆ))
(FB(sˆ) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)FG(sˆ))2(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)2
where the denominator is always negative. Also, by Lemma A.1, γ(sˆ) > 0.
Notice that ∂L2/∂qB < 0. Hence, if L2 is positive for the maximum feasible
value of qB, i.e. qB = qG, then L2 is positive for any feasible value of qB,
where:











γ ≡ fB(sˆ) f ′G(sˆ)− f ′B(sˆ) fG(sˆ)) (A.70)
L4 ≡(−q2B + 2pq2B − p2q2B − qG + 2qBqG − 4pqBqG + 2p2qBqG+
2pq2G − p2q2G + (−1+ p)((−1+ p)q2B − 2(−1+ p)qBqG+
qG(−1+ pqG))FB(sˆ)− p(−1+ qG)qGFG(sˆ)) (A.71)
κ ≡ ((1− FB(sˆ)) fG(sˆ)− fB(sˆ)(1− FG(sˆ)))2(−1+ p)p(qB − qG)2 (A.72)
where the denominator is always negative. Also, by Lemma A.1, γ > 0.
Notice that ∂L4/∂qB > 0. Hence, if L4 is negative for the maximum value
185
of qB, i.e. qB = qG, then L4 is negative for any feasible value of qB, where:





A.3.4.9 Proof of Proposition 7
The proof relies on five remarks: i) the expected return of of implement-
ing sˆ, ER(sˆ), is independent of qG and qB, ii) for p > 0.5, sˆ∗ ∈ (sˆFB, sˆmin],
and for p < 0.5, sˆ∗ ∈ [sˆmin, sˆFB), iii) by Lemma 4, the expected marginal
revenue EMR(sˆ) ≡ ∂ER(sˆ)/∂sˆ is positive for sˆ < sˆFB and negative for
sˆ > sˆFB, iv) ∂EC(sˆ)∂sˆ is increasing in qG for sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin), and decreasing in qG
for sˆ ∈ (sˆmin, 1], v) ∂EC(sˆ)∂sˆ is decreasing in qB for sˆ ∈ [0, sˆmin), and increasing
in qB for sˆ ∈ (sˆmin, 1]
Part one: For p > 0.5 where sˆ∗ ∈ (sˆFB, sˆmin], an increase in qG leads to a
greater (still negative) expected marginal cost, thus the intersection with
the expected marginal revenue corresponds to lower values of sˆ. Similarly,
for p < 0.5 where sˆ∗ ∈ [sˆmin, sˆFB), an increase in qG leads to a lower (still
positive) expected marginal cost, thus the intersection with the expected
marginal revenue corresponds to for higher values of sˆ.
Part two: For p > 0.5 where sˆ∗ ∈ (sˆFB, sˆmin], an increase in qB leads to a
lower (still negative) expected marginal cost, thus the intersection with the
expected marginal corresponds to higher values of sˆ. Similarly, for p < 0.5
where sˆ∗ ∈ [sˆmin, sˆFB), an increase in qG leads to a higher (still positive)
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expected marginal cost, thus the intersection with the expected marginal
corresponds to lower values of sˆ.
Part three: Part three is a direct implication of part one and two.
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Appendix B
The Impact of Credit Rating
Agencies on Capital Markets
B.1 Optimal Security
A security, w, can be contingent on the realized value of c, and the final
output of the project (R or 0). Recall that the cost of effort is not verifiable.
An implication of lack of verifiability is that the optimal security pins down
to two relevant-in-equilibrium payments. The intuition is the following.
First, note that the entrepreneur’s limited liability implies that the payment
in the case where the output is zero, is also zero. We now consider the case
where the project succeeds. Suppose that the payment which corresponds
to the case where the project succeeds is contingent on c. Since c is non-
verifiable, the entrepreneur would always find it optimal to report the value
of cost which corresponds to the minimum payment, denoted by wmin.
This implies that, in equilibrium, the only relevant payments would be
0 if the project’s return is 0, and wmin if the return is R. In order to be
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consistent with the benchmark model, we denote wmin as (1 + r). The
previous analysis allows me to assume, without loss of generality, that
the security is contingent on the project’s outcome. Hence, the security is
associated with the following return for potential investors:
Investor’s return
 (1+ r) if project returns R0 otherwise (B.1)
In addition, following the intuition Nachman and Noe (1994), asym-
metric information regarding the entrepreneur’s type implies the HEC en-
trepreneur mimics the LEC entrepreneur, by offering the same security.
Here I deal with the uniqueness of the optimal security. Since both
HEC and LEC entrepreneurs offer the same security, the expected rev-
enue of potential investors is 1 + r times the probability of financing an
entrepreneur who exerts effort, which coincides with the probability that
c < R− (1 + r). This last point implies that the entrepreneur chooses the
value of r by taking into consideration the probability of default, such that
the investors’ zero-profit condition is satisfied. Note that depending on
the distribution of c, there could be multiple combinations of interest rate-
default probabilities that satisfy the zero-profit condition. However, the
only combination/equilibrium which survives is the one that corresponds
to the lowest value of r, denoted as r∗. This is because that equilibrium
dominates all other equilibria from the entrepreneur’s perspective.
The question that emerges is whether such securities are observed in
capital markets. Offering such securities is a method of financing similar to
debt financing; the entrepreneur issues a bond that returns min{(1+ r), V},
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where V is the firm’s value and r the interest rate. Since the entrepreneur
has no wealth other than what the project returns, the value of the firm will
be either R if effort is exerted, or 0 otherwise. Note also that if (1+ r) ≥ V
the entrepreneur would choose not to exert effort because this would lead
to negative profit. Hence, the return can only be (1 + r) if the project is
implemented (V = R), or 0 if the project is not implemented (V = 0).
B.2 Equilibrium Existence Theorem
In order to find the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium I use the
Bolzano Theorem: for two real numbers rα and rβ, rα < rβ, if G(r) is (i) a
continuous function and (ii) G(rα) , G(rβ) are of opposite signs, then there
exists an r∗ ∈ [rα, rβ] such that G(r∗) = 0.
To find the equilibrium conditions I setE[Prob(c ≤ cˆ)|Ω] ≡ Φ(cˆ(r)|Ω),
where cˆ = R − (1 + r), and I create a new function, G(r) = (1 + r)−1 −
Φ(cˆ(r)|Ω). Note that G(r) satisfies condition (i) as Φ(cˆ(r)|Ω) and (1+ r)−1
are continuous functions. To show that condition (ii) is satisfied, I set rα = 0
where the function (1+ r)−1 reaches its maximum value, 1. Note that G(0)
is non-negative as Φ(cˆ(r)|Ω, r = 0) < 1. Hence, for an equilibrium to ex-
ist it is sufficient to show that there is at least one value of r, denoted as
r˜, such that G(r˜) < 0. Figure B.1 illustrates the case where at least one
equilibrium exists, and Figure B.2 the case where there is no equilibrium
(market breakdown).
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Figure B.1. Case where market collapses.






Figure B.2. Case where market survives.
B.3 Proof of Main Propositions
B.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Part one: The case where the introduction of a CRA alleviates under-
financing of a project with positive probability refers to a state of the world
where an LEC entrepreneur is financed only if he can differentiate himself
from an HEC entrepreneur. This is true when the following conditions are
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satisfied:
λFL(cˆ(r′)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r′)) < (1+ r)−1 (B.2)
FL(r′) ≥ (1+ r)−1 (B.3)
Thus the proof of part one, pins down to showing that (B.2) and (B.3) are
not mutually exclusive. By combining (B.2) and (B.3), we obtain:
FL(cˆ(r′)) > (1+ r′)−1 > λFL(cˆ(r′)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r′)) (B.4)
Since, FL(r′) ≥ FH(r′) (due to the FOSD assumption), the is always an in-
terest rate, denoted by r′ which satisfies (B.4).
Part two: The case where the introduction of a CRA leads to under-financing
of a project with positive probability refers to a state of the world where
an HEC entrepreneur is financed only if he is pooled with an LEC en-
trepreneur. This case emerges when the following conditions are satisfied:
λFL(cˆ(r,,)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r,,))) ≥ (1+ r,,)−1 (B.5)
FL(cˆ(r,,)) < (1+ r,,)−1 (B.6)
Thus, the proof of part two pins down to showing that (B.5) and (B.6) are
not mutually exclusive. By combining (B.5) and (B.6), we obtain:
λFL(cˆ(r,,)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r,,))) > (1+ r,,)−1 > FL(cˆ(r,,)) (B.7)
Since, FL(r,,) ≥ FH(r,,) (due to the FOSD assumption), the is always an
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interest rate, denoted by r,, which satisfies (B.7).
B.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Part one: I present the case where the entrepreneur is of LEC type. Similar
intuition applies for the case where the entrepreneur is of HEC type.
Recall that when the type of the entrepreneur is known, the prob-
ability of default is 1− FL(cˆ(r)), if the entrepreneur is of LEC type, and
1 − FH(cˆ(r)), if the entrepreneur is of HEC type. Also cˆ = R − (1 + r).
Recall that an LEC entrepreneur promises 1 + r∗GR, when a CRA exists,
and 1 + r∗I I , otherwise, where r
∗
I I > r
∗
GR. Recall also that Fi(cˆ(r)) is a non-
decreasing function of cˆ. As a result, cˆGR > cˆI I . Following the previous
remarks, FL(cˆ(rGR)) > FL(cˆ(rI I)), which implies that the probability of















E[Pr(c < cˆ|GR] = FL(cˆ(r))
E[Pr(c < cˆ|BR] = FH(cˆ(r))
Figure B.3. r and s˜ with and without CRA
Part two: Suppose that we consider the ex-ante probability of success in a
regime with a CRA. If the entrepreneur is of LEC type, he receives a good
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rating, and the probability of success equals G, whereas the interest rate
equals r∗G. Similarly, if the entrepreneur is of HEC type, he receives a bad
rating, and the probability of success equals to B, whereas the interest rate
equals to r∗B. Thus, in the regime with a CRA, the expected probability of
effort equals λG + (1− λ)B, which is the linear combination of G and B.
The blue line depicts the expected probability of success, which equals C
when λ = 0.5.
Suppose now the regime without a CRA. The red line depicts the
investor’s beliefs about the probability of success as a function of r, for the
case where λ = 0.5. Note that for any value of λ, there is a non-empty set
[r∗G, r¯] where the red line lies above the blue line. This is because for r
∗
G,
the red line captures the linear combination of G and D, whereas the blue
line captures the linear combination of G with B, where B is always lower
than D. Note also that for r∗G, the green curve is above the red line, due
to its continuity. In order to show the expected probability of effort when
there is no CRA exceeds the expected probability of effort when there is a
CRA, it is sufficient to show that the green curve crosses the red line for r∗I I
smaller than r¯. This is because at the crossing point, the value of (1+ r∗I I)
−1
equals the expected probability of success when there is no CRA. We prove
that this is the case by the method of contradiction. The negative slope of
the red line implies that the only case that the green curve crosses first the
blue line and then the red line, i.e., crossing the red line for r > r¯, is if the
green curve is concave. The green curve (depicting (1 + r)−1), however, is
convex for each value of r. Thus, the green curve crosses the red line for
r∗I I smaller than r¯. Hence, the expected probability of success in a regime
without a CRA exceeds the corresponding probability in a regime with a
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CRA, i.e.,
λFL(cˆ(r∗I I)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r∗I I)) ≥ λFL(cˆ(r∗GR)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r∗BR)) (B.8)
which implies part two of the Proposition 2:
λ[1− FL(cˆ(r∗GR))] + (1− λ)[1− FH(cˆ(r∗BR))] ≥
λ[1− FL(cˆ(r∗I I))] + (1− λ)[1− FH(cˆ(r∗I I))] (B.9)
B.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that the entrepreneur exerts effort as long as c < R− (1 + rk), and




FL(cˆ(r∗GR)) if k = GR
FH(cˆ(r∗BR)) if k = BR
λFL(cˆ(r∗I I)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r∗I I)) if k = II (no CRA)
(B.10)
Part one: Part one is an implication of FOSD. The proof is rather intuitive
and is based on the fact that, for a given interest rate r, the probability of de-
fault is weakly higher for an HEC project. As F(cˆ(r)) is an non-increasing
function of cˆ and cˆ is a decreasing function of r, the curve of FL(cˆ(r)) crosses
the curve of (1+ r)−1 before the curve of FH(cˆ(r)) does, which implies that
(1 + r∗GR) < (1 + r
∗
BR). Similarly, the curve λFL(cˆ(r)) + (1 − λ)FH(cˆ(r))
crosses the curve of (1 + r)−1 on the right of the curve of FL(cˆ(r)) and on
the left of the curve of FH(cˆ(r)) does, which implies that r∗GR < r
∗




Part two: In order to show part two I use Proposition 2. From part two of
Proposition 2, I obtain:
λFL(cˆ(r∗I I)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r∗I I)) ≥ λFL(cˆ(r∗GR)) + (1− λ)FH(cˆ(r∗BR)) (B.11)
After I substitute the equilibrium conditions into equation (B.11), I obtain:
(1+ r∗I I)
−1 ≥ λ(1+ r∗GR)−1 + (1− λ)(1+ r∗BR)−1 (B.12)
which implies that:




λ(1+ r∗BR) + (1− λ)(1+ r∗GR)
(B.13)
The aim of this proof is to show that:
λ(1+ r∗GR) + (1− λ)(1+ r∗BR) ≥ (1+ r∗I I) (B.14)
In order to show that (B.14) is satisfied, it is sufficient to show that:




λ(1+ r∗BR) + (1− λ)(1+ r∗GR)
(B.15)
Hence, the goal is to show that (B.15) holds. Relation (B.15) simplifies to:
2(λ2− λ)(1+ r∗GR)(1+ r∗BR) + (1− λ)λ(1+ r∗GR)2 + (1− λ)λ(1+ r∗BR)2 ≥ 0
which simplifies further to:
(1− λ)λ[(1+ r∗GR)2 + (1+ r∗BR)2 − 2(1+ r∗GR)(1+ r∗BR)] ≥ 0
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which is satisfied as long as:
(1− λ)λ[(1+ r∗GR)− (1+ r∗BR)]2 ≥ 0 (B.16)
where (B.16) holds, given that λ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, (B.14) is satisfied.
B.3.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Following the assumption that the CRA reveals its private signal truthfully
and without cost, and given that the CRA’s precision level is captured by α,
the investors’ beliefs about the probability of success are formed as follows:
s˜ ≡
 s˜(r˜GS) = FL(cˆ(r˜GS))α+ FH(cˆ(r˜GS))(1− α) if Good Signal (GS)s˜(r˜BS) = FL(cˆ(r˜BS))(1− α) + FH(cˆ(r˜BS))α if Bad Signal (BS)
(B.17)
Given the level of precision α, the equilibrium condition for an entrepreneur




GS) = [FL(cˆ(r˜GS))α+ FH(cˆ(r˜GS))(1− α)]−1 if GS
(1+ r˜∗BS) = [FL(cˆ(r˜BS))(1− α) + FH(cˆ(r˜BS))α]−1 if BS
(B.18)
Note that since α > 0.5, if the market survives after a bad signal,
this must be also true after a good signal. The proof of proposition 4 pins
down to showing that for a given α = α˜ < 1, there is at least an interest
rate, denoted as r˜, where the following two conditions are not mutually
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exclusive.
(1+ r˜BR|α˜)−1 ≤ [FL(cˆ(r˜BS))(1− α˜) + FH(cˆ(r˜BS))α˜] (B.19)
(1+ r˜BR|α=1)−1 > FH(r˜BR|α=1) (B.20)
where (B.19) implies that for α = α˜ an HEC entrepreneur raises funds (the
market survives), and the (B.20) implies that for α = 1 (benchmark case) an
HEC entrepreneur can not raise funds (the market breaks down). Note that
(B.19) and (B.20) are not mutually excursive because FH(cˆ(r˜)) < FL(cˆ(r˜)),
for any r.
B.3.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Note that the fee is strictly positive as long as there is at least one value of
r such that:
FL(cˆ(r))|P = 0) ≥ (1+ r)−1 (B.21)
Note also that a positive fee shifts the FL(r) curve downwards, thus, (B.21)
is the sufficient condition for an equilibrium to exist. The fee is zero if
for any r but r∗, FL(cˆ(r)|P = 0) < (1 + r)−1 and for r = r∗, FL(cˆ(r∗)|P =
0) ≥ (1 + r∗)−1. Observe that these two conditions reflect the minimum
value of FL(.) for which the market does not collapse, which is unaffected
by the profit-maximizing assumption due to the non-positive fee. Hence,
allowing a CRA to charge a fee does not affect financing opportunities.
The proof of proposition 6 relies on the remarks that cˆL is an de-
creasing function of Pmax, and FL(cˆ(r)) is a non-decreasing function of cˆL.
Hence, FL(cˆ(r)|P = Pmax) ≤ FL(cˆ(r)|P = 0), and the equilibrium interest
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rate given by (1+ r∗)−1 = FL(cˆ(r∗)), will be higher if the CRA charges the
profit maximizing fee.
B.4 Case where the entrepreneur observes a sig-
nal about the realized cost
The aim of this section is to show that the benchmark setting is qualita-
tively similar to a setup where the entrepreneur observes an informative
signal about the cost, rather than its realized value. For mathematical con-
venience, and without loss of generality, I assume that this signal is unbi-
ased:
σc = c + e
where e ∼ N(0, σ2e ). This interpretation implies that if the realized signal
is σ′c, then Bayesian updating results in E[c|σc = σ′c] = σ′c.
I first deal with the implications on the entrepreneur’s problem. Re-
call that exerting effort is profitable as long as c ≤ R− (1 + r). Since the
entrepreneur observes σc and not c, his critical condition for exerting effort
will depend on σc (rather than c). Thus, the entrepreneur exerts effort as
long as E[c|σc] ≤ R− (1+ r), which is true if σc ≤ R− (1+ r). Hence the
effort threshold cˆ ≡ R− (1+ r) switches to σˆc ≡ R− (1+ r).
I now deal with the implications on the investors’ problem. Recall
that investors’ beliefs about the probability of an entrepreneur exerting ef-
fort determine (1 + r). Following the analysis of the previous paragraph,
the investors’ beliefs about that probability equals E[Prob(σc ≤ σˆc)|Ω],
instead of E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ)|Ω], where Ω is investor’s information set. Ob-
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serve that even though cˆ = σˆc, in general E[Prob(σc ≤ σˆc)|Ω] differs from
E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ)|Ω]. In order to show that the two models are identical, it
is sufficient to show that there exists a unique ˆˆσc such that E[Prob(σc ≤
ˆˆσc)|Ω] = E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ)|Ω]. If this is the case, then replacing cˆ with ˆˆσc gen-
erates the same model. Hence, the whole exercise pins down to showing
that there exists a ˆˆσc which satisfies the aforementioned property exists.
The proof of that is straightforward. Since the cumulative distri-
bution function of σc and c is a continuous and strictly increasing func-
tion, then for each (1 + r) there is a unique cˆ associated to the value
E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ)|Ω]. In addition, for each value of E[Prob(s ≤ ˆˆs)|Ω], there is
a unique ˆˆσc associated with it. Hence, there exists a unique ˆˆσc for which
E[Prob(σc ≤ ˆˆσc)|Ω] = E[Prob(c ≤ cˆ)Ω].
B.5 Uniform Distribution Example
In this section, I assume that the cost of effort is uniformly distributed
with cL ∼ U[αc¯, βc¯] and cH ∼ U[γc¯, δc¯]. The analysis is meaningful only
if the probability of default is strictly positive. The probability of default
is zero if effort is exerted for any feasible value of c. Thus, the probability
of default is always positive as long as c¯ > R − 1. Additionally, I keep
the assumption that the implied expected rate of return of both types is
non-negative, i.e., R−1−E[ci]1+E[ci] ≥ 0. In order to satisfy these two conditions
and simplify calculations, I set α = 0 and β = δ = 1. The parameter
γ captures the efficiency level of the HEC type compare to the efficiency
level of the LEC type; as γ approaches 1, the efficiency level of the HEC
type approaches the efficiency level of the LEC type.
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B.5.1 Regime without a CRA
After I incorporate the entrepreneur’s problem, investors’ beliefs are given
by:
s˜I I ≡ λs˜L +(1−λ)s˜H = λR− (1+ rI I)c¯ +(1−λ)
R− (1+ rI I)− γc¯
c¯(1− γ) (B.22)
Substituting s˜I I into the investors’s zero profit condition, the equilibrium
interest rate, r¯∗I I , is given by:
1+ r∗I I = (B.23)
[(1− λγ)(R)− γc¯(1− λ)]−√[(1− λγ)(R)− γc¯(1− λ)]2 − 4(1− λγ)(1− γ)c¯
2(1− λγ)
It can be shown that the probability λ and the return (R) of the project
is positively related to the probability of market survival. In contrast, the
cost of effort is negatively related to the probability of market survival. For
this set of distributions, the equilibrium condition is quadratic in r. In the
case where the equation has two distinct roots, the smallest root is the one
which maximizes entrepreneur’s profits.
B.5.2 Regime with a non-profit maximizer CRA




c¯ if Good Rating
s˜BR =
R−(1+rBR)−γc¯
c¯(1−γ) if Bad Rating
(B.24)
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2 if Bad Rating
(B.25)
The market existence condition when an entrepreneur holds a bad rating
is (R − γc¯)2 ≥ 4c¯(1− γ). Similarly, when an entrepreneur holds a good
rating, the market existence condition is given by R2 ≥ 4c¯. When these
conditions are satisfied, the introduction of CRA leads to inferior results,
as it does not improve financing opportunities and it increases the expected
default probability.
An interesting case is when an HEC entrepreneur is not efficient
enough to prevent market breakdown, but he can raise capital if he is
pooled with an LEC entrepreneur. This is because the emerging interest
rate is smaller, and the condition which prevents market breakdown is
less restrictive ( [(1−λγ)R−γc¯(1−λ)]
2
(1−λγ) ≥ 4c¯(1 − γ) > (R − γc¯)2). Without a
CRA both types are financed. In contrast, in the regime with a CRA, this
pooling is prevented, and only an LEC entrepreneur is financed. Hence,
the introduction of a CRA leads to under-financing of an entrepreneur with
positive expected net return.
Lastly, when an LEC entrepreneur can be financed only if they can
be distinguished from an HEC entrepreneur ( [(1−λγ)R−γc¯(1−λ)]
2
(1−λγ)(1−γ) < 4c¯ ≤ R2),
then without a CRA, the market collapses and neither an LEC nor an HEC
entrepreneur is financed. Thus, the introduction of a CRA prevents the
market of an LEC entrepreneur from collapsing, alleviating the problem of
under-financing.
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B.5.3 Regime with a profit-maximizer CRA
Investors observe the rating and whether a rating is necessary for financing
([(1−λγ)R−γc¯(1−λ)]2 ≥ 4(1−λγ)(1−γ)c¯), and they form their beliefs





c¯ If GR & rating not necessary
s˜G¯R =
R−(1+r¯R)(1+P¯max)
c¯ If GR & rating necessary
s˜NR =
R−(1+rNR)
c¯ If No Rating
(B.26)
The combination of the CRA’s, the entrepreneur’s and the investors’ prob-
lem, determine the equilibrium interest rates r∗R and r
∗
NR for an entrepreneur






R−(1+r∗I I) if rating not necessary
(1+ r¯∗R) = 2 if rating necessary
(B.27)
(1+ r∗NR) =
(R− γc¯)−√(R− γc¯)2 − 4c¯(1− γ)
2
(B.28)
As Proposition 6 indicates, the market existence conditions are unaffected
by the profit maximizing assumption.
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Appendix C
Security Design with Endogenous
Implementation Choice
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Conditional that the market survives, i.e., λG > λminG ≡ I−[pBS+(1−pB)F](pG−pB)(S−F) , the
optimal security solves the following maximization problem.
Maximize
g(S)′,g(F)′
pG(S− g(S)′) + (1− pG)(F− g(F)′) s.t.
λG[(pGg(S)′ + (1− pG)g(F)′] + λB[pBg(s)′ + (1− pB)g(F)′] = I (C.1)
0 ≤ g(S)′ ≤ S (C.2)
0 ≤ g(F)′ ≤ F (C.3)
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Optimality of g∗(F)′ = F
The investors’ participation constraint can be written as:
CS︷ ︸︸ ︷
[λG pG + λB pB] g(S)′ +
CF︷ ︸︸ ︷
[λG(1− pG) + λB(1− pB)] g(F)′ = I (C.4)
Suppose that the entrepreneur offers a security with corresponding pay-
ments g∗(F)′ = F and g∗(S)′ which solves (C.4) given that g∗(F)′ = F.
Suppose now that the entrepreneur considers switching from g∗(F)′ = F
to g(F)′′ = F − e. For the investor’s participation constraint to be satis-
fied, the payment in case of success should be not lower than g(S)′′ =
g∗(S)′ + CFCS × e. This deviation is profitable as long as its benefit, which is
given by (1− pG)× e, exceeds its cost, which is given by pG × CFCS × e. By
simple algebra, we obtain that:
(1− pG)× e > pG × CFCS × e =⇒
λB(pG − pB)
−λG pG − λB pB > 0 (C.5)
where (C.5) is never satisfied because pG > pB. Hence, under the optimal
security g∗(F) reaches its maximum value, i.e. g∗(F) = F. By substituting
g∗(F)′ = F into (C.1) and rearranging, we obtain:
g∗(S)′ = I − F
λG pG + λB pB
+ F
Intuitive Criterion
Suppose the security which characterized in the previous analysis, g∗, i.e.,
g∗(S) = I−FλG pG+λB pB + F, g
∗(F) = F. Let us allow for an alternative security
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g′, where its corresponding payments are denoted as g(S)′ and g(F)′. For
security g∗ not to be an equilibrium in the contracting game, it must be that
there is a deviation to security g′, which is preferred by a good type but
not by a bad type, i.e.,
EU[g′|t = G, µ] > EU[g∗|t = G, µ = λ]
EU[g′|t = B, µ] < EU[g∗|t = B, µ = λ]
which can be rearranged as:
pG(g∗(S)− g′(S)) + (1− pG)(g∗(F)− g′(F)) > 0 (C.6)
pB(g∗(S)− g′(S)) + (1− pB)(g∗(F)− g′(F)) < 0 (C.7)
Recall that pG > pB. Thus, for (C.6) and (C.7) not to be mutually exclusive,
it must be the case that g′(F) > g∗(F) and g′(S) < g∗(S). However, g′(F)
cannot exceed g∗(F), since g∗(F) reaches its maximum feasible value, i.e.,
g∗(F) = F.
C.1.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Both types are better-off as long as g∗(S) < g∗(S)′, i.e.
IλG − FλG(1− pG) + λB pBS
λG pG + λB pB
<
I − F
λG pG + λB pB
+ F =⇒
IλG − FλG(1− pG) + λB pBS < I − FλB − FλG + FλG pG + FλB pB =⇒
IλG + λB pBS < I − FλB + FλB pB =⇒
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IλG + λB[pBS + (1− pB)F] < I
which holds since, by assumption, [pBS + (1− pB)F] < I.
C.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3 - Proposition 2
The optimal security solves the following maximization problem.
Maximize
g(S),g(F),g¯
pG(S− g(S)) + (1− pG)(F− g(F)) s.t.
pG(S− g(S)) + (1− pG)(F− g(F)) ≥ I − g¯ (ICCG)
pB(S− g(S)) + (1− pB)(F− g(F))) ≤ I − g¯ (ICCB)
λG[pGg(S) + (1− pG)g(F)] + λB g¯ ≥ I (PCI)
0 ≤ g(S) ≤ S , 0 ≤ g(F) ≤ F, 0 ≤ g¯ ≤ I (LL)
Binding ICCB
First, we show that under the optimal security ICCB binds. We do this by
following the method of contradiction. Suppose that the optimal security
is given by g(S), g(F) and g¯, which satisfy PCI , ICCG and ICCB is not
binding, i.e.,
pB(S− g(S)) + (1− pB)(F− g(F))) < I − g¯
Now consider the following deviation. Suppose that we increase g¯ to
g¯′′ = g¯ + e. Then, the LHS of PCI increases, thus, PCI is still satisfied.
Also, the RHS of ICCG decreases, thus, ICCG is still satisfied. This implies
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that, as long as η ≤ λBeλg pG , there is always a deviation where we decrease
g(S) to g(S)′′ = g(S)− η, which does violate ICCG or PCI . Such deviation
would be profitable, because it would increase the expected utility of the
good type. Hence, the initial hypothesis that under the optimal security
ICCB is binding does not hold.
Optimality of g∗(F) = F
Suppose for now that ICCG is slack (we will come back to this in the end
of the proof). Given that ICCB binds, by substituting ICCB into PCI and
solving with respect to g(S), we obtain:
g∗(S) = λB(−FpB + F + pBS) + λG I
λG pG + λB pB
−
R︷ ︸︸ ︷
λG(1− pG) + λB(1− pB)
λG pG + λB pB
g∗(F)
(C.8)
Condition (C.8) implies that the entrepreneur could increase g(F) by e
and decrease g(S) by R × e, without violating PCI . Increasing g(F) by
e decreases the entrepreneur’s expected utility by (1− pG) × e, whereas
decreasing g(S) by R× e increases entrepreneur’s expected utility by pG ×
R× e. By simple algebra, we obtain that:
pG × R× e > (1− pG)× e =⇒
(λB)(pG − pB)
λG pG + λB pB
≥ 0 (C.9)
where (C.9) is always satisfied, given that pG > pB. Hence, under the opti-
mal security g∗(F) reaches its maximum value, i.e. g∗(F) = F. Substituting
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g∗(F) = F into PCI we obtain:
g∗(S) = λG(I − F(1− pG)) + λB pBS
λG pG + λB pB
Also, by substituting g∗(F) = F into ICCB we obtain:
g¯∗ = I − pB(S− g∗(S))
The last part of the proof is to explore whether ICCG is slack under the
optimal security. By substituting g∗(F) = F into ICCG, we obtain:
pG(S− g∗(S)) ≥ I − g¯∗
Recall that under the optimal contract ICCB binds, i.e.,
pB(S− g∗(S)) = I − g¯∗
Hence, given that pG > pB, under the optimal contract ICCG is redundant
by ICCB.
Intuitive Criterion
Suppose the security which characterized in the previous analysis, g∗, i.e.,
g∗(S) = λG(I−F(1−pG))+λB pBSλG pG+λB pB , g
∗(F) = F, and g¯∗ = I − pB(S− g∗(S). Let us
allow for an alternative security g′, where its corresponding payments are
denoted as g(S)′, g(F)′ and g¯′. For the security g∗ not to be an equilibrium
in the contracting game, it must be that there is a deviation to security g′
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which, is preferred by a good type but not by a bad type, i.e.,
EU[g′|t = G, µ] > EU[g∗|t = G, µ = λ] (C.10)
EU[g′|t = B, µ] < EU[g∗|t = B, µ = λ] (C.11)
which can be rearranged as:
pG(g∗(S)− g′(S)) + (1− pG)(g∗(F)− g′(F)) > 0 (C.12)
pB(g∗(S)− g′(S)) + (1− pB)(g∗(F)− g′(F)) < 0 (C.13)
Recall that pG > pB. Thus, for (C.12) and (C.13) not to be mutually exclu-
sive, it must be the case that g′(F) > g∗(F) and g′(S) < g∗(S). However,
g′(F) cannot exceed g∗(F) since g∗(F) reaches its maximum feasible value,
i.e., g∗(F) = F.
C.1.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Recall that if an interior equilibrium exists, it must satisfy the following
condition:
Φ−1(λ˜G) = (pG − pB)(S− g(S, λ˜G)) (C.14)
where λ˜G = Φ(cˆ).
If there is no value of c′ ∈ [c, c¯] for which the expected benefit,
((pG − pB)(S − g(S,Φ(c′))), exceeds c′, then, there is no interior equilib-
rium. In this case, the entrepreneur never invests in her productivity level,
and the market collapses. This case is captured in Panel A of Figure C.1.
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(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))
Φ−1(λ˜G)
Panel A







(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))
Φ−1(λ˜G)
Panel B
Figure C.1. Cases where there is no interior equilibrium.
Suppose now that there is cˆ ∈ [c, c¯) which satisfies (C.14). For cˆ
to be an interior equilibrium, investors’ beliefs should be consistent, i.e.,
for cost c′ ∈ [c, c¯) the expected benefit always exceeds c′, whereas for cost
c′′ ∈ (cˆ, c¯], the expected benefit is always below c′′. This necessary condi-
tion implies that if the expected benefit ((pG− pB)(S− g(S,Φ(c¯))) exceeds
c¯, then the entrepreneur always invests in her productivity. Hence, the
unique equilibrium in this case is for λ˜G = 1. For instance, point A in
Panel B of Figure C.1 can not be an interior equilibrium, because there is
deviation to λ˜G = 1, where the beliefs are consistent and the entrepreneur
is better-off.
C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 6 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for an interior
equilibrium to exist, for the regime where the entrepreneur is obliged to the
project implementation. The payment g∗(S, λ˜G)′ is determined in Lemma
7.
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Lemma 6: Interior equilibrium - sufficient conditions
• If there is no c ∈ [c, c¯] which satisfies:
c ≤ (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S,Φ(c))′) (C.15)
then, the unique equilibrium is for λ˜G = 0, for which the market collapses.
• If c¯ satisfies:
c¯ > (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S,Φ(c¯)′) (C.16)
then, there is a unique equilibrium is for λ˜G = 1.
• If (C.16) is violated, and there exists c ∈ [c, c¯] which satisfies (C.17), then,
the unique interior equilibrium is characterized by the maximum λ˜G ∈
(0, 1) which solves:
Φ−1(λ˜G) = (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)′) (C.17)
Given Proposition 1, the optimal security when the entrepreneur is
obliged to project implementation, given λ˜G, is captured in Lemma 7.
Lemma 7
g∗(F)′ = F , g∗(S)′ = I − F
λ˜G pG + λ˜B pB
+ F
In this regime, the entrepreneur invest in her productivity as long as:
c︸︷︷︸
cost




The methodology that we follow in order to characterize the equilibrium
conditions is identical with the methodology we followed in Lemma 5.
The proof of Lemma 6 is identical to the proof of Lemma 4. The
main difference is that the payment in case of success is defined by Lemma
7 rather than Lemma 6.
C.1.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Recall that for a interior equilibrium to exist, the solid curve, which depicts
Φ−1(λ˜G), should cross the expected benefit curve from below. Recall also
that Φ−1(λ˜G) is continuous and increasing in λ˜G. Also, by Corollary 1, and
for any given value of λG, it holds:
g∗(S, λ˜G)′ ≥ g∗(S, λ˜G)
Hence, for any given value of λ˜G ∈ [λ˜minG , 1], for the expected benefit of
investing in productivity, it holds:
(pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G)) ≤ (pG − pB)(S− g∗(S, λ˜G))
Thus, the dashed curve is always above the dotted curve. As a result, the
intersection of the solid curve with the dashed curve always corresponds
to a higher value of λ˜G than the one which corresponds to the intersection
of the solid curve with the dotted curve.
Note that for λ˜G ∈ [0, λ˜minG ), the market collapses if the entrepreneur
is obliged to project implementation. This corresponds to λ˜∗G = 0.
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